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PREFACE 
The economic transformation of the Republic of China in 
Taiwan from a semicolonial to a rapidly growing and prosperous 
economy within two decades is an accomplishment that has few 
parallels in the history of world development. Today Taiwan is 
not only a key member of the economic community of the Pacific 
Basin, but also a major trading partner of many developed 
nations and a model of development for other developing 
economies. 1 To many government administrators, scholars, and 
businessmen who maintain a keen interest in Taiwan's changing 
roles, two crucial and interrelated questions arise: How did the 
transformation occur, and will Taiwan be able to sustain its 
phenomenally high growth rate in the future? The latter question 
is especially timely because the economic security of Taiwan has 
always been highly dependent on external circumstances, and in 
recent years international developments have repeatedly turned 
against the Taiwan economy. The abrupt change in U.S. and 
Japanese policy toward Peking since 1971 was a major diplomatic 
setback to the Republic of China and generated widespread 
concern over Taiwan's economic future. In the aftermath of the 
worldwide energy crisis, Taiwan had to face strong inflationary 
pressures and mounting protectionist sentiments abroad. At this 
moment, even more diplomatic storms loom over the horizon. Will 
the Taiwan economy encounter problems so severe and intracta-
ble that high rates of growth can no longer be sustained? Clearly 
the question for the future is not independent of those for the past. 
To provide a better understanding of Taiwan's development 
experience and its economic prospects, the present volume brings 
together six essays that address various aspects of these two 
problems. 
The introduction outlines some preliminary thoughts on the 
lessons of Taiwan's development as reflected in the major 
economic challenges and Taiwan's responses. The first chapter 
presents an overview of Taiwan's growth record, the distinctive 
features of the development process, and the principal sources of 
growth. Because growth of output is only one, although an 
important, aspect of economic progress, Chapter II deals with a 
key element that is closely related to the economic welfare of the 
people, that is, the changing distribution of income in the growth 
1. For editional convenience we use the names the Republic of China, ROC, 
and Taiwan interchangeably in this study. Likewise, Communist China, the 
People's Republic of China, and PRC are used interchangeably. 
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process and its implications for future growth and political 
stability. Chapters III through V discuss three important aspects 
of Taiwan's development strategy: agricultural growth, external 
economic relations, and the development of human resources. 
Because this study is a collection of essays by different authors, 
there are inevitably some duplications and major gaps that we 
have not been able to remedy. 
Several features distinguish this study from others in the 
literature and should make it more useful to those concerned about 
Taiwan's economic future. First, the analysis is set in a 
comparative framework. The development experiences of five 
major Asian economies (South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, 
Mainland China, and India) are used as a background against 
which we observe and assess the record of Taiwan's performance. 
The selection of these economies as bases of comparison is not 
arbitrary. Although these six economies differ markedly in size, 
natural resource endowment, economic organization, extent of 
reliance on external trade, stage of economic development, and 
their strategic positions and historic heritages, it still seems fair to 
say that a high rate of growth of per capita output has been the 
most important single national goal for all these countries. It 
should be of interest to relate their economic performances to the 
different development paths they follow, the different value 
systems and institutional frameworks, or to the various con-
straints each must face. Second, special emphasis has been placed 
on noneconomic factors to underscore our basic precept that 
economic growth can best be understood if we take into account 
the political, social, and strategic factors as well as the economic. 
Finally, this study is specifically designed for the general public 
and not for professional economists. 
In the preparation of this study we are indebted to numerous 
persons for comments and suggestions regarding various parts of 
the manuscript, particularly Professors Yu-chu Hsu of National 
Cheng-chih University, Wan-yung Kuo, Kuo-shu Liang, Chien-
sheng Shih, Chun Sun, Tso-yung Wang, all of National Taiwan 
University; and Tzong-shian Yu of the Academia Sinica. We wish 
to also thank Mr. Chi-cheng Chang (Secretary General of the 
Executive Yuan), Mr. Kwang-shih Chang (Vice Minister of 
Economic Mfairs), Mr. Kan Lee (Director of the Central Bank of 
China), Ms. Carolyn Lee (The Rand Corporation), Mr. Kuo-ting Li 
(Minister without Portfolio), Mr. Shih-cheng Liu (Vice Minister of 
Economic Affairs), Mr. Y. C. Liu (Chairman of China Sea 
Products Development Corporation), Mr. Yun-suan Sun (Minister 
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of Economic Mfairs), Mr. Yien-si Tsiang (member of the Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction), Mr. M. T. Wu (Director of 
Investment and Trade Office, New York), Mr. Wan-an Yeh 
(Economic Planning Council), and Mr. Kuo-hwa Yu (Governor of 
the Central Bank of China), for their comments and stimulating 
discussions. Finally, we are grateful to Prof. Hungdah Chiu of the 
University of Maryland School of Law for his efforts in expediting 
the publication of these essays and to Ho-I and Pyng-Pyng Wu for 
their preparation of the index. 
But it is the authors, not the organizations or individuals who 
have so generously helped them, who are responsible for the views 
expressed in this study. 
Y. L. Wu K. C. YEH 
Palo Alto, California Pacific Palisades, California 
January 1, 1978 

INTRODUCTION 
YuAN-LI Wu 
To understand the course of Taiwan's economic development 
in the last 25 years, we need to bear in mind that the activities of 
individuals-including both those who make policy and the 
ordinary consumers and producers-are influenced, if not fully 
determined, by the internal and external environment they 
perceive, their objectives and priorities, and their ideological, 
cultural and historical background. It is only when we bear in 
mind the sources of these influences that we can understand why 
the ROC government in Taiwan has adopted certain policies at 
certain times, why they have refrained from doing certain other 
things, and why the population has responded in a particular 
manner and taken certain initiatives of its own. The behavior of 
private producers and consumers in Taiwan has also been 
profoundly influenced by their experience during the post-World 
War II inflation and, for a segment of the population, by life under 
Japanese rule before 1945. A combination of these circumstances 
has made possible the remarkable economic performance of 
Taiwan in the last quarter century. 
The constraint imposed by certain physical factors is obvious. 
Taiwan is an island economy with limited natural resources, with 
the exception, relatively speaking, of land resources during the 
early phase of its economic development when the population was 
much smaller than it is now. Its sustained economic development 
must therefore be predicated upon the utilization of natural 
resources located in other countries and on the creation of new 
and sometimes intangible resources. Since acquisition of foreign 
resources and their products cannot be continued in the long run 
except through imports that have to be paid for, development of 
the island can proceed indefinitely only on the basis of foreign 
trade and export promotion. Import substitution would take much 
longer before it could bring about the same degree of development, 
and it would be easier to pursue at a later stage of development. 
For the beginning, and at any rate for Taiwan, export promotion 
is a much faster and surer way of entry into sustained economic 
growth. 
Export expansion is not without its preconditions. To be able 
to export requires knowledge and availability of external markets. 
Furthermore, production must be at an adequate level and the 
economy must have sufficient capacity for expansion before 
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exports can develop on any scale. Since an abundant resource 
available on the island in the beginning was labor, the most 
natural development was the type offered by "export processing 
zones." Here foreign investors would bring in their technical 
know-how, raw material, and intermediate goods, which Taiwan 
does not possess, for processing with the aid of labor that was 
cheaper than they could hire elsewhere. Then the finished 
products were exported by the same investors who had a 
preconceived and prearranged export market to begin with. When 
the labor became less abundant and, therefore, more expensive, 
new resources had to be developed so the country could regain its 
comparative advantage for export promotion. At a later stage of 
development, which corresponds to the present time for Taiwan, 
new labor resources that are qualitatively at a more advanced 
level must be created through upgrading by education and 
training. Sustained economic growth must, in the long run, be 
predicated on the proper coordination of manpower development 
with economic policy. This leads to considerations of educational 
and manpower policy, reversal of the "brain drain", infusion of 
technology from overseas, etc., as part and parcel of the gradual 
restructuring of the economy. 
Furthermore, as the island becomes more developed and 
domestic demand increases, the domestic market will be more able 
to absorb sales of new products. At the same time, as the number 
and size of productive enterprises increases, the relative impor-
tance of intersectoral, or intermediate, demand will also increase. 
Thus the time will come, and it may already have, when a greater 
degree of import substitution in the form of producing domestical-
ly more and more goods that would provide both forward and 
backward linkages and that were previously imported can be 
profitably pursued. (Import substitution does not mean the 
exclusion of imports.) This shift in emphasis is, however, only 
relative because total exports must continue to be expanded even 
though their content will change in the direction of a larger 
percentage of goods with higher value added per unit of sales than 
before, and so will the content of total imports. 
What constituted the most likely items on Taiwan's export list 
in the beginning of the post-war period? Since the island's major 
prewar exports were sugar, rice, pineapples, and other agricultural 
products, one would expect these same primary exports to 
constitute the core of the island's exports while new exports would 
also emerge in the agricultural field. This historical factor was 
compounded by the fact that at the time of the transfer of both 
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government institutions and trained manpower from the main-
land to Taiwan in 1949, there was a sizable inflow of agricultural 
technicians and researchers who were connected with the former 
National Bureau of Agricultural Research and whose employment 
was continued through U.S. aid. At that time, overall U.S. aid to 
the ROC had been suspended with the exception of a small 
amount that was still in the pipeline. This aid enabled the 
researchers on food and agriculture to move to Taiwan and, 
fortunately for Taiwan, there happened to be a sizable pool of 
such talents that had emerged during the prewar and wartime 
development of applied agricultural research in China. Assured of 
employment, these specialists were able to apply their talents to 
work on Taiwan which increased productivity, controlled pests 
and insects, and developed agricultural extension. Fortunately 
again for Taiwan, the island's farmers had been well organized, 
disciplined, and trained while under Japanese rule, in the use and 
acceptance of new farming techniques. Communication between 
the farmers and the technicians was readily established and 
successfully maintained. This combination of circumstances, 
which one can only attribute to the vagaries of history, provided a 
favorable climate for the development of new agricultural exports 
and a general increase in farm output. 
When the ROC government moved to Taiwan, it correctly 
attributed its own defeat on the mainland partly to the Chinese 
Communist Party's successful strategem of gaining both domestic 
and foreign support by cloaking itself in the mantle of agrarian 
reform. The Nationalists, having learned this bitter lesson, were 
now ready to carry out agrarian reform in Taiwan in a way that 
they had advocated in their party platform but had never been 
able to enforce while they still ruled the mainland. The successful 
land reform of the early 1950s inevitably reduced the average size 
of farm holdings. This could have had a negative effect on 
productivity but for the offsetting influence provided by the 
agricultural researchers, as well as the stimulus of new land 
ownership to former tenant farmers. Consequently, land redistri-
bution in Taiwan was accompanied by an increase in productivity 
and by the restoration of agricultural exports and the expansion 
of new farm exports. Land reform, increasing agricultural 
production, expansion of agricultural exports and later of 
processed agricultural goods for export all combined to increase 
overall exports in the early phase of Taiwan's economic develop-
ment. Political theorists argue that one can never really expect 
any group of people in a position of authority to adopt policies 
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that are seriously detrimental to their own economic interests. 
This is not to say that individuals can never rise above personal 
considerations. However, in the case of Taiwan, the government 
that enforced the land reform program and redistributed private 
property in land came from the mainland, and members of that 
government were not landowners in Taiwan. Consequently, 
consideration of private personal interest could not have affected 
their decisionmaking, and whatever they might have done in 
other circumstances is immaterial. This historical political fact 
has also worked in favor of Taiwan's economic development. 
Still another lesson of the past that both the policymakers 
and the older members of the population have learned is the 
devastating effect of galloping inflation as well as the potential of 
an incipient inflation to get out of control. The ROC government 
on Taiwan has continuously stressed that economic stability is a 
national goal equally as important as rapid economic growth. 
During the hyperinflation on the Chinese mainland before 1949, 
the accelerating depreciation of the Chinese currency in terms of 
foreign exchange was widely regarded as an indicator of inflation 
in general and was exploited by speculators who benefited from 
instability. This explains the reluctance of the ROC authorities in 
the 1950s to adjust the official exchange rate to a more realistic 
level or to relax exchange controls until the end of that decade. By 
the time exchange and trade controls were relaxed, which 
benefited Taiwan's exports, there had been a prolonged period of 
reasonable price stability. Apparently, the body politic had by 
then recovered from the inflation psychosis of the late 1940s. One 
can always argue about the timing of the 1960-61 exchange 
reform, but these historical circumstances explain the delayed 
decision of the ROC government to adopt measures that were soon 
to prove eminently successful in promoting exports. 
It is in the same light that one should regard the current 
reluctance of the ROC government to allow the New Taiwan 
dollar to be untied from the U.S. dollar and float on its own. It 
also explains why the ROC authorities habitually resist the idea 
of either devaluing or revaluing the New Taiwan dollar against 
the U.S. dollar. There still is a lingering concern that the public 
might regard changes in the foreign exchange value of the 
currency as an indication of monetary instability. This concern 
has been magnified by the experience of the price hikes made 
necessary in early 1974 following the quadrupling of the 
international price of crude oil, which Taiwan must import. The 
oil price hike and long years of development and demand 
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expansion had finally made the raise in domestic prices inevita-
ble, and the authorities felt constrained to reemphasize their 
dedication to economic stability. 
One cannot overestimate the importance of U.S. economic 
aid-both commodities and project aid-in the stabilization of 
prices and the reconstruction and initial development of the 
economic infrastructure during the 1950s. Nor can one overesti-
mate the effect of confidence provided by the U.S. security shield 
on economic development and stabilization. Initial reluctance 
notwithstanding, in the end, the ROC government did gather 
enough courage to institute exchange reform in the beginning of 
the 1960s, and the policy was a success. Together with reconstruc-
tion and expansion of the economic infrastructure with U.S. aid, 
the exchange reform of 1960-61 and the removal of restraints on 
private business succeeded in bringing about rapid economic 
growth. Consequently, when U.S. aid was finally ended in 1965, 
this potential shock was met by a renewed upsurge of the economy 
and unprecedented expansion of exports. Confidence was now 
building up until the oil crisis again dealt Taiwan a severe 
economic blow. However, by then the Taiwan economy was able 
to demonstrate a high degree of resilience so that after a short 
recession, economic growth was resumed in the latter half of 1975, 
and new economic heights were scaled in 1976. 
The Nationalist government that established itself in Taiwan 
is obviously against the type of command economy practiced on 
the Chinese mainland. At the same time the Nationalists are not 
advocates of laissez-faire. They have tried time and again to 
intervene in the economy, to maintain economic stability, to 
promote greater equality in the distribution of income, and to 
guide economic development in the direction of agricultural 
expansion and then in industrial development-first in the 
promotion of exports and more recently in the restructuring of 
foreign trade. Fortunately, however, the ROC authorities have 
opened up the economy to private efforts and have restricted 
government economic activity to a limited area of public 
enterprise and state monopolies. They have also restricted 
government intervention primarily to the maintenance of price 
stability and the promotion of greater equity. Taiwan's economic 
progress and future, therefore, owe a great deal both to govern-
ment efforts and to the deliberate limitation of these efforts to 
certain areas. One may argue about the appropriateness of timing 
of different policies, but the authorities' ability to learn from the 
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past and their increasing readiness to face new issues and 
problems as they arise cannot be gainsaid. 
Throughout the past quarter century, the theme of national 
survival has run through all government policies. Survival in the 
long run is predicated upon economic growth, the maintenance of 
relative stability, and the good measure of general consensus 
through a widely shared sense of equitable distribution of income 
and wealth. Growth has always been a primary objective, as has 
stability. In recent times, however, more and more emphasis has 
been given to equity and to the uplifting of those segments of the 
economy and population that have lagged behind in the general 
advance of the last decades. Somehow the above approach to 
economic development has succeeded; it would seem to create a 
sufficiently broad consensus in Taiwan to have galvanized the 
private sector into a notable economic performance, some aspects 
of which are described and analyzed in the following essays. Even 
in the post-oil crisis era of widespread uncertainty, cautious 
optimism seems more than justified· in future projections for 
Taiwan. 
Chapter I 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 
KUNG-CHIA YEH 
Taiwan emerged from the Second World War a backward, 
war-tom economy. In six years, it more or less restored its prewar 
productive capacity. During the following two decades, it has 
become one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and its 
living standard has risen far above levels prevalent in most Asian 
countries. This paper examines the various macroeconomic 
dimensions of the transformation that have taken place since 
1952, and compares Taiwan's performance with those of five other 
Asian economies: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Commu-
nist China, and India. 1 The purpose is to lend a broader 
perspective to Taiwan's economic growth by comparing it with 
economies that are similar or different in resource endowment, 
organization and institutions, scale and stage of development, 
and objectives and strategy of development. 
1. This paper draws heavily on a number of excellent studies on Taiwan's 
economic development. Foremost among them are: Kuo-wei Chang (ed.), Taiwan 
ching-chi fa-tsan (Economic Development in Taiwan), Taipei: Cheng-Chung Book 
Co., 1967; Cheng-hsuing Chiu (ed.), Taiwan ho-pi yu chin-yung lun-wen-chi 
(Studies in Money and Finance in Taiwan), Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Co., 
1975; Mo-huan Hsing, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971; Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in 
Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1968; 
Shirley W. Y. Kuo, The Economic Structure of Taiwan 1952-1969, Taipei: Graduate 
Institute of Economics, National Taiwan University, 1970; Teng-hui Lee, 
Intersectoral Capital Transfer in the Economic Development of Taiwan-A Case 
Study (Ph.D. dissertation; Cornell University, 1968); Kuo-shu Liang, Foreign Trade 
and Economic Development in Taiwan 1952-67 (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1970); Douglas S. Pauuw and John C. H. Fei, The Transition in Open 
Dualistic Economics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973; Tzong-shian Yu, 
"An Econometric Model for Taiwan's Economy," Journal of the Chinese Statistical 
Association, March 1970, 2892-2909; and papers in the two conference volumes, 
Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, Taipei, 1967, and Conference on 
Population and Economic Development in Taiwan, Taipei: Institute of Economics, 
Academia Sinica, 1976, especially those by Kwoh-ting Li and Wan-an Yeh, "Public 
Policy and Economic Development on Taiwan," Conference on Economic 
Development of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan, 1967, 27-51, Kuo-shu Liang, "Trade and 
Policy in Taiwan, 1952-1965," Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, 
Taipei, Taiwan, 1967, 239-277 and; K. T. Li, The Experience of Dynamic Economic 
Growth on Taiwan, Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1976. 
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Economic performance can be measured in a number of ways 
depending on the specific criterion of performance. 2 For the 
present purpose, we have selected three basic criteria to assess the 
achievements of Taiwan's economy: growth, stability, and 
welfare.3 These are not the only, nor necessarily the ultimate goals 
of economic development, but they clearly are fundamental to 
economic progress, however defined. 
Section I focuses on the growth of total and per capita 
product, and on stability of the growth rates and domestic prices. 
Section II discusses structural changes in the economy. The level 
and pattern of private consumption are examined in Section III. 
Section IV traces the sources of rapid economic growth. A 
summary of the main findings is given in Section V. 
I. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 
Growth of Total and Per Capita Product 
The most common yardstick for evaluating economic perfor-
mance is the growth of real gross national product.4 Figure 1 
shows changes in Taiwan's GNP, population, and per capita 
product in 1952-72.5 The tremendous growth of total output since 
2. For a variety of indicators of socioeconomic change, see Irma Adelman 
and Cynthia T. Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967; United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development, 
Geneva, 1970; Nancy Baster, "Development Indicators: An Introduction," Journal 
of Development Studies, April1972, 1-20; Dudley Sears, "What are We Trying to 
Measure?" Journal of Development Studies, April 1972, 21-36; Donald McGrana-
han, "Development Indicators and Development Models," Journal of Development 
Studies, April 1972, 91-102; Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World 
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Second edition, New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1972; Milton Moss (ed.), The Measurement of 
Economic and Social Performance. Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 38, New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973. 
3. Welfare is a rather elusive concept. It is used here loosely to mean the 
quantifiable material well-being of the people. 
4. The conceptual limitations of GNP as a performance indicator have been 
extensively discussed in recent years. See especially Moss, op. cit. Nonetheless, for 
all practical purposes, GNP remains the most useful single indicator. Its 
shortcomings, of course, should be borne in mind. 
5. Data underlying this chart refer to GDP in constant 1971 prices and are 
taken from Statistical Yearbook 1975 pp. 194-195; and Monthly Bulletin, 
November 1976, p. 18. In general, there are two conceptually different measures of 
total product: gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP). 
GNP refers to total output attributable to the factors of production supplied by the 
nationals of Taiwan; GDP refers to total payments from abroad. GNP is the 
appropriate measure of its productive capacity. Furthermore, an economy is often 
1'1 _L B =n=+++--++tt-tt~ >--~-++ . - -- ·. . .... -cn-n r 
500 I : l ! I -I t I I __j I ~ G . t ~ 
. r i . -r ~-- I --: ---l----+- . - _I-. -~ . I NP,I_ 19~vcel_ -- - - ~ 
' I l . 1 ..... -f -~-t - 1 I . -. , : ~-- -- ~ 
. I i T -1 t-Il i-1'- · //1·-t-J,- -- i 400 
r I l I r _j -j l . . . . v/ p.,l ~P'I" GNI 
:mol I_ -t -~ - - ~-- -+--[ --- I I _..-Y / - --j ~J-~1 ·~.-
·- 1- 1 ,----t --t-----------f--/.7 - ---;- __ .- ¥--~--~--~----
• ' I ' ' / I I ---
1
, I : , , _.....~ .--- -- Population 
-- --- - r··--t- -- t ---:----- __..- - f--- _____ c - - -- ----f-- --t -ll=r---------=--- --
. ...-1 ---
._.......---- -- . . 
1001 ·· .~-~.:.-+ :!~=~ · ;--: · ··· -~ 1 ·1 -r -; · · -
~()() 
195~ l9b4 1956 195H 1960 196~ 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 
Figure 1. Indexes of Real GNP, Population, and GNP per Capita 
> z 
0 
<: 
M 
~ ;; 
:;] 
...... 
v.; 
14 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES 
1952 is unmistakable. By 1972, GNP rose to more than five times 
its initial level, and per capita GNP was 186 percent higher than 
in 1952. Growth was continuous throughout the period and has 
actually accelerated since the early 1960s. The oil crisis in 1973 
and its disruption of the world economy also brought a halt to 
Taiwan's growth in 1974, but since 1975 the economy has been 
turning upward again. 
Table 1. Rates of Growth of Population and 
GNP, 1952-1972t 
1952-72 1952-60 1960-65 
GNP per capita 
Republic of China 5.6 3.6 6.4 
Japan 8.5 7.2 8.8 
South Korea 4.8 2.7 3.6 
Philippines 2.7 3.1 1.6 
Communist China 3.3 3.6 2.9 
India 1.3 1.8 0 
GNPtt 
Republic of China 8.8 7.2 9.6 
Japan 9.6 8.3 9.8 
South Korea 7.2 4.9 6.4 
Philippines 5.7 6.2 5.0 
Communist China 5.6 6.0 4.7 
India 3.5 3.8 2.6 
Population 
Republic of China 3.2 3.6 3.2 
Japan 1.1 1.1 1.0 
South Korea 2.4 2.2 2.8 
Philippines 3.0 3.1 3.4 
Communist China 2.2 2.3 1.8 
India 2.2 2.0 2.6 
1965-72 
7.3 
9.5 
8.4 
2.9 
3.3 
1.8 
10.1 
10.8 
10.3 
5.6 
5.7 
3.9 
2.8 
1.3 
1.9 
2.7 
2.3 
2.1 
operating below its full capacity. For some purposes, potential GDP (or GNP) -
i.e., full employment GDP- should be used. In the present case, GNP and GDP for 
Taiwan do not differ very much and can be used interchangeably for most 
purposes. 
t The initial year for South Korea is 1953. 
tt For Republic of China, the growth rates are based on gross national product 
in constant market prices of 1966; for Japan, South Korea, and Communist China, 
gross national product in constant prices; for the Philippines and India, net 
domestic product at constant factor cost. 
Source: Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book 1974, 1975, pp. 4, 19; United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1969, New York, 1970, Vol. III, pp. 175-177; id., 1973, 1975, pp. 152-153; 
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, pp. 128-131; id., 
1973, p. 103; Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 42-43. 
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To show how fast the Taiwan economy has been growing 
compared with other countries, Table 1 presents the average rates 
of growth of GNP, population, and per capita product for Taiwan 
and five selected Asian countries in 1952-72 and three subperi-
ods.6 The year 1952 has been selected as a base point for appraisal 
mainly because by then the economies had fairly well recovered 
from the war and were entering a new phase of economic growth. 
In Taiwan, the land reform program initiated in 1951 was just 
about completed. Agricultural output had regained its prewar 
peak. The focus of U.S. aid, which began flowing in soon after the 
Korean War, now shifted from rehabilitation to expanding social 
infrastructure and agriculture. For Communist China and India, 
the year 1952 marked the period immediately before they both 
launched their first five year plans. In Korea, the war had by then 
stabilized, and rehabilitation and growth got underway soon 
afterward. The choice of 1972 as the terminal point is not a 
compelling one; indeed, a more recent year might have been 
preferred. However, it was the last year before the worldwide 
economic disruptions caused by the oil crisis in 1973 and thus 
provides a convenient vantage point from which to take stock of 
developments in the last two decades. 
The striking feature suggested by Table 1 is the rather high 
growth rate of Taiwan's per capita income of 5.6 percent per year 
since 1952, which exceeded those in all other countries except 
Japan. In particular, Taiwan's growth rate is much higher than 
those of the Philippines, Mainland China, and India. The rapid 
growth of Taiwan's per capita income is all the more remarkable 
if one notices that Taiwan's population increased very -rapidly 
6. The measures of total product for the six countries are not uniform. Some 
represent gross domestic product, others refer to gross national product. Some are 
net, others are gross of capital consumption. Some are based on constant market 
prices of a certain year, others are based on constant factor cost of another year. 
Even if uniform measures were available, international comparisons of rates of 
GNP growth would still be beset with numerous conceptual and statistical 
difficulties. For a brief discussion of these complexities, see Simon Kuznets, 
Economic Growth of Nations, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971, pp. 3-10. In 
the present case, varying degrees of statistical differences in the evaluation basis 
will undoubtedly affect the comparison. In particular, the estimates of GNP and 
population for the Chinese mainland are likely to have wider margins of error 
because of uncertainties surrounding the rather narrow statistical base, the quality 
of the data, and certain methodological issues. And, with the exception of Japan, 
all the countries were primarily agricultural economies in the 1950s and their GNP 
may well be heavily influenced by their harvests, which tend to fluctuate with the 
weather conditions. The rate of growth based on the initial and terminal years 
would therefore be rather sensitive to the harvests in these years. Nonetheless, all 
these difficulties are not likely to distort the overall picture significantly. 
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during this period. In fact, all the five developing countries in 
Table 1 had quite high rates of population growth of more than 2 
percent per year. But Taiwan's population increased the fastest, at 
an average rate of 3.2 percent per year during the last two 
decades. Yet, despite such a high rate of population growth, per 
capita income expanded at a phenomenal pace, faster than in the 
other developing countries.7 This implies, of course, that Taiwan's 
aggregate income expanded even more rapidly than those of other 
countries. In the two decades since 1952, Taiwan's real GNP rose 
at an average rate of 8.8 percent per year, second only to Japan's 
9.6 percent, and higher than those of others, which range from 
India's 3.5 percent to Korea's 7.2 percent. 
Table 1 also shows the growth rates in three subperiods: 
1952-60, 1960-65, and 1965-72. The main reasons for taking 1960 
and 1965 as intermediate time points are that there had been a 
major shift in Taiwan's developing policy around 1960 and that 
economic assistance from the U.S. terminated in 1965. It is of 
interest to examine how the economy performed after these crucial 
events took place. For other countries such a periodization might 
seem arbitrary, but it apparently introduces no serious distortion 
except perhaps in the case of India, which had a poor year in 1965. 
During these three subperiods, growth of Taiwan's per capita 
income has been accelerating. The growth rate in the 1960s was 
distinctly higher than in the 1950s. The higher growth rate since 
1965 is of particular interest, for it signifies unmistakably a 
sustained growth without external economic aid. Among the 
countries listed in Table 1, only Japan and South Korea 
experienced a similar pattern of accelerating growth. For the 
others (the Philippines, Communist China, and India) no 
acceleration occurred. In the latter case, the average growth rates 
in the second subperiod (1960-65) declined rather sharply and 
they hardly recovered to their initial levels in the third subperiod 
(1965-72). 
7. There appears to be a consensus among experts that, on balance, rapid 
population growth has a retarding effect on growth of per capita income even 
though how serious the effect is remains controversial See Study Committee of the 
Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Science, Rapid Population 
Growth - Consequences and Policy Implications, Vol. I, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 27-34. Some believe that "rapid population growth is not 
a bar, perhaps not even a hindrance to rapid rise in per capita income." Everett E. 
Hagen, The Economies of Development, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1968, pp. 
247-271. Others argue that "there are serious economic dangers arising from the 
natural tendency of population to grow too rapidly." Stephen Enke, Economics for 
Development, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963, pp. 335-355. 
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In contrast to total GNP, Taiwan's population growth has 
been declining, from 3.6 percent in the 1950s to about 3 percent in 
the 1960s, quite possibly as a result of the population control 
program. Again, no comparable downward trend can be found in 
the other countries during the same period.8 However, up to the 
early 1970s, Taiwan's population growth rate remained the 
highest, more than twice as high as Japan's. If population growth 
should continue to slow down as is likely, per capita income could 
increase even faster. 
As a result of rapid growth in the last two decades, Taiwan 
now ranks high among the Asian countries in terms of per capita 
income. Table 2 compares the per capita income of 11 Asian 
countries in U.S. dollars in 1975 prices and averages for world 
developed and developing countries.9 Taiwan's per capita income, 
U.S. $900 in 1975, is still far below that of Japan, but exceeded 
that of Malaysia and far above those of India, Communist China, 
and the Philippines. It is substantially higher than that of 
neighboring Korea, not to mention the average for the world 
developing countries. But equally clear, it still has a long way to 
catch up when compared with the developed countries. 
8. The effect of birth control on the Chinese mainland is unclear. Despite 
some reports of a sharp decline in birth rates in some localities, some 
demographers have not found the available evidence sufficiently convincing to 
conclude that the rate of population increase had indeed fallen during 1953-70. See 
John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's 
Republic of China," in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, People's 
Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, Washington, D.C., 1972, 220-:l:34. 
9. The measure of a country's product in terms of another's currency unit is 
an intricate problem. Thus, the figures shown in Table 2 are only a rough order of 
magnitude. Different estimates of GNP have been made of the different Asian 
countries based on different conversion rates, but they do not alter the ranking 
significantly. 
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Table 2. Rank of Selected Asian Countries by 
GNP Per Capita, 1975 
GNP/capita 
(in 1975 U.S.$) Rank 
World: 
Developed countries 4,445 
Developing countries 437 
Asia: 
Japan 4,358 1 
Taiwan 900 2 
Malaysia 761 3 
Republic of Korea 551 4 
Philippines 352 5 
Thailand 334 6 
Communist China 253 7 
Indonesia 215 8 
India 158 9 
Pakistan 147 10 
B).lrma 101 11 
"-" Not applicable. 
Source: U.S. Department of State, The Planetary Product in 1975, Washing· 
ton, D.C., 1977, pp. 22-27. 
Economic Stability 
Economic stability refers here to stability in the domestic 
price level and in the growth of total output with reference to a 
long-term trend. 10 Clearly, economic stability is a highly desirable 
development goal. Fluctuations in prices and output not only 
disrupt economic growth, they generally result in underutilization 
of the economic capacity and more inequitable distribution of 
income. In an important sense, economic stability is also an 
essential element in political and social stability. Has the Taiwan 
economy been able to maintain relative stability in the process of 
rapid growth? We focus first on fluctuations in its total economic 
activity. 
10. Two important aspects of economic stability (employment and balance of 
payments) have not been included in the following discussion for lack of adequate 
information for international comparison. 
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Table 3. Fluctuations in GNP, Selected Countries 
Country Period Degree of instability 
Taiwan 1952-72· 2.0 
Philippines 195Q-70 2.0 
Japan 1952-72 3.0 
India 195Q-72 3.1 
South Korea 1953-72 3.3 
Communist China 1952-72 9.5 
Eighteen free market 
economies 195Q-60 5.7 
Eight planned 
economies 195Q-60 2.7 
Sources: See note to Table 1, Staller, 1964, p. 391. 
Table 3 compares the year-to-year fluctuations in GNP for 
Taiwan and five other Asian economies in the last two decades. 
For reference, we also include the averages for 18 free market 
economies and eight planned economies in 1950-60. 11 The 
measure of the degree of instability is the antilog of the square 
root of logarithmic variance of the series Yt/Ytl, with unity 
subtracted from the antilog. 12 The value ranges from zero to 
infinity. If there were no fluctuation at all, the value would be 
zero. The higher the value, the less stable the path of growth. As 
Table 3 shows, economic growth in Taiwan has been much 
smoother than in almost any of the other five countries and the 
11. The 18 free market economies are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany (F.R.), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nether· 
lands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The 8 planned economies include: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. 
12. The method is described in Joseph D. Coppock, International Economic 
Instability, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, pp. 23-24, and has been applied to 
various countries by George J. Staller, "Fluctuations in Economic Activity: 
Planned and Free-Market Economics, 1950-1960," American Economic Review, 
June 1964, 385-395; and Yuan-li Wu, "Communist Economic Planning vs. 
Capitalism as a Model for Development," in M. M. Drachkovitch (ed.), Marxist 
Ideology in the Contemporarq World - Its Appeals and Paradoxes, Stanford: 
Hoover Institution, 1968. The index of stability equals 
antilog y ~ [log(Yt/Yt-1)-(l!N} ~log(Yt/Yt 
N 
where Yt represents GNP in constant prices in year t, and N is the number of years 
minus one. 
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Figure 2. Scatter Diagram: Growth Rate and Instability 
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averages for planned and free market economies in the 1950s. Of 
particular interest is the exceptionally high degree of instability in 
Communist China. While the European Communist economies 
were subject to wider fluctuations than those of the free market 
economies, Communist China had even greater instability in 
growth than the other planned economies. 
As noted by Wu, the Chinese Communists claim that 
fluctuations result in higher rates of growth. The implication is 
that the pace of development and smoothness of the growth path 
are tradeoffs. A rough test of this proposition is made in a scatter 
diagram relating the rates of growth to the measure of instability 
in Figure 2. If the Communist claim were empirically true, the 
data should show a positive correlation between the growth rate 
and the degree of instability. But the scatter diagram for the six 
countries indicates no such relationship. It is not clear whether a 
larger sample would yield results that corroborate the proposition. 
In any event, data for all the countries except Communist China 
suggest that both high and low rates of growth could be achieved 
with fairly low degrees of instability. Among these six countries, 
the performances of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are clearly 
better. Their growth rates are higher and their paths of growth 
have been quite smooth. That of Communist China is perhaps the 
worst. Its growth rate is considerably lower than the three best 
countries, and its economy exhibited a much higher degree of 
insta hili ty. 
Taiwan was also successful in maintaining price stability. To 
be sure, there were considerable inflationary pressures immediate-
ly after the war and following the massive evacuation from the 
mainland. However, since 1952, the implicit GDP deflator rose at 
a moderate rate of 6.8 percent per year. 13 This is well within the 
limit of 10 percent considered by some economists as the 
maximum justifiable price of rapid development. 14 The path to 
price stability has not been a smooth one. During the earlier 
period 1952-60, the inflationary rate was about 10 percent per 
year. It was not until the 1960s that it fell to about 5 percent. In 
1974-75, prices rose sharply by 34 percent, but the rate of increase 
has since declined. 
13. Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195. 
14. See A. C. Harberger, "Some Notes on Inflation," in Warner Baer and Isaac 
Kerstenetzky (eds.), Inflation and Growth in Latin America, Homewood, Illinois: 
Irwin, 1964. 
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Table 4. Average Annual Rates of Increase in Wholesale 
and Consumer Prices, Selected Countries, 1952-73 
(Percent per year) 
1952-60 1960-73 1952-73 
Wholesale prices 
Taiwan 8.8 3.4 5.4 
Japan 0.3 2.0 1.3 
S. Korea 11.8 
Philippines 0.9 8.3 5.4 
India 2.6 6.9 5.2 
Consumer prices 
Taiwan 9.7 4.0 6.1 
Japan 2.4 6.2 4.7 
S. Korea 18.9 12.2 14.7 
Philippines 0.2 3.6 2.3 
India 2.2 6.9 5.1 
Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 157, 272-273; United Nations, 
Statistical Yearbook 1960, New York: United Nations, 1960, pp. 447-448, 453-455; 
Statistical Yearbook 1966, New York: United Nations, 1967, pp. 535-537; 
Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York: United Nations, 1971, pp. 566-568. 
Table 4 compares the rates of increase of the wholesale and 
consumer price indexes in Taiwan and four other countries in 
1952-73. The comparison shows that, for the period as a whole, 
Taiwan's wholesale price and consumer price indexes rose at a 
rate faster than those of all others except Korea. Taiwan's higher 
rate of inflation than Japan's should not be surprising. The 
financial system in a developed country like Japan is apparently 
more efficient in mobilizing and economizing the use of money in 
the face of inflation, and the degree of mobility of re,sources is 
likely to be higher so that the response of output to price changes 
might well be faster and more flexible. 15 The higher inflationary 
rates in Taiwan than in other developing countries seem to 
suggest that Taiwan had been less successful than others in 
controlling inflation. This is clearly true of the period 1952-60. 
Wholesale and consumer prices in Taiwan rose at a rate many 
times those of others, except Korea, which was still feeling the 
effects of the war. However, the picture was very much different in 
the 1960s. Although the inflation rates in Japan, the Philippines, 
15. See Harry Johnson, "Is Inflation the Inevitable Price of Rapid Develop· 
ment or a Retarding Factor in Economic Growth?" Malayan Economic Review, 
X:1, April 1966, 22-28. 
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and India were higher than in the 1950s, those in Taiwan declined 
markedly. It may be recalled that Taiwan's economic growth 
during this period (1960-72) was much faster than in 1952-60. The 
experience of Taiwan suggests that inflation need not be a 
concomitant of rapidly rising per capita income, either as an 
instrument of development policy or an inevitable outcome of 
structural change. 
The comparison in Table 4 leaves out the case of the Chinese 
mainland, mainly because data on price changes are lacking. 
Official sources claim that prices have been stable for the past 25 
years. 16 However, almost all prices are administratively set. 
Changes in demand and supply conditions generally are reflected 
in quantity changes rather than in price variations. Price stability 
under these conditions thus has a different meaning and cannot 
be easily interpreted.17 
II. PA 'ITERNS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Changes in Industrial and Employment Structure 
Economic growth is both the cause and consequence of 
changes in the industrial and employment structure. In the 
process of growth some sectors generally grow faster than others, 
and structural changes in output and employment are simply 
manifestations of the differential rates of growth of the various 
sectors during the period. At the same time, economic growth is 
largely the result of continuous shifts of resources from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors. For these reasons it is 
useful to make a brief examination of the extent and pace of 
structural changes in Taiwan. 
16. See, for example, New China's First Quarter Century, Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1975, pp. 45-50; and Kuang-hsi Peng, Why China Has No 
Inflation, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976. 
17. For a discussion of the price system, see Nai-renn Chen, Chinese Economic 
Statistics, Chicago: Aldine, 1967; Peter Schran, "China's Price Stability: Its 
Meaning and Distributive Consequences" (mimeographed), 1976. 
Table 5. Industrial Origin of Net Domestic Product, 1952-73 ~ .!>-
(Percent) 
Agriculture Industry Transportation Commerce Others 
Total Mining Manufacturing Electricity C . and onstructwn Communications 0 
0 
1952 35.7 17.9 2.1 10.8 0.6 4.4 3.8 18.7 2:3.9 z 
1953 38.0 17.6 1.7 11.2 0.7 4.0 3.4 18.4 22.6 
..., 
t:rJ 
1954 31.5 22.0 1.8 14.4 0.5 5.3 3.7 17.5 25.3 s:: 
1955 32.5 20.9 1.7 13.7 0.7 4.8 4.0 16.8 25.8 'tl 0 
1956 31.2 22.2 2.2 14.4 0.8 4.8 3.9 16.9 25.8 ~ 
1957 31.3 23.6 2.6 15.5 1.0 4.5 4.3 15.2 25.6 > ~ 
1958 31.0 23.8 2.9 15.4 1.2 4.3 4.1 15.4 25.7 >< 
1959 30.3 25.5 2.5 17.6 1.1 4.3 3.9 14.6 25.7 ~ 1960 32.5 24.7 2.3 16.7 1.3 4.4 4.1 14.4 24.3 s: 1961 31.3 24.9 2.1 16.9 1.5 4.4 4.8 14.0 25.0 z 
1962 29.0 25.7 2.5 16.9 1.8 4.5 4.6 14.5 26.2 r:n 1963 26.6 28.0 2.1 19.6 1.7 4.6 4.4 14.7 26.3 ..., 
1964 27.7 28.2 1.8 20.4 1.7 4.3 4.3 15.0 24.8 c:: t' 1965 27.0 28.2 1.9 19.9 1.8 4.6 4.8 14.9 25.1 
-1966 25.7 28.6 2.0 20.1 1.8 4.7 5.4 14.4 25.9 t:rJ rn 
1967 24.5 29.4 2.0 20.9 1.7 4.8 5.2 14.5 26.4 r:n 
1968 23.8 30.3 1.7 21.9 1.7 5.0 5.5 13.9 26.5 t:rJ ::tl 
1969 20.3 31.6 1.4 23.0 2.0 5.2 5.7 14.6 27.8 ;; 
1970 19.1 32.5 1.4 23.8 2.3 5.0 5.7 14.3 28.4 rn 
1971 17.1 34.5 1.3 25.7 2.3 5.2 5.8 14.4 28.2 
1972 16.7 35.3 ~ 1.2 26.8 2.2 5.1 6.0 14.5 27.5 
1973 15.5 37.9 1.0 29.8 2.1 5.0 5.4 15.0 26.2 
Source: Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, p. 28. 
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Table 5 shows Taiwan's net domestic product by industrial 
origin in 1952-73.18 The most striking feature of the table is the 
rise in industry's share from roughly 18 percent in the early 1950s 
to about 38 percent in 1973. The rise was accompanied by a fall in 
agriculture's share by almost the same amount, leaving the share 
of the service sector virtually unchanged over the last two 
decades. Within the industrial sector, the shares of manufacturing 
and electric power rose while those of mining and construction 
declined. The rise in manufacturing was especially marked. It 
accounted for almost the entire increase in industry's share. 
Within the service sector, the shares of transportation and 
communications and other services rose slightly while the share 
of commerce declined moderately. 
The rise in industry's share is characteristic of the process of 
economic growth. Taiwan's experience, however, is unique in 
several respects. First, the pace of industrialization is unusually 
rapid. Within a period of two decades, industry's share of net 
national product increased by 18 percentage points. By compari-
son, industry's share in Britain rose by only 11 percentage points 
over a period of 40 years during 1801-1841. In the early phase of 
Japan's development during 1878/82 to 1923/27, industry's share 
increased sharply by 22 percentage points, but it took Japan 45 
years to bring about such a drastic structural change.19 As shown 
in Table 6, the Philippines and India both experienced less rapid 
change in their industrial structures over the same period. Only 
South Korea and Communist China could match Taiwan in its 
rapid pace of industrialization. In the case of Communist China, 
undoubtedly there has been considerable industrial development. 
However, it is not clear whether and to what extent the rather 
sharp increase was due to the larger price weights attached to 
industrial growth than in other countries. In any event, Taiwan in 
the 1970s is second only to Japan in the degree of industrializa-
tion as measured by industry's share of total output, and is 
substantially ahead of South Korea, Communist China, India, 
and the Philippines. The experience of Taiwan, and for that 
matter, of South Korea, clearly demonstrates that rapid industrial-
ization is certainly feasible without having to repeat the 
prolonged process of the developed countries. 
18. Estimates are based on totals in current prices. Conceivably a rise (or fall) 
in relative agricultural prices could have exaggerated (or understated) agriculture's 
share in real terms. However, in the present case, relative prices of agricultural and 
nonagricultural products have not changed significantly enough to distort the 
picture. 
19. See Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1966, p. 88-91. 
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Table 6. Industrial Distribution of National 
Product, 1952- 71, Six Economics 
(Percent) 
Manufacturing, 
Mining, and 
Agriculture Construction Services 
Taiwan, shares in 
NNP, market prices 
1952 36 18 46 
1960 32 25 43 
1965 27 28 45 
1971 17 35 48 
Japan, shares in 
NDP, factor cost 
1952 23 31 46 
1960 15 36 48 
1965 11 36 53 
1971 6 44 49 
S. Korea, shares in 
GDP, factor cost 
1953 49 11 40 
1960 40 19 42 
1965 41 24 35 
1971 29 29 40 
Philippines, shares 
in NDP, factor cost 
1952 35 23 42 
1960 31 24 45 
1965 32 24 45 
1971 29 20 51 
India, shares in 
GDP, factor cost 
1952 49 17 33 
1960 50 21 30 
1965 46 22 31 
1971 45 27 28 
Communist China, 
shares in GNP 
1952 56 15 29 
1960 33 36 31 
1965 38 31 31 
1971 32 37 31 
Source: EPC, 1974, p. 28; United Nations, 1970, pp. 91-93; United Nations, 
1974, pp. 574-575; JEC, 1972, p. 42; JEC, 1975, pp. 42-43. 
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Second, the structural shift from agriculture to industry in 
Taiwan occurred over a period of expansion in which both 
agricultural and industrial production advanced rapidly and 
simultaneously, although at different rates. During 1952-72, 
industrial production rose at 15 percent per year. 20 But agricultu-
ral output has also been growing contin\lally at a respectable rate 
of 4.6 percent per year. This remarkable achievement can be seen 
in Fig. 3, which shows the growth rates of industrial output on the 
horizontal axis and that of agricultural output on the vertical axis 
for six countries. 21 The two perpendicular lines with Taiwan as 
the origin divide the plane into four quadrants. Any point in the 
northwest quadrant (I) indicates that the country's industrial 
growth rate is higher than that of Taiwan but its agricultural 
growth rate is lower. The southwest quadrant (II) is the worst case 
for the other countries in which both the agricultural and 
industrial growth rates are below those of Taiwan. Countries in 
the southeast quadrant (Ill) have higher agricultural growth rates 
than Taiwan, but their industrial growth rates are lower. 
Countries in the northeast quadrant (IV) have both growth rates 
higher than those of Taiwan. It can be seen that none of the five 
major Asian countries could match Taiwan's performance. The 
only country that came close is South Korea. Japan and 
Communist China did experience rapid industrial growth, but 
their agricultural growth rates are considerably lower than 
Taiwan's. For India and the Philippines, both their agricultural 
and industrial growth rates are very much below Taiwan's. The 
significance of the Taiwan experience is that rapid industrializa-
tion need not be at the expense of agricultural development, and 
indeed, the two sectors might well be closely complementary 
rather than competitive in the medium run. 
A third interesting feature in Taiwan's case is that the time 
path of the structural changes assumed the form of successively 
rising plateaus. The years 1953, 1961, and 1965 stand out as major 
20. Economic Planning Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book 1974, Taipei, 1974, p. 70. 
21. For data used to calculate rates of agricultural growth, see Statistical Data 
Book 1974, p. 51; Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook 1970, 
Rome: FAO, 1970, p. 30, and 1973, pp. 27-28. Growth rates are computed on the 
basis of averages for 1952-54 and 1970-72 to reduce the sensitivity of the index to 
single-year fluctuations. For those used to calculate industrial growth rates, see 
Statistical Data Book 1974, p. 70; JEC, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Statistical Yearbook 
1960, New York: United Nations, 1961, pp. 81-82; United Nations, Statistical 
Yearbook 1973, New York: United Nations, 1974, pp. 143-153. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Industrial and Agricultural Growth Rates 
EcoNOMic GROWTH: AN OvERVIEW 29 
benchmarks of a step function. Up to 1953, agriculture's share 
remained at about 37 percent of net domestic product. Then it 
settled at a lower level of about 31 percent during 1954-61. 
Beginning in 1962, it fell to a still lower plateau of about 27 
percent for the period 1962-65. Thereafter, it declined continu-
ously rather sharply to a low of about 16 percent by 1973. These 
benchmarks generally coincided with major changes in develop-
ment policies. 
When we turn to the structure of the labor force, a similar 
pattern emerges. As Table 7 shows, a structural shift from 
agriculture to industry has occurred in the employment structure 
as in the output structure. The share of labor force in agriculture 
dropped from 52 percent in 1952 to 30 percent in 1975, while that 
in industry rose significantly from 20 to 36 percent, and the share 
of employment in the service sector rose moderately from 28 to 35 
percent over the same period. 
Table 7. Labor Force by Industrial Sectors, 1952-75 
(Percent) 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
1952 52.1 20.2 27.7 
1955 50.3 20.9 28.8 
1960 47.2 22.0 30.8 
1965 44.1 23.1 32.8 
1970 36.7 28.3 35.0 
1975 29.9 35.5 34.6 
Source: W.Y. Kuo, "A Study of Factors Contributing to Labor Absorption in 
Taiwan, 1954-1971," Conference on Population and Economic Development in 
Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1976, p. 492. 
Changes in Expenditure Patterns 
Two broad problems concerning the pattern of expenditures 
are of interest: First, how is total output distributed among 
various end uses in Taiwan compared with other countries at their 
present stage of development? In particular, how much of the total 
output has been set aside for future growth? Second, what major 
changes since 1953 have occurred in the relative share of each 
category of final demand? 
Personal consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed investment 
Inventory change 
Exports 
Imports 
Total 
* 1970. 
Table 8. Expenditures On Gross Domestic Product, 
Six Economies, 1973 
(Percentage of GDP in current prices) 
Taiwan Japan Korea Philippines 
52 51 68 69 
15 9 10 8 
26 37 24 18 
1 3 2 2 
49 10 32 22 
-43 -10 -35 -20 
- - - -
100 100 100 100 
M. China* 
64 
10 
23 
3 
100 
t 1971. Sub-items sum up to 103 percent. Apparently there is a statistical discrepancy of -3 percent. 
Indiat 
77 
10 
16 
1 
4 
-5 
100 
Source: Taiwan -Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, p. 190. Japan, Korea, Philippines and India-
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1974, New York: United Nations, 1975, pp. 43-45. Mainland 
China- T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, "Chinese and Other Asian Economies: A Quantitative Evaluation," American Economic 
Review, May 1973, p. 221. 
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Table 8 shows the distribution of gross domestic product for 
Taiwan and five other Asian economies in 1973 in terms of six 
categories of final expenditures: personal consumption, govern-
ment consumption, capital investment (gross domestic fixed 
capital formation), inventory changes, exports, and imports.22 The 
distinctive features of resource allocation in Taiwan are the large 
share of resources devoted to growth, the substantial government 
consumption, high proportion of output entering into foreign 
trade, and the small share of personal consumption. In terms of 
the proportion of total output allocated to growth, Taiwan stands 
second only to Japan, slightly above Korea and Mainland China, 
and considerably higher than the Philippines and India. 
Government consumption in Taiwan absorbed a much larger 
share of total output than in other countries partly because of its 
fairly large expenditures on education, science, and culture,23 and 
presumably also because of a large defense burden. Taiwan is 
trying to maintain rapid growth and a sizable defense program at 
the same time, a difficult task that most other countries have been 
able to avoid. 
The extent of Taiwan's participation in external trade is 
highest among the six economies. About one-half of total output 
was exported in 1973. Its average propensity to import is also very 
high. Such high foreign trade proportions are not uncommon for 
small countries.24 South Korea and the Philippines also have 
rather high import ratios. What is unique in Taiwan's case is its 
trade surplus, about 6 percent of total GDP, whereas other 
countries had either a deficit or a much smaller surplus. 
Figure 4 shows the changing pattern of expenditures over the 
last two decades. The most striking feature is the very rapid 
increase in the share of exports from less than 10 percent in the 
1950s to 44 percent of GDP in 1973-74. The rise has been 
especially steep since the mid-1960s. Over the same period, the 
share of imports also increased but at a less rapid rate, so that the 
sizable trade deficit in the 1950s declined steadily, and finally a 
surplus appeared in the early 1970s. The increase in the share of 
22. For definitions of these concepts, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 
370-371. 
23. These expenditures accounted for 20 percent of total government current 
expenditures in FY 1973. See Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 239. 
24. By size we refer to the size of land area and population. For a discussion of 
the inverse relationship between size and foreign trade ratio, see Simon Kuznets, 
V. Capital Formation Proportions: International Comparisons for Recent Years (in 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, VIII: 4, Part II, July 1960), pp. 
14-32. 
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gross fixed capital formation was no less dramatic, from about 10 
percent in the 1950s to about 25 percent of GDP in the early 1970s. 
The marked increase was accompanied by a substantial reduction 
of the share of government consumption and a moderate decrease 
in the share of personal consumption. In sum, the shift of resource 
allocation clearly indicates that Taiwan in the last two decades 
has transformed itself from a high consumption to a high 
investment economy, and from an internally oriented to an 
externally oriented economy. 
The significant size of foreign trade in Taiwan's GDP 
indicates that rapid domestic growth has been intertwined with 
rapid growth of external trade. Two observations in this 
connection are worth noting. First, foreign trade has become 
significant only since the early 1960s. As Table 9 shows, both 
Taiwan's imports and exports grew at about the same rate as 
world imports and exports in 1952-61 so that Taiwan's share of 
world trade remained the same during this period. But in 1960-73, 
Taiwan's trade expanded much faster so that its share of the 
world's imports increased threefold and exports fivefold. The 
ratios of goods and services traded to GDP show the same trend. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Table 9. Selected Measures of Taiwan's Participation 
In Foreign Trade, 1952-73* 
(Percent) 
1952 1961 1973 
Taiwan's imports as percent 
of world imports 0.23 0.23 0.64 
Taiwan's exports as percent 
of world exports 0.16 0.15 0.78 
Ratio of imports of goods 
and services to GDP 16.0 15.7 38.0 
Ratio of exports of goods 
and services to GDP 8.7 10.8 46.0 
Ratio of imports to GDP 
plus imports 13.8 13.5 27.5 
Ratio of exports to GDP 
plus imports 7.4 9.4 33.3 
Index, physical volume 
of imports, 1952 prices 100 186.4 1,284.0 
Index, physical volume 
of exports, 1952 prices 100 168.7 2,260.3 
* Imports are valued cif, and exports fob. Lines (1) and (2) refer to imports and 
exports of commodities only, and are based on totals in current U.S. dollars. Lines 
(3) through (6) refer to imports and exports of goods and services and are based on 
totals in constant 1971 NT dollars. 
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Second, by 1973 the interdependence of foreign trade and 
economic growth reached unprecedented proportions. About 28 
percent of the total supply of resources were from abroad, and 
exports absorbed one-third of Taiwan's total resources. Conse-
quently, Taiwan's economy is now rather sensitive to the 
changing economic conditions abroad that affect its imports and 
exports. In particular, the enormous size of the export-GDP ratio 
means that the direct effect of export expansion on economic 
growth will be substantial.25 For example, in 197D-73 the high 
rate of growth of exports (29.9 percent per year) compounded by a 
large export-GDP ratio (29.2 percent in 1970) accounted for over 
70 percent of the growth of GDP during this period.26 During 
1973-74, mainly as a result of the oil crisis, exports declined and 
(involuntary) inventory rose sharply. Consequently, GDP hardly 
increased at all. 
III. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GROWTH: LEVEL 
AND PATTERN OF CONSUMPTION 
One of the principal goals of economic development is to 
increase the economic welfare of the people. Economic welfare, 
however, is hard to define. Conventional measures in terms of 
national income are only rough approximations, partly because 
many crucial aspects of welfare lie outside the scope of national 
income measurement, and partly because the national income 
estimate itself involves many intricate aggregation problems,27 
For our present purpose of a general overview, we focus on the 
levels and patterns of personal consumption as indicators of 
25. The rate of growth of GDP is a linear combination of the growth rates of 
exports and other components of GDP, with their corresponding shares in GDP in 
the base period as weights. By direct effect of exports, we refer to the rate of growth 
of exports weighted by the export-GDP ratio. For further discussion, see the 
following section. 
26. Growth of GDP over the same period was ll.8 percent per year. For data 
used, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 195. 
27. Theoretical and empirical issues surrounding the use of national income as 
a measure of economic welfare have been the subject of an extended discussion 
among economists in the past two decades. See Simon Kuznets, "National Income 
and Economic Welfare," inS. Kuznets, Economic Change, New York: Norton, 1953, 
192-215; Paul A. Samuelson, "Evaluation of Real National Income," in Kenneth J. 
Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, Illinois: 
Irwin, 1969, 402-433; Milton Ross (ed.), The Measurement of Economic and Social 
Performance, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973. Foremost 
among the difficulties of using per capita income as a measure of standard of 
living is that it fails to take into account the distribution of income among persons. 
On this problem regarding Taiwan, see Chapter II of this volume. 
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changes in the standard of living in Taiwan, bearing in mind the 
many limitations of these measures. 28 
Earlier, we observed that the proportion of private consump-
tion in gross domestic product declined moderately in the last two 
decades. The decline, however, does not signify a reduction in the 
standard of living. Both per capita income and consumption have 
been rising, and the decline only implies that per capita 
consumption increased at a lower rate than per capita income. In 
fact, a downward trend in the proportion of private consumption 
in GNP is not uncommon in the experience of the developed 
countries.29 The decline is generally accompanied by a rise in the 
share of capital formation as was the case with Taiwan. In an 
important sense, the change represents a tradeoff between current 
and future consumption. Moreover, the decline in the share of 
private consumption is compensated for to some extent by an 
increase in the share of government services to the consumers 
such as education, health, recreation, and environmental improve-
ment. For example, the share of public expenditures on education 
in GNP doubled during 1952-72.30 
The rise in the standard of living in Taiwan is clearly 
reflected in the various indicators in Table 10. Per capita 
consumption in 1973 is almost two and one-half times that in 
1952. This is a significant increase by any standard. But perhaps 
more impressive is the pace of change compared with the 
experience of other developed countries. For example, Japan 
doubled its per capita consumption between 1924-28 and 1962-64, 
a 38-year period.31 It took Taiwan less than 20 years to increase its 
per capita consumption more than twofold. 
28. The implicit assumption here is that personal consumption is the end in 
itself and not an intermediate product. As Kuznets points out, "higher consump-
tion levels may make for higher productivity of the population, either because of 
beneficial physical effects or greater training, or because of inducements toward 
more enthusiastic participation in productive activity." Simon Kuznets, Quantita-
tive Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VII. Supplement to Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, X:2, Part II, January 1962, p. 59. Nonetheless, 
it seems fair to say that personal consumption is more a goal of, rather than a 
means to, production in societies like that of Taiwan. 
29. Kuznets, 1962, op. cit., pp. 2Q-23. 
30. Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 262. 
31. Simon Kuznets, "Trends in Level and Structure of Consumption," in L. 
Klein and K. Ohkawa (eds.), Economic Growth, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1968, p. 
198. 
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Table 10. Selected Indicators of Consumption 
In Taiwan, 1952, 1961 and 1973 
1952 1961 
Per capita consumption in 1971 prices 
(1952 = 100) 100 127 
Per capita calorie intake per day 2,078 2,430 
Percent from animal products 12 11 
Index of food consumption per capita: 
Cereals, as flour 100 120 
Potatoes and other tubers 100 93 
Sugar 100 100 
Pulses, nuts and seeds 100 150 
Meat 100 93 
Milk 100 500 
Fats and oils 100 144 
Protein 100 122 
Per capita consumption of industrial 
products (1952 = 100) 
Steel 100• 2,329 
Rubber 100 423 
Energy 100b 137 
Residential use of electricity 100 192 
Index of per capita output (1952 = 100) 
Alcoholic beverages 100 134 
Cigarettes 100 117 
Cotton fabrics 100 168 
Paper 100 257 
Cement 100 247 
•1953 as base. 
h1954 as base. 
1973 
246 
2,754 
19 
117 
27 
154 
235 
172 
1,100 
289 
151 
13,480 
2,495 
327 
956 
227 
130 
349 
800 
695 
Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 79-80; Statistical Yearbook 
1975, pp. 2, 117, 168-169, 208-209; Economic Planning Council, 1976, p. 46. 
As per capita income increased, both the quantity and quality 
of the diet improved, as suggested by increases in per capita daily 
calorie intake, in the proportion of calorie intake from animal 
products, and in the substitution of meat, pulses, nuts, seeds, fats 
and oils, and milk, for such inferior products as potatoes and other 
tubers. Per capita consumption of basic industrial products (steel, 
rubber, and energy) also went up sharply. No doubt, a large 
proportion of these products went into other final uses such as 
investment and exports. But most likely private consumption also 
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rose significantly. The 856 percent increase in residential use of 
electricity was primarily the result of the rapid increase in 
consumer durables. 
Table 10 also shows indexes of per capita output of five 
industrial products related to private consumption: alcoholic 
beverages, cigarettes, cotton fabrics, paper, and cement. In all 
cases, the rise in the last two decades or so has been substantial. 
As measures of standard of living, these indexes are less 
meaningful than per capita consumption, but they do point to the 
direction if not the magnitude of improvements of the people's 
consumption standards. 
All the indicators show an acceleration in improvements in 
the 1960s compared with the 1950s. The average rate of growth of 
per capita consumption was 5.4 percent per year from 1960-62 to 
1972-74, considerably higher than the average of 3.0 percent for 
the period 1951-53 to 1960-62.32 The rapid growth was interrupted 
in 1973-74 when per capita consumption hardly increased. But 
there are indications that the upward trend resumed again in 1975 
and 1976.33 
Table 11. Distribution of Private Consumption 
Expenditures by Types Of Goods In Taiwan, 1951-74 
(Percent) 
1951-53 1960-:-62 1972-74 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Clothing and footwear 
Gross rent, fuel and power, 
furniture, furnishings, 
household equipment, and 
operations 
Medical care and health expenses 
Transportation and communications 
Recreation and entertainment 
Miscellaneous goods and services, 
including education and cultural 
services 
Total private consumption 
66.7 
3.8 
15.8 
4.4 
1.1 
2.4 
5.8 
100.0 
59.1 
4.2 
19.5 
4.6 
0.8 
2.9 
8.9 
100.0 
47.1 
5.2 
21.8 
5.6 
3.4 
4.8 
12.0 
100.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, 1976, pp. 208-209. 
32. For data used, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 2, 208-209. 
33. See Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, The Republic of China, Il:7, July 1976, 
pp. 15, 18. 
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As per capita consumption increased, the structure of 
consumption expenditures by types of goods also changed. Table 
11 shows the percentage shares of types of expenditures in total 
private consumption: (1) food, beverages, and tobacco; (2) clothing 
and footwear; (3) gross rent, fuel and power, furniture, furnish-
ings, household equipment, and operations; (4) medical care 
and health expenses; (5) transportation and communications; (6) 
recreation, entertainment, education, and cultural services; (7) 
miscellaneous goods and services. Two distinctive features of the 
trend are evident. First, the share of food in personal consumption 
declined considerably, indicating an expenditure (or income) 
elasticity of less than one.34 This change conforms with the 
experience of other countries and accords with Engel's law.35 
Second, the shares of all other categories increased. 36 Changes in 
the shares of transportation and communications, and recreation 
and other services are especially marked. Although this may seem 
unusual, it is by no means unique. The Japanese experience in 
1952-64 shows a similar pattern.37 So does the cross-section 
comparison of non-Communist countries with different levels of 
per capita income. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
level of per capita income is but one of many factors underlying 
the structural changes in Taiwan. Other socioeconomic and 
demographic changes such as urbanization, reduction in income 
inequality, interregional and international diffusion of technologi-
34. One should not confuse the elasticity of consumption of a commodity group 
with respect to total consumption expenditures with the elasticity of consumption 
of the commodity group with respect to income. The two are different concepts. The 
income elasticity of food consumption, for example, is equal to the expenditure 
elasticity of food consumption multiplied by the income elasticity of total personal 
consumption. In Taiwan's case, we have observed that the average propensity to 
consume has been declining, implying that it was greater than the marginal 
propensity; i.e., the income elasticity of consumption is less than one. If the 
expenditure elasticity of food consumption is also less than one, as in the case here, 
then one can infer that the income elasticity of food consumption is also less than 
one. However, where the expenditure elasticity of consumption of a commodity 
exceeds one, as is the case with all categories other than food in Taiwan, one 
cannot infer that income elasticity of consumption of these commodity groups is 
greater or less than one. 
35. See Kuznets, 1962, op. cit. Note that the empirical findings on structural 
change in personal consumption based on cross-section intercountry and 
intertemporal comparisons for individual countries do not always agree. The 
inverse relationship between the share of food expenditures in total expenditures 
and the level of per capita income is perhaps the most consistent result. 
36. The original data for transportation and communications for 1961 are 
apparently in error. Hence the irregular pattern. 
37. Kuznets, 1968, op. cit., p. 229. 
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cal change, consumption habits, and the size of households may 
also be significant.38 Whatever the causes of the structural 
change, such changes do indicate shifts from "necessities" (such 
as food) to "luxuries" (such as recreation, entertainment, educa-
tion, and l!ultural services), suggesting a rise in the standard of 
living. 
Consumption expenditure is one important component of the 
level of well-being of the people. There are other dimensions of 
welfare, such as the pleasantness of living environment, working 
conditions, security of income, crime rate, equity in the distribu-
tion of the tax burden and benefit, etc. A detailed examination of 
these elements is beyond the scope of this paper. We shall briefly 
review changes in three aspects of the quality of life: health, 
education, and living conditions. Changes in these elements are 
the consequences of rapid economic growth and in tum may affect 
future growth. 
One commonly used indicator of the general health of the 
population is its life expectancy at birth. Table 12 shows that the 
life expectancy of males in Taiwan increased from 56 years in 
1952 to 68 years in 1974, and females from 61 to 73 years over the 
same period. Closely associated with this change was the sharp 
drop in the crude death rate, from 9.9 to 4.8 per thousand during 
this period. How this improvement was achieved can be readily 
seen from the increases in the number of medical personnel and 
hospital beds per thousand population in 1952-74. Again it is 
clear that the change in the last decade or so was much more 
impressive than during the decade before 
38. For some in-depth studies, see Yung-san Lee, "The Effect of Population 
Growth on Consumption Patterns in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and 
Economic Development in Taiwan, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 
Taipei, 1976, pp. 487-526, and references therein. 
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Table 12. Selected Indicators of Social 
Development in Taiwan, 1952-1974 
1952 1961 1974 
Medical care and health 
Medical personnel per 10,000 population 14.5 16.4 33.8 
Physicians 6.3 6.6 9.3 
Nurses, including midwives 3.5 5.2 15.5 
Others• 4.7 4.6 9.0 
Hospital beds per 10,000 population 2.9 3.9 6.3 
Life expectancy at birth: Male (no. of years) 56.5 62.3 67.9 
Life expectancy at birth: Female (no. of years) 60.7 67.7 72.8 
Crude death rate (no. per 1,000) 9.9 6.7 4.8 
Infant mortality rate (no. per 1,000) 37.2 32.7 14.1 
Crude birth rate (no. per 1,000) 46.6 38.3 23.4 
Education 
Enrollment rate, primary education (age 6-ll)h 84.0 96.0 98.5 
Secondary education (age 12-17) 
Male 17.9 33.9 69.8 
Female 7.2 16.6 56.8 
Higher education (age 18-24) 
Male 1.5 4.0 11.8 
Female 0.2 0.9 7.1 
Public expenditures on education as % of GNP 1.7 2.4 3.0 
Living conditions 
Percent of urban population in total 47.6 50.9 63.4 
Percent of households using electricity 35.4 60.8 97.3 
Percent of households using piped water 28.8 30.8 46.1 
Radio receivers per 1,000 population 87.8C 88.8 
TV sets per 1,000 population 1.4d 60.1 
Telephone sets per 1,000 population 4.2 9.8 57.0 
Automobiles per 1,000 population 1.1 2.2 15.3 
• Includes herb physicians, dentists, assistant dentists, pharmacists, and 
assistant pharmacists. 
b Ratio of number of students to the corresponding school·age population. 
c 1962. 
d 1963. 
Source: Economic Planning Council, Social Welfare Indicators, Republic of 
China 1975, Taipei, 1976; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, 
Taipei, 1976. 
Meanwhile, the crude birth rate also declined sharply, from 
46.6 per thousand in 1952 to 23.4 per thousand in 1974. Taiwan 
began its development process in the early 1950s with substantial 
population pressure. The rapid reduction in the mortality rate 
would have intensified the pressure had not the birth rate fallen 
even more sharply. As it was, the natural rate of increase in 
population fell from 3.6 percent in 1952 to 1.9 percent in 1974. 
From a longer perspective, the almost simultaneous improvement 
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in health conditions and reduction of the crude birth rate within a 
short period is one of Taiwan's most important achievements as 
well as one of the most significant development lessons Taiwan 
could offer to other countries.39 
Development planners have rightly placed great emphasis on 
education as an investment in human capital. Nonetheless, this in 
no way diminishes the importance of intellectual enlightenment 
as a development objective in itself. But whether education is to be 
an end or means to economic growth, its tremendous development 
in Taiwan is unmistakable. By 1974, over 98 percent of the 
population aged 6-11 years are enrolled in primary schools. The 
enrollment rates for the population in age groups of 12-17 and 
18-24 have also risen severalfold. In particular, the rather sharp 
rise in secondary school students has been due to the extension of 
free schooling for ages six to nine since the late 1960s. This is 
reflected in part in the rise of the share of public expenditures on 
education in total GNP. As noted earlier, GNP has grown very 
fast in the last two decades, but public expenditures expanded 
even faster so that its share increased from 1.7 percent in 1952 to 3 
percent in 1974. 
Seven indicators of the changing living conditions are 
summarized in Table 12. The proportion of total households using 
electricity and piped water rose sharply. By 1974 about 97 percent 
of the households were using electricity. The percentage is 
substantially higher than the percentage of total population in 
urban areas, indicating that rural electrification is highly 
developed. The numbers of major consumer durables (television, 
telephones, and automobiles) per thousand population increased 
dramatically, especially since 1961, but the number of radios 
remained unchanged. In sum, all the indicators suggest substan-
tial improvements in the standard of living in the last two decades 
or so. This is not to say that there have been no disamenities 
resulting from economic growth. Indeed there are clearly discerni-
ble negative aspects, such as the pollution of air and water in 
Taipei, traffic overcrowding in the cities, and erosion of tradi-
tional cultural values, all directly or indirectly associated with 
rapid industrialization. Still, it is difficult to accept the conclusion 
that such undesirable developments have outweighed the tre-
mendous positive achievements. 
39. The problem is actually more complicated than it appears. See T. Paul 
Schultz, Evaluation of Population Policies: A Framework for Analysis and Its 
Application to Taiwan's Family Planning Program, Santa Monica: The Rand 
Corporation, R-643-AID, June 1971. 
~ 
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Table 13. Selected Indicators of Personal Consumption, 
Six Asian Economies, 1973 
0 
Mainland 0 
Taiwan Japan S. Korea Philippines China India z ~ 
t'l 
(1) Per capita income, U.S.$ 601 3,838 374 262 221 128 a= 
"0 (2) Percent of total consumption 0 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 47.1 32.4 54.6 59.3 - 61.2 ~ > Clothing and footwear 5.4 9.4 12.0 5.9 - 7.8 ~ 
Gross rent, fuel and power 17.8 14.8 8.0 10.6 8.6 ...: -
Furniture, furnishings and household > 
rJ) 
equipment 4.5 10.4 3.5 5.8 - 3.9 > Miscellaneous goods and services 25.2 33.0 21.9 18.4 - 18.5 z 
Total private consumption 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 00 (3) Nutrition ~ 
c::: Calories per capita per day 2,620 2,510 2,520 1,940 2,170 2,070 1:1 
Protein, grams per capita per day 70 79 68 47 60 52 -t'l 
(4) Education** rJ) 
Public expenditures per capita, U.S.$ 23 166 10 7 9 2 00 t'l School-age population per teacher 53 30 76 47 47 58 ~ 
-School-age population in school, 66 70 65 67 63 39 t'l 
Literacy rate 85 99 88 72 95 34 
rJ) 
(5) Health 
Public expenditures per capita, U.S.$ 17 130 1 1 2 1 
Population per physician 2,967 864 1,983 1,490 8,142 4,399 
Population per hospital bed 1,064 97 1,723 776 1,000 1,980 
Infant mortality, no. per 1,000 18 12 60 78 55 139 ... 
Life expectancy at birth 69 73 61 58 62 50 
(6) Other indicators 
Sugar consumption per capita, kgt 19.6 30.4 6.5 20.5 4.8 6.5 
Newsprint consumption per capita, kgt 2.0 20.2 4.8 1.5 0.9 0.3 
Energy consumption per capita, kgt 1,427 3,839 961 309 460 201 
Steel consumption per capita, kgt 151 691 124 29 37 14 
Radios per 1,000 population 94 658tt 127tt 47 16* 24 
Television sets per 1,000 population 58 229 36 11 0.4* 0.3 
Telephones per 1,000 populationt 48 35.6 3.5 1.1 - 0.3 
Passenger cars per 1,000 populationt 6.0 144.0 2.3 8.7 - 1.2 
- Not available. 
t 1974. 
tt 1972. 
* 1970. 
** School-age refers to ages 5-19. Literacy rate refers to percent of adult population (over 15) able either to read or 
write. 
Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1976, Arms Control Association, 1976, pp. 
26-27; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, pp. 2, 117, 153, 166-168, 209, 280; United Nations, Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1975, New York: United Nations, 1976, Vol. I, pp. 627-628, 782, 834-835, Vol. II, pp. 32:3-:324; 
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1965, New York: United Nations, 1966, p. 135, United Nations, Demographic 
Yearbook 1974, New York: United Nations, 1975, p. 129; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1975, New York: United 
Nations, 1976, pp. 70, 380, 493-494, 582, 587, 593-594, 605, 901; China: Energy Balance Projections, Washington, D.C.: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, p. 33. 
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Table 13 compares a number of socioeconomic indicators for 
six economies in 1973 to show how Taiwan stands among these 
countries. Direct comparison of per capita consumption in terms 
of a common currency unit is not possible for lack of statistical 
data. As an approximation, we compare the per capita GDP in 
U.S. dollars. These figures are subject to serious limitations in 
comparability, and the share of personal consumption in GDP 
varies widely among countries. Nonetheless, the differences 
shown in Table 13 are so wide that clearly Taiwan's per capita 
consumption in 1973 was above all these countries except Japan. 
A comparison of the structure of consumption corroborates this 
finding. In general, the larger the shares of such "luxuries" as 
household equipment and miscellaneous goods and services, or 
conversely, the lower the shares of "necessities" such as food, 
clothing, and rent, the higher the standard of living. As Table 13 
shows, the share of "luxuries" in total consumption in Taiwan 
(29.7 percent) is lower than Japan's but higher than those of the 
three other economies. 
A comparison of the daily calorie intake per capita indicates 
that the people in Taiwan enjoy a larger supply of calories. To 
some extent, the number of calories depends partly on climatic 
conditions. A better indicator of the standard of living is the per 
capita consumption of protein in the diet. Here, again, Taiwan is 
second only to Japan in terms of protein consumption. 
In education and health, Taiwan's public expenditures on 
education on a per capita basis are much less than Japan's, but 
several times larger than the other countries'. Its enrollment 
rate and literacy rate are about the same as all others except 
India. The relative sizes of population per physician or hospital 
bed rank about the middle among the six economies. However, its 
infant mortality rate is distinctly lower, and its life expectancy at 
birth distinctly higher than all others except Japan. 
Various other indicators also convey the impression that the 
standard of living in Taiwan is quite high relative to that in other 
countries. Its per capita consumption or possession of eight major 
industrial products ranks second or third. In particular, the 
number of television sets, radios, telephone, and passenger cars 
per capita is very much higher than in most other countries. 
IV. SOURCES OF GROWTH 
The preceding sections describe the various dimensions and 
consequences of growth. We turn to the question: How did the 
Taiwan economy grow so fast? Longrun growth of output is 
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possible only if there is a sustained increase both in the productive 
capacity of the economy and in aggregate demand. The first 
question is, therefore: What are the sources of growth on the 
supply side? 
Changes in Output per Worker and Employment 
As a first approximation, the growth of GNP can be 
separated into two parts: the rates of growth in the· size of the 
labor force and output per worker. Table 14 shows two interesting 
features in the rates of growth of these two elements in 1952-73 
and in the two subperiods. First, for the period as a whole, growth 
of output per worker contributed a larger share to growth of GNP 
than increase in employment, a characteristic common to 
economies undergoing rapid economic expansion. Second, the 
pattern of change in the subperiods shows that the growth rate for 
employment rose markedly, whereas that of output per worker 
remained the same in the 1960s as compared with the 1950s. As a 
result, increase in output per worker accounted for about three-
fourths of the growth in GNP during 1952-60, but it declined to 
about one-half in 1961-73. 
Table 14. Rates of Growth of GNP, Employment, 
and Output Per Worker in Taiwan, 1952-73 
GNP 
Employment 
Output per worker 
Output per worker as 
share of total 
(Percent per year) 
1952-60 
6.9 
1.6 
5.3 
76.8 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975. 
1960-73 
9.7 
4.7 
5.0 
51.5 
1952-73 
8.6 
3.5 
5.1 
59.3 
The growth of employment at 3.5 percent per year over two 
decades is impressive. Its significance, however, lies in the extent 
to which human resources in Taiwan have been fully and 
economically utilized. 40 Some insight into the question can be 
40. For excellent studies of various aspects of this problem see Cheng Li (ed.), 
Taiwan jen-li tzu-yuan lun-wen-chi (Studies in Human Resources in Taiwan) 
Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Co., 1975; and Conference on Population and 
Economic Development in Taiwan, Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia 
Sinica, 1976. 
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gained by relating employment to population and labor supply as 
shown in Table 15. Three points suggested by the data are of 
interest. First, the proportion of population participating in 
production had hardly changed between 1953 and 1974. The rapid 
increase in employment was matched by an equally rapid increase 
in total population. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Table 15. Labor Supply and Employment in 
Taiwan, 1953, 1960, and 1974 
1953 1960 
Total population (1,000) 8,283 10,612 
Population, aged 15 and over (1,000) 4,759 5,822 
a. Not in labor force 1,677 2,339 
b. Labor supply 3,082 3,483 
Employment (1,000) 2,888 3,270 
Unemployed (1,000) 194 213 
Labor participation rate 34.9 30.8 
Percent of population aged 15 and 
over 57.5 54.9 
Ratio of labor supply to population, 
aged 15 and over 64.7 59.8 
Employment rate 93.7 93.9 
Unemployment rate 6.3 6.1 
1974 
15,708 
9,957 
4,321 
5,636 
5,486 
150 
34.9 
63.4 
56.6 
97.3 
2.7 
Source: (1) and (2)-Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 14-15, 20. Totals refer to 
midyear population calculated by taking an average of those in beginning and end 
of year. 
(2)a = (2) minus (2)b. 
(2)b = sum of (3) and (4). 
(3) and (4)- W. Y. Kuo, "A Study of Factors Contributing to Labor Absorption 
in Taiwan, 1954-1971," Conference on Population, pp. 485, 494. 
(5) = (3)/(1). 
(6) = (2)1(1). 
(7) = (2)b/(2). 
(8) = (3)1(2)b. 
(9) = (4)/(2)b. 
Second, the rate of increase of total population was especially 
high in the early 1950s so that the number of new entrants into 
the labor supply in the late 1960s and early 1970s was quite large, 
raising the proportion of those aged 15 and over from 58 percent in 
1953 to 63 percent in 1974. In short, potential labor supply 
actually increased faster than population or employment.41 
However, the economic life of the people of Taiwan is such that 
not all those in this age group would seek employment. In fact, the 
41. Strictly speaking, potential labor supply should be defined as the total 
population in the age group 15 and over, less the number of those disabled. The 
latter is believed to be small relative to total population. 
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proportion of those that could have been but are not gainfully 
employed has increased, partly because of a sharp rise in student 
enrollment in the secondary level or above, and partly because of 
an increase in life expectancy and per capita income. Thus, if we 
define labor supply as those aged 15 and over, excluding those 
unable or unwilling to work and those not otherwise occupied 
(such as students and housewives), total effective labor supply as 
a percentage of those in the age group 15 and over declined from 
65 percent in 1953 to 57 percent in 1974. 
Third, the rate of employment, defined as the ratio of those 
gainfully employed to effective labor supply increased perceptibly 
from 93.7 percent in 1953 to 97.3 percent in 1974. Correspondingly, 
the unemployment rate was cut in half from about 6 percent in 
1953 to 3 percent in 1974. It probably went up in 1975 somewhat 
under the effects of the world recession. 
Growth of employment is but one of several dimensions of the 
problem of labor's contribution to growth of output. Possible 
changes in man-hours worked, in the quality of labor, and in 
interindustry shifts in the employment structure are also perti-
nent. The limited information on hours of work suggests little 
change over the years.42 This means that employment changes 
are fair approximations to changes in labor input. No information 
on the changing quality of labor is available, but there can be 
little doubt that the tremendous achievements in Taiwan's 
educational effort noted in the preceding section has greatly 
enhanced the contribution of Taiwan's labor force to economic 
growth. 
On the question of structural shifts in employment, it can be 
shown that, ex post, changes in output per worker for the economy 
as a whole reflected relative changes in sectoral output per worker 
and in the sectoral shares of employment.43 Table 16 presents 
42. Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 45. 
43. Let 0 and 0' represent total output in the current and base periods; Nand 
N', total employment in the current and base periods; and Oi and Ni, output and 
employment in sector i. Then, 
OIN ~ [(0[/N[) (N[!N) Oi'] 
O'IN' =LJ.. Oi'!Nj' • N(!N' • (Y 
The item on the left-hand side refers to changes in overall output per worker. The 
three items on the right hand side represent changes in the average output per 
worker in sector i, relative changes in sector i's employment share, and the output 
share of sector i in the base period. 
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estimates of output and employment structure and output per 
worker by the three broad sectors: agriculture, industry, and 
services in 1952, 1962, and 1972. As may be expected, output per 
worker in agriculture is lower than those in industry or services, 
and the gap has been increasing. A comparison of the relative 
output per worker in the industry and service sectors in the last 
two decades indicates that the ratio of the former to the latter has 
been increasing. The trend is consistent with the findings based 
on cross-country studies that the ratio is positively correlated to 
total product per worker.44 
Table 16. Output and Employment Structures and 
Output Per Worker in Taiwan, 1952, 1962, and 1972 
1952 1962 
Shares in NDP, current prices (%) 
Agriculture 35.7 29.0 
Industry 17.9 25.7 
Services 46.4 45.3 
Shares in labor force (%) 
Agriculture 52.1 45.9 
Industry 20.2 22.5 
Services 27.7 31.6 
Product per worker (1000 NT/worker) 
Total 5.1 18.0 
Agriculture 3.5 11.4 
Industry 4.5 20.6 
Services 8.6 25.8 
Index of output per worker (%) 
Total 100.00 352.9 
Agriculture 100.00 325.7 
Industry 100.00 457.8 
Services 100.00 300.0 
1972 
16.7 
35.3 
48.0 
33.0 
32.1 
34.9 
46.1 
23.4 
50.7 
63.5 
903.9 
668.6 
1,126.7 
738.4 
Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 27-28; Kuo, 1976, pp. 492 pp. 
492, 494. 
Capital Formation 
It has been observed that the rise in output per worker has 
been responsible for a considerably larger share of the growth in 
GDP than has the rise in the size of the labor force in the two 
44. Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations. 
II. Industrial Distribution of National Product and Labor Force, in Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, V:4, Part II, July 1957, p. 41. 
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decades since 1952 (Table 14). Changes in the output per worker, 
however, are the combined result of many factors other than those 
associated with labor, such as changes in the stock of capital per 
worker, new technology, scale of production, efficiency in 
management, and so on. Among these factors, capital investment 
is perhaps one of the most important. 45 This is primarily because 
the formation of physical capital is a necessary if not sufficient 
condition for an increase in productive capacity, and because 
growth in any economy must depend on its own capability to 
generate and sustain fairly high rates of capital formation. To 
evaluate the performance of the Taiwan economy in this 
particular respect, we focus on three issues: (1) the level, structure, 
and trend of capital formation proportions, to indicate the 
changing volume of output set aside for investment; (2) the 
financing of capital formation, to trace the sources of funds that 
make capital formation possible; and (3) the relation between 
investment and economic growth, to indicate roughly how 
effectively investment is being used to increase output. 
Table 17 shows the gross domestic capital proportions in 
1952-74 in constant 1971 prices. Three observations based on this 
table are worth noting. First, the proportion of capital formation 
rose significantly during 1952-74, from an average about 12 
percent in the 1950s to about 27 percent in the early 1970s. Over 
the entire period, it accounted for about 18 percent of total output. 
Second, the rising trend shows sharp upturns around 1960 and 
1965. Before 1960, the rate of capital formation averaged less than 
12 percent. It rose to 16 percent in 1961-65, followed by an even 
larger increase to 25 percent after 1965. Third, the increase in the 
rate of capital formation was almost entirely due to the rise in the 
rate of fixed capital formation. The proportion of inventory 
change in total output varies from year to year but remains more 
or less constant at about 3 percent over the long run.46 The 
overwhelmingly large share of fixed capital formation is signifi-
cant because fixed capital formation generally contributes more to 
increasing productive capacity than increases in stocks. 
45. The role of investment in economic growth has been a controversial issue 
in the economic literature of the 1950s and 1960s. But despite the controversy, no 
development economist goes so far as to deny the importance of capital. See Gerald 
M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Second edition, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 165-185. 
46. The exceptionally high percentage in 1974 was probably due in part to the 
accelerated purchase of raw materials in the face of world inflation following the 
oil crisis, and in part to involuntary inventory accumulation. 
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Table 17. Percentage of Gross Capital Formation 
in Gross Domestic Product, 1952-74* 
(Percent) 
Gross Gross Fixed 
Capital Capital Increase 
Formation Formation in Stocks 
1952 12.0 9.1 2.9 
1953 12.5 10.8 1.7 
1954 12.7 10.7 1.7 
1955 9.9 8.6 1.3 
1956 11.0 9.3 1.7 
1957 10.3 8.5 1.8 
1958 11.7 9.9 1.7 
1959 12.8 11.1 1.7 
1960 14.7 12.0 2.7 
1961 15.4 12.7 2.7 
1962 15.5 12.5 3.0 
1963 15.3 13.5 1.8 
1964 16.4 12.8 3.6 
1965 19.1 14.2 4.9 
1966 19.8 16.4 3.4 
1967 22.4 18.6 3.8 
1968 24.4 20.5 3.9 
1969 23.5 20.8 2.7 
1970 25.7 21.7 4.0 
1971 25.8 22.9 2.9 
1972 23.4 24.1 -0.7 
1973 24.9 23.7 1.2 
1974 34.0 25.9 8.1 
Average 
1952-60 11.9 10.0 1.9 
1961-65 16.3 13.1 3.2 
1966-74 24.9 21.6 3.3 
1952-74 18.0 15.2 2.7 
* Based on totals in constant 1971 prices. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195. 
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Table 18. Capital Formation Proportions, Six Asian 
Economies, 1952, 1961, and 1972a 
1952 1961 
Gross capital formation (%) 
Taiwan 15 20 
Japan 26 35 
South Korea 16h 14 
Philippines 12 19 
Mainland China 
Indiac 10 15 
Gross IlXed capital formation (%) 
Taiwan 11 16 
Japan 20 33 
South Korea 7h 12 
Philippines 11 17 
Mainland China 10 
Indiac 10 15 
Increase in stocks (%) 
Taiwan 4 4 
Japan 6 2 
South Korea 9h 2 
Philippines 1 2 
Mainland China 
India 
• Based on totals in current prices except those for Mainland China. 
b 1953. 
c Fiscal year beginning 1 April, 1952, 1961, and 1970 respectively. 
d 1970 and 1957 prices. 
- Nil or not available. 
51 
1972 
23 
36 
-22 
19 
15 
24 
34 
20 
17 
24d 
15 
-1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1969, 
Vol. II, 1970, pp. 46-47; 1973, .1975, pp. 42-44; ECAFE, Economic Survey of Asia 
and the Far East 1957, p. 216; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; Field, 1976. 
Compared with those of five selected Asian countries shown 
in Table 18, Taiwan's capital formation proportion in 1972 is 
second only to that of Japan, and substantially above those of the 
Philippines and India. Even more impressive is the rapidity with 
which the current high capital formation was attained. While all 
the developing countries experienced a rise in capital formation 
during this period, none experienced an increase as large as that 
of Taiwan. 
Capital formation can be financed by domestic savings or 
capital flows from abroad. Foreign capital inflows are important 
both as additional resources to fill the savings or foreign 
exchange gaps and as carriers of new technology. But in the long 
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run, economic growth can be sustained only if internal financing 
becomes an inherent part of the growth process. Table 19 shows 
the proportions of the two different sources of capital formation in 
Taiwan in 1952-72: gross domestic savings (which include 
provision for capital consumption and private and public savings) 
and capital inflows (which include U.S. aid, foreign capital, and 
loans). Up to 1962, Taiwan depended heavily on external sources. 
During this period U.S. aid, foreign capital, and loans accounted 
for over one-third of domestic capital formation. But after 1962, 
there was a sharp drop in the percentage of external financing. 
The dramatic shift reflects the increasing capability of the 
economy to generate domestic savings. By comparison, there had 
been no discernible downward trend in the degree of reliance on 
foreign financing in Korea or the Philippines over more or less the 
same period, although proportions of foreign financing in the 
early stages in these countries were lower than in Taiwan.47 About 
the only other developing country in the group that has become 
much more independent of external financing since the early 
1960s is Communist China. However, the method of mobilizing 
domestic savings is very much different in the two regions. 
47. See United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1969, New 
York: United Nations, 1970, pp. 201-202. 
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Table 19. Sources of Gross Capital Formation, 1952-72* 
(Percent) 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Provision 
for Capital Net National Savings U.S. Aid, Foreign 
Total Consumption Total Private Capital, and Loans 
1952 58.1 31.3 26.8 27.7 40.0 
1953 60.6 33.0 27.6 26.6 36.9 
1954 49.7 31.2 18.5 21.6 52.5 
1955 65.6 37.6 28.0 25.5 32.5 
1956 58.0 33.2 24.8 25.1 42.9 
1957 63.4 36.9 26.5 23.5 33.2 
1958 54.1 33.2 20.9 18.3 44.2 
1959 51.2 33.2 18.0 16.3 45.8 
1960 59.9 32.1 27.8 23.2 37.3 
1961 64.8 31.4 33.4 32.9 35.6 
1962 68.4 33.1 35.3 34.8 34.5 
1963 93.6 35.2 58.4 49.9 4.0 
1964 99.8 32.7 67.1 52.1 -1.2 
1965 84.9 27.0 57.9 42.4 15.4 
1966 93.2 26.8 66.4 52.1 4.5 
1967 89.5 24.4 65.1 49.4 7.9 
1968 88.5 23.9 64.6 43.4 11.5 
1969 94.8 24.4 70.4 42.3 4.1 
1970 97.8 24.2 73.6 51.1 0.8 
1971 108.9 25.8 83.1 62.9 -9.8 
1972 127.5 27.6 99.9 69.2 -27.5 
* Gross domestic savings and capital inflows do not sum up to 100 percent 
because of statistical discrepancies. 
Source: Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, p. 
41. 
As Table 19 shows, the rise in the share of domestic savings 
in Taiwan was due primarily to the increase in net national 
savings. While provision for capital consumption declined 
slightly, net national savings rose from 25 percent of total 
domestic capital formation in the 1950s to about 85 percent in the 
early 1970s. The latter, in tum, was the result of the rising trends 
in both private and public savings. By contrast, savings in 
Communist China consist almost entirely of public savings. In 
Taiwan, the decision to save or consume remains largely with the 
individuals or private businessmen. In Communist China, the 
state determines how much to save. 
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The incremental output-capital ratio (i.e., the ratio of increase 
in output to investment) has often been used to show what 
additions to output could be obtained from one unit of investment. 
Other things being equal, the higher the ratio the larger the 
"returns" to a given amount of investment. The concept has many 
limitations and its measurement is usually beset with numerous 
difficulties.48 For this reason, measures of total factor productivity 
are often used instead. Nonetheless, under certain not too 
unrealistic assumptions, the ratio can be useful as a device to 
separate the two elements underlying the rate of growth of output: 
the rate of savings and the incremental output-capital ratio.49 
This has been done by others for various countries. 50 It is 
interesting to compare Taiwan's experience with some of the 
findings for other countries summarized in Table 20. 
48. See Otto Eckstein, "Capital Theory and Some Theoretical Problems in 
Development Planning," American Economic Review, May 1961, 92-101; Maurice 
Allais, "The Influence of the Capital-Output Ratio on Real National Income," 
Econometrica, 30 1962, 700-728; A. A. Walters, "Incremental Capital-Output 
Ratios," Economic Journal, December 1966, 818-822; G. Myrdal, Asia Drama, New 
York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968; Hagen, op. cit.; Harvey Liebenstein, 
"Incremental Capital-Output Ratios and Growth Rates in the Short Run," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, February 1966, 2Q-27; Kazuo Sato, "International 
Variations in the Incremental Capital-Output Ratios," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, July 1971, 621-640; J. Vanek and A. H. Studenmund, "Toward a 
Better Understanding of the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, August 1968, 435-451. 
49. These assumptions are that new technology is generally embodied in new 
capital; the rate of utilization of existing equipment remains more or less constant, 
the supply of factors other than capital is fairly elastic; and appropriate time lags 
have been allowed for. 
50. Kuznets, 1960, op. cit.; Simon Kuznets, VI. Long Term Trends in Capital 
Formation, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX:4, part II, July 
1961; Liebenstein, op. cit.; Sato, op. cit.; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1960, 
New York: United Nations, 1960. 
Country 
(1) 18 countries 
(2) 10 countriest 
(3) Taiwan 
(4) Japan 
(5) S. Korea 
(6) Philippines 
(7) India 
(8) Communist Chinat 
Table 20. Rates of Growth of Output, Investment, 
and Incremental Output-Capital Ratios, 
Selected Countries, 1950s and 1960s 
Rate of growth Rate of 
of GNP investment 
Period (%/year) (%) 
1951-57 4.6 15.5 
1950-58 4.7 14.2 
1952-58 7.1 11.4 
1960-72 9.5 20.1 
1960-72 10.6 36.7 
1960-72 9.2 20.2 
1960-72 5.3 20.2 
1960-70 3.4 16.6 
1961-70 4.2 21.5 
t Gross fixed capital formation only. 
Incremental 
output-capital ratio 
0.30 
0.33 
0.62 
0.47 
0.29 
0.45 
0.26 
0.20 
0.20 
Source: (1) Kuznets, 1960, pp. 50-51. See pp. 78-79 for countries in the group. (2) Kuznets, 1961, p. 16. (3) Statistical 
Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; (5) through (7) United Nations, 1975, pp. 42-44, 101, 114. (8) Liu and Yeh, 1973, pp. 218-221. 
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The comparison brings out several notable features in 
Taiwan's development experience. First, the ratio for Taiwan is 
distinctly higher than the average for developing countries in the 
1950s and for the other selected countries in the 1960s. In short, 
during these periods investments were rather "productive" in the 
sense that increase in output per unit of investment was much 
larger than in other countries. 
Second, in the 1950s, the rate of growth of output in Taiwan 
was higher than the average for developing countries, not because 
the rate of investment was higher but because its incremental 
output-capital ratio was higher. Similarly, Taiwan's rate of 
growth of GNP was higher than those of the Philippines, India, 
and Communist China in the 1960s for the same reason. 
Table 21. Sectoral Distribution of Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation in Taiwan, 1952-74* 
(Percent) 
1952 1960 1970 
Agriculture 20.5 15.0 7.5 
lndustry1 21.5 25.9 37.9 
Utilities 7.1 10.9 9.4 
Transportation 10.3 14.9 14.5 
Housing 1.7 2.0 1.2 
Others2 38.9 31.3 29.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 Includes mining, manufacturing, and construction. 
2 Includes trade, education, military construction, and other services. 
* Based on totals in current prices. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 210-212. 
1974 
6.8 
38.4 
16.7 
8.8 
0.8 
28.5 
100.0 
Third, the incremental output-capital ratio for Taiwan during 
the two subperiods declines, suggesting that a higher rate of 
growth of output was obtained only from much more capital. The 
declining trend could have been due partly to a shift of investment 
from sectors with higher ratios (such as manufacturing) to those 
with lower ratios (such as utilities and transportation), and partly 
to changes to technology that requires more capital per unit of 
output.51 But the sectoral distribution of gross fixed investment 
shown in Table 21 indicates that such shifts are likely to have 
rather small effects. Industry's share of investment did rise 
markedly from 1952-70 and remained at a high level between 
51. Changes in relative prices could also have been a factor. 
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1970 and 1974. However, the increase was largely offset by the 
decline in the share of agricultural investment, so that if we take 
investment in agriculture and industry together, their combined 
share hardly increased in 1952-74.52 Similarly, aggregate invest-
ment in the sectors with low output-capital ratios such as 
transportation and housing also remained virtually unchanged, 
from 27.8 percent in 1960 to 26.3 percent in 1974, the sharp rise in 
the share for utilities during 1970-74 being offset by a decline in 
the shares of transportation and housing. The presumption is 
quite strong that structural or technological changes within a 
sector favoring lower incremental output-capital ratios have 
taken place. Little is known about technological changes asso-
ciated with the new investment. There are, however, some 
indications that within the industry sector more investment 
apparently has been allocated to "heavy" industries in recent 
years. This is suggested by the rather drastic change in the output 
structure in the last decade or so. Gross value added in the 
manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco as a percentage of 
value added in manufacturing as a whole declined from 45 percent 
in 1960 to 19 percent in 1974.53 By contrast, the share of 
chemicals, and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic 
products increased from 10 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1974; 
and that of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment 
from 8 to 24 percent over the same period. To the extent the 
change in output structure implies a corresponding shift in 
investment allocation and that investment in the "heavy" 
industries requires larger doses of capital per unit of output, a 
good part of the decline in the aggregate incremental output-capi-
tal ratio could be traced to structural shifts within the industry 
sector. Whatever the cause for the decline, if the trend should 
continue, the need for further rise in the savings ratio would be 
great, as more and more investment would be required to 
compensate for the decline in the incremental output-capital ratio 
in order to maintain a high rate of growth. 54 
Growth in Total Factor Productivity 
Thus far we have been concerned with growth of employment 
and capital stock as two major sources of growth. Other factors, 
such as improvement in skills, technology, organization, and 
52. Note that investment in agriculture includes mostly equipment purchase 
for agricultural production. Investment in water works and the like is included in 
"others" as part of investment by producers of government services. 
53. Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 206-207. 
54. An incisive analysis of·this problem was made by Ta-chung Liu in an 
unpublished study. 
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scale, also contribute to growth of output. How significant these 
other factors were, relative to capital stock and employment, can 
be roughly measured by a combined capital and labor input 
approach.55 Table 22 summarizes estimates of the sources of 
growth of output, attributable to growth of labor, capital and 
"total productivity" in Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, India, 
Communist China, and the Soviet Union. The comparison brings 
out several interesting features in Taiwan's development process. 
The first is the relative importance of increases in total 
productivity compared with growth of labor and capital inputs. It 
accounted for over one-half of the growth of total output in the last 
two decades, far more significant than increases in capital or 
labor.56 
55. The rate of growth of these other factors, generally referred to as total 
factor productivity or technical progress, is defined as that portion of growth of 
total output not attributable to increases in labor and capital input. We use here a 
simple method developed by Solow that measures technical progress as the 
residual obtained by deducting the logarithmic aggregation of the rates of growth 
in labor and capital from the rate of growth of total output. The weights used in 
combining the labor and capital inputs represent the relative factor shares in total 
output and are assumed to add up to one. This simple device is subject to a number 
of criticisms. Conceptually, its weakness lies in the restrictive properties of the 
underlying Cobb-Douglas production function. Implicitly, the approach assumes 
neutral technical progress, technical progress being independent of increases in 
factor inputs, and constant unitary elasticity of substitution between factors 
(whatever the factor intensity). Statistically, as the residual, the measure not only 
includes increases in total productivity but also contains the measurement errors 
in the capital and labor series. Moreover, both capital and labor are highly 
heterogeneous with respect to levels of skill and age. The meaning of the aggregate 
series is thus imprecise. Because of these limitations, many attempts at refinement 
have been made. (For a comprehensive survey of these studies, see M. Ishaq 
Nadiri, "Some Approaches to the Theory and Measurement of Total Factor 
Productivity: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, December 1970, 
1137-1177; and C. Kennedy and A. P. Thirlwall, "Surveys in Applied Economics: 
Technical Progress," Economic Journal, March 1972, 11-72.) However, these 
various more sophisticated approaches are not without shortcomings. For example, 
the more general constant elasticity of substitution production function (of which 
the Cobb-Douglas is a special case) has specification errors that only production 
functions with variable elasticity of substitution could avoid. (See the discussion in 
George H. Hilderbrand and Ta-chung Liu, Manufacturing Production Functions in 
the United States, 1957, Ithaca, New York: New York State School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1965.) For our present purpose of a 
limited inquiry, the simple Solow approach, though far from ideal, is adequate. 
56. Although the weights used to combine labor and capital outputs are 
arbitrarily assigned, estimates of productivity increase using alternative sets of 
weights are not very sensitive to the choice of weights. The same findings are also 
true of the estimates for the Philippines. See Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Dimensions of 
Postwar Philippine Economic Progress," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
February 1969, p. 96. 
Table 22. Sources of Growth of Real National Income, Selected Countries 
(Percent per year) 
Sources of growth 
Growth of 
national Labor Capital Increase in 
Country Period product input input productivity 
Taiwan 191?2-73 8.61 1.79 2.37 4.45 
1952-61 6.86 1.04 1.12 4.70 
1961-73 9.94 2.36 3.34 4.24 
Japan 1953-71 8.77 1.85 2.10 4.82 
1953-61 8.13 1.91 1.62 4.60 
1961-71 9.29 1.78 2.57 4.94 
Philippines 1947-65 5.75 2.24 1.01 2.GO 
India 1950-60 4.48 1.86 1.55 1.06 
Communist China 1952-57 6.00 1.05 1.95 2.90 
Soviet Union 1950-58 6.40 1.08 3.60 1.72 
1958-67 5.30 1.02 3.60 0.68 
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Sources: (1) Taiwan - GDP in 1971 prices, Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; employment, W.Y. Kuo, 1976, p. ~ 
494; capital stock data provided by Professor W.Y. Kuo. The weights are assumed to be 0.6 and 0.4 for labor and capital [;; 
inputs respectively. (2) Japan - Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," in Hugh =E 
Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds.), Asia's New Giant, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 94. (3) Communist 
China - T.C. Liu, "The Tempo of Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland, 1949-65," An Economic Profile of 
Mainland China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 62-63. (4) Philippines and India - M. 
lshag Nadiri, "International Studies of Factor Inputs and Total Factor Productivity: A Brief Survey," Review of Income 
and Wealth, June 1972, p. 136. (5) Soviet Union - Abram Bergson, "Towards a New Growth Model," Problems of 
Communism, March-April, 1973, p. 3. 
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Second, in both absolute and relative terms, productivity 
increases in Taiwan during the 1950s was greater than in all the 
other countries, including Japan. During this period, Taiwan's 
growth of total output was only moderately higher than those of 
the Philippines, Communist China, and the Soviet Union. Yet its 
productivity increase was far greater than in those countries. In 
the 1960s, the pace of productivity increase in Taiwan remained 
high, far above that of the Soviet Union and only slightly below 
that of Japan. Since productivity indicates how efficiently the 
inputs are being used, its change is a useful measure of economic 
performance. In this respect, Taiwan has out-performed the 
Philippines, India, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, and 
its record matches that of Japan. 
Third, in Taiwan and, for that matter, in most other countries 
for which estimates are available, productivity increases have 
slowed down in the 1960s compared with those in the 1950s.57 
However, the growth of output in Taiwan accelerated, while those 
in other countries slowed. The result was that the relative 
importance of productivity increases in Taiwan's growth declined, 
while that of capital input increased markedly. If the trend should 
continue, it points again to the increasing importance of capital 
formation in Taiwan's future growth. 
Sources of Growth: Changes in Final Demand 
Turning to the sources of growth on the demand side, we 
summarize the contributions of various components of final 
expenditures to GDP growth in Table 23.58 For the period as a 
whole, exports of goods and services were the most important; 
government consumption and increase in stocks were the least 
important. The picture, however, was very much different in the 
1950s. During 1952-60, growth of private consumption and 
government consumption accounted for over 80 percent of the 
growth of GDP. But since then, the contribution of both 
components declined, while those of gross fixed capital formation 
and exports rose sharply. By the early 1970s exports constituted 
over 80 percent of total growth. 
57. See M. Ishaq Nadiri, "International Studies of Factor Inputs and Total 
Factor Productivity: A Brief Survey," Review of Income and Wealth, June 1972, p. 
147; and Williamson, op. cit., p. 96. 
58. By definition, GDP is the sum of its components. Its rates of growth can 
thus be expressed as the sum of the growth rates of the components each weighted 
by its percentage share in GDP at the base period. The contribution of each item to 
growth of total product is simply the share of its weighted rate of growth in the 
growth of GDP. 
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Table 23. Sources of Growth of GDP by 
Final Expenditures, 1952-73 
61 
1952-73 1952-60 196Q-70 197Q-73 
Average annual rate of growth (%) 
Private consumption 7.7 6.2 8.2 9.6 
Government consumption 4.7 6.0 4.2 2.6 
Gross fixed capital formation 13.7 10.6 15.7 15.2 
Increase in stocks 4.1 5.9 13.6 -25.3 
Exports 17.6 9.0 21.3 29.9 
Less: imports 13.2 6.1 16.8 21.3 
Gross domestic product 8.6 6.9 9.1 11.8 
Percentage share of GDP growth (%) 
Private consumption 49.9 55.6 52.2 44.0 
Government consumption 11.2 27.4 11.4 3.8 
Gross fixed capital formation 26.8 16.1 28.7 28.8 
Increase in stocks 0.8 2.4 4.9 -5.8 
Exports 53.9 12.2 43.2 87.9 
Less: Imports 42.7 13.7 40.4 58.7 
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195. Estimates are based on totals 
in constant 1971 prices. 
To identify exports as the fastest growing component of total 
output is simply to describe what happened. The decomposition of 
output growth does not tell us whether export expansion was the 
cause or consequence of growth, and if the former, how export 
expansion has generated growth. Has Taiwan's growth been 
export-led? Export-led growth occurs when an export expansion 
originating from an external source triggers domestic growth. 
Cves has suggested a test of whether growth is export-led. If the 
export expansion arises primarily from external demand, then 
changes in the prices and quantity of exports should be positively 
correlated; if it arises from shifts in domestic supply, the 
correlation would be negative. 59 By this test, Taiwan's growth was 
clearly export-led, since both the price index for exports and the 
export volume moved upward during 1952-73. To be sure, one can 
trace the origin of Taiwan's export expansion at some stage to 
such exogenous factors as the liberalization of Japan's import 
restrictions, the sharp increase in imports of the developed 
countries, and the escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s. 
And, the increase in exports undoubtedly had direct effects on 
59. Richard E. Caves, "Export-Led Growth and the New Economic History," 
in J. N. Bhagwati (ed.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 1971, 403-442. 
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output growth. However, at most, such external factors could have 
accounted for only part of the growth of exports. An equally, if not 
more plausible, explanation of the relation of exports and 
economic growth is that exports played a strategic role in 
channeling the inflow of resources essential for domestic growth. 
A glance at the ratio of imports to GDP shows that Taiwan's 
reliance on imported goods has been increasing during the last 
two decades. In 1974, Taiwan required almost three times as much 
imported resources per unit of GDP as it did in 1952. These 
imports contributed to economic growth in several ways. First, 
close to one-half of total imports consists of raw materials and 
fuels for which the possibility of domestic substitution in the short 
run is rather limited. Fuel, oil, cotton, and wheat are examples. 
Second, capital goods imports also accounted for a substantial 
share of total imports, larger than that of consumer goods. We 
noted earlier the importance of investment to Taiwan's economic 
growth, and clearly investment depends heavily on imports.60 
Third, imports of capital goods have also been major carriers of 
foreign technology. But growth of imports could not have been 
achieved without a concomitant export growth, particularly after 
U.S. economic aid was terminated in 1965. 
60. For an interesting model of the relation between imports and growth along 
these lines, see Tzong-shian Yu, "Taiwan's Foreign Trade and Economic Growth," 
in Cheng Sun (ed.), Studies in Taiwan's Foreign Trade, Taipei: Lieng-ching 
Publishing Co., 1975, 85-131. 
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Table 24. Relative Effects of Increased Home Demand, Export 
Expansion and Import Substitution on Manufacturing 
Output, 1953-70 
(Percent) 
Home Export Import 
demand expansion substitution 
Total manufacturing products 
1953-70 80.0 28.1 -8.0 
1953-55 99.5 -8.6 9.2 
1955-60 91.7 16.5 -8.3 
1960-65 82.7 17.3 0 
1965-70 73.4 34.9 -8.3 
Nondurable consumer goods 
1953-70 42.5 59.1 -1.6 
1953-55 75.2 2.5 22.4 
1955-60 84.6 21.2 -5.8 
1960-65 72.2 31.3 -3.3 
1965-70 27.9 78.8 -6.8 
Metals and machinery 
1953-70 65.4 15.4 19.1 
1953-55 80.5 1.5 18.0 
1955-60 93.6 3.8 2.5 
1960-65 77.9 9.5 12.6 
1965-70 72.4 22.2 5.4 
Intermediate goods 
1953-70 84.4 13.7 1.9 
1953-55 99.4 0.5 0.1 
1955-60 96.2 5.5 -1.6 
1960-65 77.5 14.8 7.7 
1965-70 87.0 16.1 -3.0 
Source: Liang Kuo-shu, op. cit., p. 236. 
Table 24 shows the relative effects of increased domestic 
demand, export expansion and import substitution on manufac-
turing industries for 1953-70 and subperiods, estimated by 
Liang.61 (1) For manufacturing as a whole, the importance of 
export expansion is clear. Except for the early 1950s when import 
substitution was significant, exports accounted for an increasing 
proportion of total output growth. (2) The most drastic shifts 
occurred in the nondurable consumer goods. In the early 1950s, 
the influence of domestic demand was dominant. Import substitu-
tion accounted for 22 percent of its output growth, and the effect of 
export expansion was miniscule. By the late 1960s, export 
61. Kuo-shu Liang, ''Taiwan's Exports and Employment," ibid., pp. 209-246. 
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expansion became the most important source of growth, far more 
important than domestic demand, not to mention a negative effect 
of import substitution. (3) A similar but less drastic change has 
also taken place in metals and machinery and intermediate goods. 
In both cases, domestic demand remained significant, with export 
expansion assuming an increasingly important role, particularly 
for metals and machinery. 
V. SUMMARY 
The intent of this chapter is to describe what happened to the 
Taiwan economy in the last two decades in terms of some broad 
aggregates. The principal findings can be briefly summarized: (1) 
The most significant feature is of course the high rate of growth of 
total and per capita output since 1952. Few nations in the world, 
both developed and developing, could match Taiwan's perfor-
mance during this period. Fewer still had achieved such a high 
rate of growth with relatively stable prices and little fluctuations 
in output, and in the face of rapid population growth and a heavy 
commitment to defense. Of the five main economies selected for 
comparison, only Japan and South Korea experienced such high 
growth rates. The Philippines, Communist China, and India 
belong to a different group with distinctly lower growth rates. 
(2) As is characteristic of all countries going through rapid 
industrialization, Taiwan's industrial and employment structure 
shifted in favor of manufacturing, while the share of agriculture 
in GDP declined. The unique feature in Taiwan's experience is 
that the transformation occurred in a fairly short span of time. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector actually expanded quite 
rapidly as the economic structure changed. This was in marked 
contrast to the experience of such economies as that of Commu-
nist China. 
(3) From yet another standpoint, Taiwan's economic change 
was also unique. Like most other developed countries, Taiwan 
shifted from a high-consumption to a high-investment economy. 
But unlike most others, its development process went through, 
first, an import substitution stage, which was then replaced by a 
dramatically different export-oriented phase. 
(4) As per capita income rose, both the level and the structure 
of per capita consumption changed. Per capita consumption more 
than doubled in two decades. Proportions of consumption 
expenditures on high-income elasticity items (education, recrea-
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tion, household equipment) increased markedly. Other indications 
of social development, such as life expectancy, enrollment rate in 
schools, and television sets per capita, also suggest rapid 
improvements in this standard of living to a level considerably 
more advanced than other developing Asian economies. 
(5) Rapid growth was the result of growth in employment and 
even faster growth in output per worker. The latter is probably 
related to the sharp rise in the capital formation proportions. U.S. 
aid was particularly important in financing capital formation up 
to the early 1960s. But domestic savings and to a lesser extent 
foreign private capital became the important sources of capital 
formation after 1965. The incremental output-capital ratio has 
been fairly high, considerably above those of other countries. But 
it declined somewhat in the last decade, presumably because of 
structural changes within the industrial sector favoring industries 
that required larger doses of capital per unit of output. The change 
suggest that, if the trend continues, demand for capital will 
intensify in the future growth of the Taiwan economy. 
(6) A breakdown of the sources of growth of GDP by the 
simple Solow method indicated that increases in total factor 
productivity were far more important than either the growth of 
labor input or capital input. The overall pattern is similar to that 
of Japan but very much different from those of the Philippines, 
India, or the Soviet Union where increases in labor or capital 
input were the important sources of growth. It will be recalled that 
the growth rates of Taiwan and Japan are substantially higher 
than the rates of these other countries. The disparities in the 
growth rates might well be related to the difference in the relative 
weights of the various sources of growth. 
(7) An examination of the increase in GDP by final 
expenditures indicates that increments in exports by far ac-
counted for the largest share. Exports have become important 
only since the 1960s, reflecting the dramatic shift of an import 
substitution policy in the 1950s to an export promotion policy 
since the late 1950s. In an important sense, the economic 
achievements of Taiwan were largely due to the successful 
promulgation of an outward-looking policy. 
Our brief overview necessarily overlooks many interesting 
aspects of Taiwan's development experience. In particular, we 
have not discussed the role of the government and the major 
economic policies in various stages of development. It will suffice 
to point out that U.S. aid, land reform and technological change 
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in the agricultural sector, and an inward-looking development 
strategy emphasizing import-substitution were the major land-
marks in this first phase of the development (1952-59). Since the 
1960s, export expansion has provided the momentum for rapid 
economic growth. Subsequently, the inflow of private foreign 
capital and technology became the crucial growth-generating 
elements, reinforcing the outward-looking development program. 
Some of these issues will be taken up in the following chapters. 
Chapter II 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE PROCESS OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TAIWAN 
YuAN-LI Wu 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic Benefits - Distribution and Growth 
Analysis of economic development in quantitative aggregates 
would be woefully incomplete if one were to ignore the distribution 
of benefits of development. If we compare the GNP, a frequently 
used quantitative measure of economic welfare, to a pie, successful 
economic development will make the pie larger, as has been amply 
demonstrated in the case of Taiwan. However, since a growing 
"pie" is not produced merely as an object of wonderment, to be 
admired in the abstract but not to be touched by anyone, how the 
pie is sliced and how and when the slices are made available to 
individual members of the society are an inalienable part of 
economic development. Success or failure of the development 
process must, therefore, be judged from the points of view of both 
production and distribution. 
Some students of economic development have even gone so far 
as to suggest that a single index of economic development might 
be constructed that would automatically take into account both 
aspects1 so that when the index is employed in choosing from 
among economic policies and assessing their results, the best 
policies chosen will automatically take both goals into account. 
For instance, one might divide the population into five (or any 
other number of) income classes in descending order of income 
size, each class to consist of one-fifth (or quintile) of the total 
population. One might then choose to consider a 1% increase in 
income of the lowest fifth of the population to be equivalent to a 
multiple of a 1% increase in the income of the highest one-fifth, 
and so forth for the other income intervals. If such a weighting 
system is adopted in calculating the result, a policy to achieve 
1. See Montek S. Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenecy, "The Econom-ic Frame-
work," Chapter II in Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell, John H. 
Duloy and Richard Jolly, Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974). A. K. Sen has actually developed such a measure. See his "Real 
National Income," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1976): 19-
39. 
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high economic growth would automatically tend to favor an 
accelerated increase in the income of the poorest one-fifth of the 
population. Conversely, a policy favoring the poorest segment of 
the population in income distribution would tend to yield a higher 
calculated rate of growth even if the absolute increase in output 
were constant. 
The choice of weights in constructing such a comprehensive 
index of development (i.e., including objectives in both production 
and distribution) must in the final analysis rest on value 
judgments, and a decision on this basis can be reached only as a 
part of the society's political process, with the term "political" 
being construed in a very broad sense, including both ideological 
considerations and practical (i.e., institutional and other) con-
straints. However, before we proceed further, let us remind 
ourselves of some of the relationships between production and 
distribution in general, as well as the object of distribution. 
First, the nature of the economic development strategy 
followed will inevitably affect the pattern of income distribution, 
which is a major component of the distribution of benefits in 
general. For instance, an industry-first policy will initially and 
directly create more income for those in industry - owners as well 
as workers - and for those in both industry and non-industry 
who sell to the industrial sector. Alternatively, an agriculture-first 
strategy would have the corresponding primary effect on those 
engaged in agriculture and in industries supplying agriculture. 
Moreover, whether the development strategy aims at achieving 
self-sufficiency or is export-orientated is another major channel of 
causal relationship that directionally runs from production to 
distribution. Still another element in development strategy which 
has causal relationship running from production to distribution is 
the choice between labor-intensive and capital-intensive methods 
of production. 
Second, a major determinant of the rate of expansion of 
production is capital formation. Since private capital formation in 
a market economy, even when there is an inflow of foreign capital, 
is largely determined by the availability of domestic private 
savings, the distribution of income, which could affect savings, 
can influence the rate of increase of aggregate production, 
although, according to some students, the propensity of thrift may 
not vary as much between the rich and the poor in Taiwan as one 
might be inclined to believe a priori. Furthermore, the pattern of 
income distribution will also affect the composition of market 
demand for goods, and, therefore, the demand for inputs and the 
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rate at which production in the aggregate can expand. Here the 
causal relationship is directionally reversed; the linkage is from 
distribution to production. 
A third linkage between production and distribution has to do 
with the effect of the distributive pattern of economic benefits on 
the institutional framework and socio-political environment 
within which production takes place. If this environment is hostile 
to the orderly planning and execution of economic activities, 
production will not expand rapidly or steadily. Since no economic 
system can realistically expect the benefits (and cost) of produc-
tion to be shared absolutely equally by every member of the 
society, whether the distributive pattern will lead to the emergence 
of groups whose interests are mutually antagonistic becomes a 
critical issue to social and political stability. For example, a 
particular development strategy might consistently favor urban 
dwellers and discriminate against rural residents so that rural-
urban antagonism will in due course arise as an outcome of 
opposition of economic interests. Antagonism may also stem from 
conflicting economic interests between farmers and non-farmers, 
between new immigrants and earlier settlers (e.g., the Chinese in 
Malaysia versus the Malays under the Bumiputra program), 
between those who were initially rich and those who were initially 
poor, and so forth. If the economic development strategy followed 
tends to create such antagonistic groups, the latter would work 
against the emergence of political consensus which is needed for 
an effective economic policy, including measures to modify the 
distributive pattern that would otherwise prevail. Effective 
implementation of the income tax, subsidies, and other forms of 
income transfer, is more likely if a reasonable degree of consensus 
can be developed. The same issue can also be formulated in terms 
of the effect of a particular distributive pattern on socio-political 
homogeneity. 
Economic interest groups that could become mutually antago-
nistic may overlap. For example, there could be one conflict of 
economic interests between farmers and non-farmers and another 
between two linguistic or ethnic groups, yet each of the latter may 
include both farmers and non-farmers. In the Taiwan context, in 
addition to the usual farmer-non-farmer division, we must also 
look into the relative positions of the post-1945 settlers (commonly 
described as "mainlanders") and the pre-1945 settlers (commonly 
described as "Taiwanese"), who, or whose forebears, came to 
Taiwan in €arlier times. 
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Economic Benefits and Non-economic Values 
The preceding remarks have focused attention on the 
interrelationships between economic growth and the distribution 
of economic benefits. However, man does not live by bread alone. 
A longer life in good health, better education, more congenial 
working conditions, stable employment, and, last but not least, a 
greater measure of personal freedom are easily among the 
desiderata that many would wish to attain. Since economic 
development is only one aspect of development, and since with 
economic development many other variables will also change, two 
questions immediately arise. First, what other variables might 
usefully serve as indicators of socio-political-economic develop-
ment other than the sheer volume of output?2 Discussion of the 
importance of distribution in addition to production can be viewed 
as a variant of this question, the scope of which can be expanded 
to cover non-economic values. Second, what are the interrelation-
ships among these different variables? In particular, how might 
the pattern of distribution of economic benefits affect that of non-
economic values and vice-versa? 
Clearly, the development of Taiwan can and should be 
analyzed also from this broader perspective. [This is discussed in 
a later chapter of the book from which this chapter is excerpted -
ed.] Nevertheless we might note in this connection that, a priori, 
one can envisage the interrelationships between the distributive 
patterns of two such variables both as supportive of each other 
and as substitutes. Thus, as time passes, a more equitable 
distribution of educational opportunities is likely to lead to greater 
equality of economic opportunities and, therefore, of income. 
Conversely, a more equitable income distribution is likely to lead 
to a more equitable distribution of education.3 In a more static 
2. See, for instance, Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics and Economic 
Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1967), and D. V. McGranahan, C. Richard·Proust, N. V. Sovani and M. 
Subramanian, Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development (New 
York: Praeger, 1972). For a discussion on Taiwan in this respect, see Charles H. C. 
Kao, "Development Indicators and their Implications for Taiwan's Economic 
Development," Industry of Free China, Taipei: Economic Planning Council, Vol. 
XXXXI, No. 5 (May 1974). 
3. These propositions are predicated on the assumption that the initial level 
of educational opportunities is sufficiently high so that their greater availability 
would benefit the recipients. Similarly, in the second case, the initial level of 
income must be sufficiently high if a more equal distribution is to be beneficial. A 
more equal distribution of very little income (or of educational opportunities) would 
hardly increase the potential availability of more educational opportunities (or of 
income). 
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sense, it is quite plausible that at a given time those who are at 
the lower end of income distribution could regard greater 
educational opportunities, such as special scholarships, as 
partially making up the disadvantage they suffer in income 
distribution. The initial disadvantage could be viewed as tempor-
ary, and more future advantage may be traded for less present 
advantage. 
Of all the non-economic values to which people aspire, 
perhaps the most fundamental is the sharing of political decision-
making power which can result in a more equitable "allocation" of 
all other "values." Consider now the relationship between the 
distributive patterns of income - representing all economic 
benefits - and of political power- representing all non-economic 
values. On the one hand, those who do not enjoy an equal share of 
political power may regard a more than equal share of income as 
an adequate compensation, at least in the short run, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, as equity in the distribution of political 
power increases, it is likely to be used to increase equity in income 
distribution.4 By the same token, as income distribution becomes 
4. 
1 
Increasing 
political 
equality 
Increasing 
income equality 
In the above diagram Point A represents total inequality in both income 
distribution and the distribution of political power. Point D, on the other hand, 
denotes complete equality in both respects. Point C represents complete political 
equality together with complete economic inequality in distribution. At the other 
end, Point B represents complete economic equality with complete political 
inequality. The proposition advanced in the text is that both B and C are 
essentially unstable situations. As political equality increases, for instance, 
through the evolution of democratic institutions, it is likely that the more equally 
distributed political power will be used to promote economic equality. This 
essentially is in accord with the thesis advanced by Simon Kuznets in his 1955 
paper on the tendency toward greater income equality during the later stages of 
economic development following the establishment of political democracy. See also 
Simons Kuznets, "Demographic Components in Size-distribution of Income" 
(Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored by the Japan Economic 
Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, December 16-20, 
Vol. II, July 1975). On the other hand, Point B is also unstable because the 
population that shares economic benefit and power equally among its members 
will probably be unwilling to support the smaller group holding political power in a 
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more equal, barring the existence of a totally authoritarian 
government,5 it will become increasingly improbable for inequity 
in the distribution of political power to prevail inasmuch as such 
an inequity will become progressively harder and more costly to 
support. [These issues are also discussed fully in the next chapter 
- ed.] 
Finally, the distribution of the benefits of economic develop-
ment is, of course, only one side of distribution. The obverse is the 
distribution of development costs, which one might regard as 
negative benefits. Unfortunately, it is not possible to net the 
benefits or costs of economic development for individual members 
or groups of the society. Rather the two aspects must be 
considered separately. Since consideration of the distribution of 
the costs of development would require a detailed examination of 
the sources of private savings and of the financing of government 
capital formation, which would take us far afield, we will confine 
our discussion in this paper to an account of income distribution 
and how changes in the pattern have come about. 
II. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN 
Distribution by Income Class - A Preliminary International 
Comparison with Developed and Less Developed Countries 
According to an IBRD study on income distribution in less 
developed countries6 (LDCs), the typical pattern to be found in an 
LDC is as shown in Table 1. 
highly concentrated form. Such a situation would seem to require the use of force 
by those holding political power in order to maintain their own authority. 
Our hypothesis suggests that the two kinds of equality can to some degree be 
traded in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction for individual segments 
of the population. This is illustrated by the "indifference curves" shown in the 
diagram. At the same time, it is also our hypothesis that increase in either income 
(or political) equality is likely to facilitate further increases in political (or income) 
equality. The movement in the direction from A to D, as denoted by the arrow in 
the diagram, tends to become progressively easier, at least for a part of the way. 
This part of Kuznets' hypothesis may be true even if his argument that economic 
development in its early stages leads to greater inequality may not hold. The point 
raised by Oshima in "Income Inequality and Economic Growth, the Postwar 
Experience of Asian Countries," in The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XV, No.2 
October 1970), is further substantiated in our discussion in the text. 
5. One may note in this connection Mao Tse-Tung's concern about the 
periodic recurrence of "revisionist tendencies" in mainland China which would 
give rise to greater income inequality especially as the lower incomes remain at an 
extremely low level absolutely. · 
6. Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. XVI and 40. 
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Table 1. Income Distribution in LDCs 
Percent of total Households 
Arranged in Descending 
Order of Income 
Highest 20% 
2nd 20% 
3rd 20% 
4th 20% 
Lowest 20'P'o 
Percent of Total Income 
53 
22 
13 
7 
5 
Total 100 
Sixty-six developed and underdeveloped countries that had 
data on income distribution were examined by the author and 
classified into three groups: (1) "high inequality" (income share of 
the lowest, i.e., poorest, 40% of all households being less than 12%); 
(2) "moderate inequality" (income share of the lowest 40%, 
between 12 and 17%); (3) "low inequality"7 (income share of the 
lowest 40%, 17% and above). Each of the three groups was further 
divided into three subsets according to the level of per capita 
income. See Table 2. 
Of the 66 countries included in the IBRD study, ten are in 
East, Southeast and South Asia.8 In terms of GNP per capita, 
Japan is the most developed of these ten while Sri. Lanka, India, 
Pakistan and Burma, all in South Asia, with Burma also 
straddling Southeast Asia, are the poorest. The remaining five, 
including Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines fall within a relatively narrow range and are all in East or 
Southeast Asia. For comparison, the respective income distribu-
tion patterns of these Asian countries, as given by Chenery et al., 
can be seen in Table 3. 
As far as Taiwan is concerned, especially noteworthy are (1) 
the virtually identical pattern of its income distribution with that 
of Japan, (2) the close approximation of the Taiwan and Japanese 
patterns to that of the United States, and (3) the slightly larger 
share of the lowest 40% on the income ladder in the Taiwan and 
Japanese distributions as compared with the other Asian 
countries of low inequality, or, for that matter, as compared with 
the United States. 
7. Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the 
Problem," Chapter I •. in Chenery et a!., op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
8. Iran, Iraq and Turkey are regarded as Middle Eastern countries and are, 
therefore, not listed here. 
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Table 2. Number and Percent Distribution of 
Selected Countries in Terms of 
Income Distribution 
Total High Inequality Moderate Inequality Low Inequality 
(1) 26 Countries with per capita GNP up 
to US $300 a year 
26 10 8 8 
100.0 38.4 30.8 30.8 
(2) 21 Countries with per capita GNP of 
US $300-750 a year 
21 10 6 5 
100.0 47.6 28.6 23.8 
(3) 19 Countries with per capita GNP 
above US $750 
19 3 8 8 
100.0 15.8 42.1 42.1 
(4) All 66 Countries 
66 23 22 21 
100.0 34.8 33.3 31.8 
Source: Chenery et a!., Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford Univer· 
sity Press, 1974), pp. 8·9. 
The fact that income distribution has become increasingly 
equitable over a lengthy period of rapid growth in GNP per capita 
has made the Republic of China on Taiwan one of the few 
developing countries whose growth is "distributionally biased" in 
favor of persons with low incomes. A comparison with three other 
Asian countries can be seen in the estimates of Chenery et al., 
given in Table 4. 
The Trend of Increasing Equality in Income 
Distribution by Household 
The cross-section comparison presented in Table 2 shows the 
Taiwan economy as one of low income inequality on the basis of 
1964 data. A closer examination can be made by looking at the 
same statistics in several benchmark years both before and after 
1964. These figures show a progressive decline of inequality 
during a 20-year span in terms of several alternative measures 
(Table 5). 
Several phenomena are most interesting from the point of 
view of economic policy, and politically most significant from the 
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Table 3. Patterns of Income Distribution in 
Selected Asian Countries 
Relative Shares of Income 
by Income Class 
75 
Year GNP per Lowest 40% Middle 40% Top20o/n 
of Capita of All of All of All 
Data (US$) Households Households Households 
High Inequality 
The Philippines 1971 239 11.6 34.6 53.8 
Malaysia 1970 330 11.6 32.4 56.0 
Moderate Inequality 
Burma 1958 82 16.5 38.7 44.8 
India 1964 99 16.0 32.0 52.0 
Low Inequality 
Sri Lanka 1969 95 17.0 37.0 46.0 
Pakistan 1964 100 17.5 37.5 45.0 
Thailand 1970 180 17.0 37.5 45.5 
ROK (South Korea) 1970 235 18.0 37.0 45.0 
ROC (Taiwan) 1964 241 20.4 39.5 40.1 
Japan 1963 950 20.7 39.3 40.0 
Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
According to Chenery et al., "The income shares of each percentile group were 
read off a free-hand Lorenz curve fitted to observed points in the cumulative 
distribution. The distributions are for pretax income. Per capita GNP figures are 
taken from the World Bank data files and refer to GNP at factor cost for the year 
indicated in constant 1971 U.S. dollars." 
For the benefit of American readers, the corresponding figures for the United 
States, also a country of low income inequality, are: 
1970 4,850 19.7 41.5 38.8 
perspectives both of the Republic of China and of other countries. 
One is the combination of a progressive movement toward greater 
equality by income class with a sharp increase in GNP and in 
average household income over the same period. At constant 1972 
prices, per capita GNP in Taiwan rose from NT$10,875 in 1964 to 
NT$19,122 in 1972, while average household income rose from 
NT$32,452 in 1964 to NT$61,032 in 1972.9 This means that the 
9. At constant 1972 prices the real household income of the lowest decile rose 
by 109.2% from NT$9,854 in 1964 to NT$20,618 in 1972. In contrast, the 
improvement for" the top decile was 52.5% during the same period, from NT$84,454 
in 1964 to NT$128,760 in 1972. These data, not including the Taipei municipality 
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Table 4. Comparative Income Growth Rates 
Annual Rates of Income 
Growth in Percent by 
Class of Income 
Recipients 
Annual Increase in 
Welfare for the 
Country as a Whole 
Upper Middle Lowest GNP Equal Poverty 
Period 20% 40% 40% Weights Weights Weights 
Korea 
The Philippines 
India 
Taiwan 
1964-70 10.6 
1961-71 4.9 
1954-64 5.1 
1953-61 4.5 
7.8 
6.4 
3.9 
9.1 
9.3 
5.0 
3.9 
12.1 
Source: Chenery et a!., op. cit., Chapter 2, p. 42. 
9.3 
5.4 
4.5 
6.8 
9.0 
5.5 
4.1 
9.4 
9.0 
5.4 
4.0 
10.4 
"Equal Weights" implies a weight of 0.2 for the upper 20% of the income 
recipients, and 0.4 and, again, 0.4 for the middle and lowest 40% respectively. 
"Poverty Weights" are 0.1 for the highest 20%, 0.3 for the middle 40%, and 0.6 for 
the lowest 40%. 
Although the "poverty weights" are clearly arbitrary and could just as well be 
replaced by other weights, the effect of their use in the case of Taiwan is especially 
illuminating. 
groups at the lower end of the income ladder enjoyed an 
accelerated rate of absolute and relative improvement, which is 
what some development economists have advocated as most 
desirable. 10 The narrowing of the income gap between the rich and 
the poor in the course of economic growth through the faster 
improvement of those in lower income intervals is bound to affect 
mutual perceptions of one another by people of different incomes, 
making the establishment of consensus for major policies easier. 
Given the wide distribution of television sets in Taiwan and the 
great visual impact of differences in living standards and life 
styles due to income differences, this is an important stabilizing 
and unifying influence not to be lightly ignored. 
A second interesting phenomenon is the continuation of the 
trend toward greater equality over the entire 20 year period. The 
first decade of economic development was accompanied by a 
sharp decrease in income inequality: 18% between 1953 and 1961 
for 1972, would yield a ratio between the top and bottom deciles of 6.2. If Taipei is 
included, as in Table 2, the ratio becomes 6.8, reflecting the greater concentration 
of higher income households in the capital city. 
I 0. See Chenery et al.; op. cit. 
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Table 5. Changes in Income Distribution in Taiwan 
Distribution in Quintiles 1953 1961 1964 1972 
Lowest quintile of all households 3.0 4.5 7.7 8.6 
Second quintile 8.3 9.7 12.6 13.1 
Middle quintile 9.1 14.0 16.6 17.0 
Fourth quintile 18.2 19.8 22.1 22.2 
Highest quintile 61.4 52.0 41.0 39.1 
Second highest 15% 28.8 26.4 24.8 24.8 
Top 5% 32.6 25.6 16.2 14.3 
Gini Coefficient 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.30 
Ratio of Income Share 
Top 10% to bottom 10% 30.4 19.3 8.6 6.8 
Top 20'1'o to bottom 20% 20.5 11.6 5.3 4.6 
Index of Decile Inequality 0.46 0.37 0.26 0.24 
Source: Wan-yong Kuo, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes" (Paper presented to the Joint JERC-CAME Seminar on 
Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and 
East Asia, Tokyo, December 16-20, 1974), Table 5. The original 1953 figures are 
taken from Kuo-wei Chang, "An Estimate of Taiwan's Personal Income Distribu-
tion in 1953 - Pareto's Formula Discussed and Applied" (in Chinese), Journal of 
Social Science, Taipei, Vol. 7 (August 1956): 260. The 1961 estimates are from Kuo-
wei Chang's report on a Pilot Study of Personal Income and Consumption in 
Taiwan (mimeographed in English), prepared under the auspices 6f a National 
Income Statistics Working Group of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
& Statistics (DGBAS), of the Executive Yuan, Table A, p. 23. The 1964 estimates are 
those of DGBAS as presented in its report on Survey of Family Income & 
Expenditure & Study of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan (in Chinese). The 
1972 estimates are also based on DGBAS data, adjusted by Wan-yong Kuo with 
income tax receipts data and through the incorporation of data for the Taipei 
special municipality which is no longer included in the original provincial figures 
following the elevation of its administrative status in 1968. (Provincial Statistics in 
1968 still include Taipei.) The 1964 data in this table give us 20.3% for the lowest 
40%, 38.7% for the middle 40%, and 41% for the top 20%, which are very close to the 
estimates for Taiwan in Table 1. 
in terms of the Gini income concentration ratio.U This was 
followed by a further decrease in terms of the same index of 28.3% 
m 1961-64 and of another 9.1% in 1964-72. How did these 
11. The Gini index can vary from 0 (total absolute equality) to 1 (total 
inequality). The Gini index for family income in the United States was .37 
according to the 1960 census and .36 in the 1970 census. That of Japan was .35 
(1960). U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 and 1970 Census of Population, Part I, U.S. 
Summary, and Annual Report of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, 
Japan, 1963. 
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progressive and continued improvements in distribution come 
about simultaneously with rapid increases in total output and 
several significant shifts of Taiwan's development strategy 
during the two decades? 
Income Differentials between Farmers and Non-Farmers 
and Sectoral Distribution Patterns 
If changes in income distribution in Taiwan have resulted in 
greater equality in terms of various measures based on income 
classes cutting across different economic sectors, what changes in 
income differences have occurred both between and in individual 
sectors? An answer to this question will go a part of the way in 
answering the question raised at the end of the last section. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, growing differences in this respect 
could also create antagonisms detrimental to economic and 
political stability and the national consensus in policy making. 
Let us attempt to answer this question with respect to farm 
and non-farm families12 about which considerable statistical 
information is available. Using the DGBAS data for 1970-72 
adjusted to include the city of Taipei, Kuo Wan-yong shows that 
while income equality increased in the entire economy during 
1964-72, the degree of equality increased more- that is, the Gini 
coefficient decreased more- for non-farm families than for farm 
families (Table 6). In 1972, the Gini coefficient showed a greater 
degree of equality for the former than for the latter although their 
relative standings had been the reverse in 1964. The "cross-over" 
occurred between 1970 and 1971. Given these patterns of 
distribution within the two sectors, respectively, it is not 
surprising that the rapid expansion of the industrial sector in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to greater overall equality 
:rather than inequality. 
Contrary to the preceding favorable distributive effect of rapid 
industrial growth, to be explained below, an unfavorable develop-
ment during 1964-72 was the widening discrepancy between farm 
and non-farm incomes although both were rising. Average income 
per farm family rose by 53.3% between 1964 and 1972, from 
NT$32,013 to NT$49,090, at constant 1972 prices. On the other 
hand, average non-farm family income rose by 97%, from 
NT$32,740, virtually at par with farm family income, in 1964 to 
12. The classification is based on the occupation of the family head. Family 
income from all sources is included. Thus, the income of a farm family may include 
income from both agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits of all family members. 
The same is true of the income of a non-farm family. 
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Table 6. Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration by Sector 
Year Farm Non-farm Both Sectors 
1964 0.315 0.336 0.328 
1968 0.292 0.338 0.3:35 
1970 0.283 0.285 0.299 
1971 0.297 0.292 0.301 
1972 0.291 0.288 0.295 
Source: Kuo Wan-yong, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes" (1974). (Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored 
by the Japan Economic Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower 
Studies, December 16-20, Vol. II, July 1975), Table 7. 
NT$64,497 in 1972, 31.5% higher than the corresponding farm 
figure. 13 This factor is probably among the most serious potential 
threats to income equality if it is allowed to continue unchecked. 
Economic Policy and Income Equality 
The changes in overall and sectoral income distribution in 
Taiwan can be explained in terms of (1) sectoral emphasis and 
shifts in development strategy over time, (2) the open economy 
and foreign trade orientation of the island, (3) the initial state of 
asset distribution and subsequent changes effected by government 
intervention, and (4) other governmental measures that have 
improved access to education and technology and redirected 
investment in favor of certain groups and sectors that might 
otherwise have been at a disadvantage in comparison with the 
rest of the society. 
The 1950s and Early 1960s 
Two basic facts should be borne in mind. First, since the ratio 
of labor to capital in agricultural production, given Taiwan's 
small-farm, labor-intensive economy, was a priori greater in 
13. Kuo, op. cit., 1974, Table 13. This increasing sectoral discrepancy also 
accounted for the facf that the overall Gini index in 1970-72 (Table 4) is higher 
than both sectoral coefficients. See Kuo, op. cit., for a technical discussion of what 
she calls the "within," "between," and "share" effects. 
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agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector during the 1950s, a 
larger share of factor income should go to labor in the agricultural 
sector than in the non-agricultural sector as production in both 
sectors increased. (The reverse may be true in the case of the 
labor-land ratio other than, urban housing construction.) How the 
relative shares of labor to capital (or labor to land) in factor 
income might change in the aggregate ~ould depend upon the 
relative rates of growth of the two economic sectors during a given 
period. Second, as shown in Table 7 the contribution of agriculture 
to net domestic product per capita grew at about the same rate 
during 1952-60 as did the non-agricultural sector. Thus, if other 
things had been equal, the expansion of agricultural and non-
agricultural production at a virtually equal pace during 1952-60 
should not alter the proportion between factor income earned by 
labor and factor income that went to owners of property, i.e., both 
land and capital. The benefit of increased production would then 
be shared by labor and property owners in the same proportion as 
their respective income shares were at the beginning of the period. 
Table 7. Contribution of Agriculture to Net 
Domestic Product per Capita 
1952 1960 
Total population (in thousand persons) 8,128 10,792 
Agriculture 4,257 5,373 
Non-agriculture 3,871 5,419 
Net Domestic Product (NT$ million) 
Agriculture 5,233 16,528 
Non-agriculture 9,424 34,305 
Per Capita Value-added (NT$) 
Agriculture 1,229.3 3,076.1 
Non-agriculture 2,434.5 6,330.5 
Ratio of Non-agriculture: 
Agriculture 1.98:1 2.06:1 
1972 
15,289 
5,947 
9,342 
38,121 
190,217 
6,410.1 
20,361.5 
3.18:1 
Source: Taiwan Data Book (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 1974),pp. 4, 
27, 49. 
However, other things did not remain equal during this 
period. One of the most important economic events in the early 
1950s, if not the most important single event, was the implementa-
tion of land reform in Taiwan in 1953 (one of the benchmark years 
previously selected), preceded during 1949-52 by sale of public land 
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and reduction of land rent paid by tenant farmers. The rent 
reduction had the effect of reducing the rate of return to property 
in the agricultural sector, thereby increasing the relative share of 
labor in a period of rising agricultural output and income (Table 
8). 
Table 8. Distribution of Agriculture Income 
by Factor (in percent) 
Land Capital Labor 
Before Land Reform 
(Under Japanese Rule) 
1941 52.20 11.48 36.32 
1942 51.99 11.44 36.57 
1943 45.65 10.04 44.31 
Post Land Reform 
1953 37.39 8.23 54.38 
1956 36.28 7.98 55.74 
Source: S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Nung-yeh Fa-chan ti Tsung-ho Lun-shu" 
(A Comprehensive Study of Agricultural Development). JCRR Special Report No. 
28, July 1959 reprinted in T. H. Yu, ed., Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi 
(Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei: Lien-ching Publications 
Co., 1975), p. 37, Table 13. 
Under Land Reform, the conversion of many tenants into 
owner farmers and wider dispersion of land ownership, with 
limitation on the size of individual holdings, had the effect of 
further spreading property income among a larger number of farm 
families. The net effect of rent reduction and land reform together, 
therefore, was to increase sharply the degree of equality in income 
distribution in the agricultural sector. 
It goes without saying that these beneficial effects of asset 
redistribution through land reform could have been at least 
partially nullified had agricultural production declined. The 
actual increase in production after land reform enabled the 
recipients of property income in the agricultural sector also to 
enjoy rising income from property ownership. One must therefore 
also examine why agricultural output actually increased after 
land reform, a point to be discussed elsewhere. 
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The overall equalizing effect of greater income equality in the 
agricultural sector during 1952-60 was not offset by developments 
in the non-agricultural sector where income distribution was more 
unequal. Several factors contributed to this outcome. First, the 
discrepancy between agricultural and non-agricultural per capita 
income which developed later did not widen significantly during 
this period. Second, the expansion of production in the non-
agricultural sector during this period was probably brought about 
by an increase mostly in relatively small businesses, many of 
which were established by new immigrant entrepreneurs from the 
China mainland. Even in the beginning of the 1970s small firms 
employing less than 100 persons each were still responsible for 
35% of gross production in manufacturing. 14 Private capital 
ownership was not highly concentrated. A number of large 
industrial enterprises previously owned by the Japanese had been 
taken over by the ROC government and were run as public 
enterprises so that income which would have accrued to property 
owners of these enterprises went to the Treasury. Third, outside 
the economic infrastructure which was expanded by the govern-
ment and government enterprises, industrial production in 
Taiwan during this early phase of the island's postwar economic 
development stressed consumer goods production using products 
from the agricultural sector as inputs. Thus expansion in the non-
agricultural sector had the effect of stimulating production in the 
agricultural sector where income distribution was more equal. At 
the same time, production in the industrial sector was not capital 
intensive; the initial asset distribution did not seem to be highly 
14. See Gustav Ranis' essay on Taiwan in Chenery et al., op. cit., 1974. 
According to the criteria employed by the ROC government, any firm that is 
engaged in manufacturing, processing or handicraft production is officially 
designated as a small or medium·sized enterprise (a) if its registered capital and 
total assets are below NT$5 million and NT$20 million respectively, or (b) if its 
registered capital is below NT$5 million and its employment is below 100-300 
persons, the exact cut off being dependent upon the nature of the industry. For 
firms engaged in trade, service and transportation the maxima are 50 persons in 
employment and NT$5 million in annual sales. Of all these firms, those employing 
fewer than one hundred persons are generally regarded as "small businesses." 
According to the 1971 Industrial and Commercial Consensus, the small firms 
numbered 276,095 or 98.97% of all the reporting firms. Within the manufacturing 
sector, they numbered 40,737 or 95.43% of the total. These small manufacturers 
were responsible for 35% of gross production, 35.6% of employment, 34% of value-
added, and 45% of export sales, as compared with the entire manufacturing sector. 
See C. C. Chao, "Small Business Development" (paper prepared for the US-ROC 
Symposium for Small Business Development and Trade Promotion, San Francisco, 
March 25-26, 1976). 
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concentrated; the small-scale enterprises tended to spread the 
benefit of increased production more widely among owners of 
industrial property. Also, the most important industrial inputs 
used by the agricultural sector at that time, viz., chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, were mostly imported. Their purchase 
did not constitute a source of demand for the domestic industrial 
sector. Finally, greater industrial employment and the relative 
ease of business formation by enterprising persons of low income 
were obviously helpful in raising the earnings of the lower-income 
groups in the non-agricultural sector. 
To sum up, (1) the ROC government's initial emphasis on 
agricultural production, (2) asset redistribution through land 
reform, (3) the consumer goods and small business emphasis in 
the industrial sector, and ( 4) certain characteristics of asset 
distribution of the postwar and post-1949 period were responsible 
for the improvement in income distribution in Taiwan during the 
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. 
From the 1960s to the early 1970s 
Although further improvement in income equality slowed 
down during the 1960s and early 1970s, a remarkable phenom-
enon was that the movement toward greater equality continued in 
both the farm and non-farm sectors. This occurred in spite of a 
widening gap between farm and non-farm family incomes due to 
the failure of agricultural production to keep pace with the 
accelerated expansion of industrial production. Several factors are 
involved in explaining what happened to income distribution in 
the second decade. 
First, the crux of the development strategy adopted during 
this period was the expansion of foreign trade. In the light of the 
preceding expansion of the agricultural sector, export expansion 
began very naturally with increased export of agricultural and 
processed agricultural products. This was helpful in sustaining 
agricultural income. 
Second, because of the paucity of its natural resources, 
Taiwan's foreign trade orientation involved an expansion of both 
exports and imports. By eschewing self-sufficiency as an objec-
tive, the rapidly expanding exports were based on progressively 
increasing imports which included many capital-intensive prod-
ucts. Any attempt to achieve self-sufficiency by stressing import 
substitution at this point would doubtless have reduced the rate of 
expansion considerably. The export orientation of Taiwan's 
economic development not only increased the rate of economic 
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growth, but also reduced the rate at which capital's share of factor 
income was to increase. 
Third, much of the export expansion during this period took 
place in the form of labor-intensive products. Imported raw 
materials and intermediate goods were processed into finished 
goods for export through the concentrated application of labor 
which was much cheaper in Taiwan than in the countries where 
Taiwan exports were marketed. The several Export Processing 
Zones established to attract foreign capital were especially 
illustrative of this practice. The effect on income distribution was 
twofold. Within the industrial sector, the very rapid expansion of 
labor-intensive exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prior to 
the 1974 world-wide recession induced by the oil cartel's price hike, 
reduced the initial labor surplus and raised wages and employ-
ment. The result was to raise the earnings of non-farm families at 
the lower income levels. For farm families, participation in the 
rapid expansion of the industrial sector took place partly through 
access to the new employment opportunities offered. Many women 
employees of foreign businesses in the Export Processing Zones 
came from farm families. The net effect was to increase the 
proportion of non-agricultural income for farm families, especially 
those with smaller land holdings. This in turn served to reduce the 
income discrepancy between farm and non-farm families, in spite 
of the lagging growth of the farm versus the non-farm sector, 
while simultaneously increasing income equality in the farm 
sector. 15 
15. See Chang Han-yu, "Taiwan Nung-chia So-te ti Pien-hua yii Shih-p'ing 
Chia-kung chih Fa-chan," (Changes in Taiwan's Agricultural Income and 
Development of the Food Processing Industry), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an 
(Quarterly Journal of the Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1973). Chang 
gives the following data for 1965 and 1971: 
Non-agricultural Income as Percent of Agricultural Income 
1965 1971 
Farm family with cultivated 
land under v2 ha. 35.3 53.3 
Farm family with cultivated 
land exceeding 2 ha. 11.8 22.2 
Average of all farm families 19.4 28.2 
In 1971, for farm families or under .5 hectare, 34.6% of the non-agricultural 
income received came from wages, the rest being property income and income from 
other occupations, which presumably included both wage and property income. For 
families having more than 2 hectares, the proportion of wages in non-agricultural 
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In short, a very rapidly expanding industrial sector oriented 
to export that was based on processing of imported materials by 
highly labor-intensive methods was instrumental in raising 
wages, which also benefited farm families. The latter were 
progressively becoming less dependent on agriculture as their sole 
source of labor income. Under these conditions income equality 
was able to improve further, albeit at a slower rate than before. 
Distribution of Wealth between Pre- and Post-1945 Settlers 
Aside from the distribution of income between farm and non-
farm families, a related distributive factor of major interest is the 
relative economic status of the pre-1945 ethnic Chinese settlers of 
Taiwan (often loosely referred to as Taiwanese by Westerners) 
versus that of the post-1945 settlers (often referred to as 
Mainlanders). Since the "Mainlanders" came to Taiwan in 1945 to 
take over the Japanese administration, political power was 
initially vested entirely in their hands. During the past 30 years, 
they have progressively broadened the participation of govern-
ment so that more and more members ofthe pre-1945 settler group 
are now included in the government hierarchy. This progressively 
more equal distribution of political power, more advanced at the 
provincial and local government levels than at the central 
government level, should be considered in conjunction with the 
distribution of economic benefits between the two groups. An 
interesting point that concerns us in this paper is whether the 
relative economic status of the two groups corresponds to their 
relative political positions or whether a different relationship 
prevails. 
Although income distribution data are not available on the 
basis of the dates of immigration of family heads to Taiwan, the 
problem can be approached indirectly by examining the distribu-
tion of wealth between the two groups. Two major points need to 
be borne in mind in this connection. First, the 1953 land reform 
which took place not very long after the transfer of the central 
government of the Republic of China from the mainland to 
Taiwan effectively precluded the existence of absentee landlords. 
The earliest group of post-1945 settlers from the mainland 
consisted primarily of government officials, members of the armed 
forces, officers of public corporations and some businessmen. Few 
of them, if any, had either the inclination or time, before the land 
reform, to become farm land owners. Thus, land, a form of 
income was 11.1•J'n. The corresponding proportions of wages in non-agricultural 
income in 1965 were 26.1% and 15.1%, respectively. 
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physical asset of dominant importance during the early years of 
Taiwan's post-World War II economic development, has remained 
entirely in the hands of the pre-1945 settlers. Some of the public 
land taken over by the ROC government from the Japanese was 
also sold to the farmers as a part of the land reform program. 
While the government and public corporations, such as Taiwan 
Sugar, still own some of the land, there has not been any 
redistribution benefiting the post-1945 settlers. Only to the extent 
that land has been transferred from crop cultivation to non-
agricultural or other agricultural uses could ownership of landed 
wealth outside the urban areas become vested in the hands of 
post-1945 settlers. 
In view of the above, unless the distribution of wealth outside 
the agricultural sector were in favor of the post-1945 settlers, the 
distribution of wealth as a whole would tend to favor the pre-1945 
settlers who are owners of virtually all private farm land. A most 
important factor to bear in mind in this connection, therefore, is 
the distribution of ownership of large enterprises in the civilian 
sector of the economy. In 1975 there were 35 businesses in Taiwan 
whose annual sales exceeded NT$1 billion each. In addition, 
another 66 firms had annual sales exceeding NT$400 million each 
(see Table 9). Altogether 132 firms had annual sales exceeding 
NT$200 million each. If these firms are grouped according to 
whether the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the President 
of the firm16 are from pre- or post-1945 settler families, 59% of the 
aggregate capital of all the firms is accounted for by enterprises 
headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 41% by post-1945 settlers. 
Furthermore, if a line is drawn at the level of NT$300 million in 
capitalization, there are 47 firms above this line. Of these larger 
firms, which are further divided into five intervals (see Table 10), 
those headed by pre-1945 settlers account for an overwhelmingly 
larger proportion of invested capital than the post-1945 settlers in 
four groups, the single exception being the group of firms with 
capitalization from NT$500 million to NT$1 billion. In contrast, 
for firms capitalized below NT$300 million, a larger proportion of 
invested capital is accounted for by enterprises with post-1945 
settler heads, the only exception being the group of firms with 
capitalization of NT$100 to NT$200 million. 
Similarly, one can use annual sales as the criterion. On this 
basis, of 10 firms each with annual sales in excess of NT$3 billion, 
7 are headed by pre-1945 settlers and only 3 by post-1945 settlers. 
16. A few finns had non-Chinese Presidents or Board Chairmen. 
Table 9. Business Enterprises in Taiwan 
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million 
~ 
z 
0 
Aggregate Annual Sales (NT $ million) 0 
a:: 
Heads No. 1,000to t%J 5,000to 4,000to 3,000to 2,000to 500to tj 
of of Over under under under under under under Under 
-Firms Firms 6,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 500 Total r:n ~ 
-t:J:I 
Pre-1945 69 6,147.5 10,947.3 9,162.7 6,163.0 4,559.2 12,692.8 22,203.7 6,162.1 78,038.3 c 
Settlers (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (10) (32) (18) (69) '"'3 
-Post-1945 63 9,859.5 (0) 4,080.1 3,225.4 7,477.7 13,970.5 10,480.0 11,995.8 ()1,089.0 0 z 
Ret tiers (1) (10) (1) (1) (3) (10) (14) (33) (63) ~ 
Total 132 16,007.0 10,947.3 13,242.8 9,388.4 12,036.9 26,663.3 32,683.7 18,157.9 1:19,127.3 z 
Percent ;? 
Pre-1945 52 38 100 69 66 38 48 68 34 56 t%J 
Settlers ~ 
Post-1945 48 62 0 31 34 62 52 32 66 44 0 
Settlers Q 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group. 
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976. 
00 
-J 
~ 
Table 10. Business Enterprises in Taiwan 
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million 
0 
Total Capitalization (1,000,000 NT $) 0 
z 
Heads No. 1,000to 500to 400to 300to 200to 100to ~ 
of of Over under under under under under under Under a: 
Finns Firms 2,000 2,000 1,000 500 400 300 200 100 Total "tt 0 
Pre-1945 69 2,040.0 5,379.3 5,077.0 4,493.7 2,425.3 2,717.0 2,581.5 429.3 25,143.1 ~ 
Settlers (1) (4) (8) (10) (7) (12) (19) (8) (69) ~ Post-1945 61* - 2,120.0 7,430.9 810.0 680.0 3,521.8 1,907.6 667.8 17,138.1 
Settlers (0) (2) (11) (2) (2) (15) (14) (15) (61) ~ Total 130 2,040.0 7,499.3 12,507.9 5,303.7 3,105.3 6,238.8 4,489.1 1,097.1 42,281.2 
Percent r:n 
>--,3 
Pre-1945 53 100 72 41 85 78 44 58 39 59 c: t:l 
Settlers .... l"'l 
Post-1945 47 0 28 59 15 22 56 42 61 41 riJ 
Settlers r:n 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 l"'l 1:1:1 
.... 
l"'l 
riJ 
*Two of the firms are without data on capital 
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group. 
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976. 
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In contrast, of 122 firms each with annual sales below NT$3 
billion, 62 are headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 60 by post-
1945 settlers. Furthermore, within each sales interval above the 
NT$3 billion mark, firms headed by pre-1945 settlers account for 
an overwhelmingly larger proportion of total sales, there being 
only a single exception. In all the sales intervals below the NT$3 
billion mark the reverse is true, again with the exception of a 
single interval. 
An earlier survey in 196917 which divided business firms in 
Taiwan on the basis of financial groups shows that of 337 firms 
which can be clearly identified in terms of ownership by pre- or 
post-1945 settlers, 60% were accounted for by the pre-1945 settlers 
while the post-1945 settlers controlled 28% (95 firms), with 12% (41 
firms) representing combined ownership. Furthermore, the firms 
of the pre-1945 group were responsible for 61% of invested capital 
on the basis of capitalization and 59% of business revenue in that 
year. On the other hand, the firms of the post-1945 group were 
responsible for 30% of invested capital and 31% of total business 
revenue. The mixed group accounted for 9% of capitalization and 
11% of revenue. These earlier statistics point to the larger 
ownership of the pre-1945 settlers in business outside the 
agricultural sector, but there was no noticeable disparity in size 
between the enterprises of the two groups. Hence the growth of the 
relative importance of the pre-1945 settlers in the control of the 
larger enterprises in the 1975 survey appeared to be a phenom-
enon of the early 1970s. 
Both the 1969 and 1975 statistics lend support to the 
conclusion that the larger Taiwan enterprises are headed by pre-
1945 settlers while the smaller firms have a larger proportion of 
post-1945 settler heads. The more recent growth was in favor of 
the pre-1945 settlers for the larger enterprises and the post-1945 
settlers for the smaller ones. The exceptions to the rule are 
relatively few. Although the 1975 data deal with only the larger 
firms, while the 1969 data include a wider spectrum of businesses, 
comparison of the more recent findings with the 1969 statistics 
suggest that there may have been a trend during the first half of 
the 1970s for the post-1945 settlers to move up in their relative 
economic standing while some members of the pre-1945 settler 
group forged even further ahead. In view of the fact that the post-
1945 settlers were late corners and few of them had settled in 
17. See Chang ChUn-H11ng, Taiwan She-hui-li ti fen·hsi (An analysis of Social 
forces in Taiwan) (Taipei: Huan-YU Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 32-42. 
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Taiwan with vast personal wealth, it is quite understandable that 
they have had to compete very hard in the private economic sector 
and are not in a dominant position. This can be contrasted with 
the more favorable political position the post-1945 settlers enjoyed. 
We have already noted the movement toward greater equality in 
the distribution of political power in favor of the pre-1945 settlers. 
The present statistical analysis indicates that there may have 
been a slight and slower shift toward greater equality in the 
distribution of industrial and commercial wealth in favor of the 
post-1945 settlers. Fortunately for Taiwan, therefore, the redistri-
bution of political power and material wealth can move in 
opposite directions, thus serving to compensate each other. A 
priori, one is inclined to conclude that this is a situation favoring 
greater social stability. 
Future Prospects 
We have put the preceding discussion on income distribution 
in the past tense although many of the conditions of the 1960s and 
early 1970s continue to hold today, because several circumstances 
now exist that could significantly alter the course of development. 
First, Taiwan is trying to shift toward more capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive production. It is also trying to supply 
domestically more of the manufactured industrial raw materials it 
needs. The relative rates of growth of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors will change further and the relative share of 
capital as factor income will probably also rise. There is a latent 
tendency, therefore, toward less rather than greater equality in 
income distribution unless capital ownership can become progres-
sively more equally distributed, and unless other corrective 
measures are undertaken. Thus the role of government interven-
tion may have to, and probably will, increase in order to forestall 
a reversal of the previous trend toward greater equality in income 
distribution. Both existing and new measures, fiscal and other-
wise, will have to be expanded, but greater government interven-
tion could stifle productivity and economic growth if adequate 
safeguards and judicious restraint are not provided. 
Within this context some of the measures adopted in recent 
years deserve mention. In the first place, the progressive income 
tax, although a part of the ROC's long-standing taxes, has been 
implemented much more vigorously in recent years as a result of 
technical reforms in data collection and reporting. Income tax 
collections increased noticeably between 1966 and 1972, especially 
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for the higher income brackets. 1k Secondly, among the more recent 
measures, reduction of various hidden taxes levied in the form of 
rice collection since 1964, and particularly since 1969, has 
contributed to greater income equality, especially in reducing the 
disparity between farm and non-farm incomes. These two 
categories of measures are clearly focused on income transfers. 
In the third place, expansion of the stock exchange, which can 
be seen in an increase in the number of listed stocks between 1962 
and 1973, has been a welcome development in promoting the 
dispersion of property ownership. 19 This development could be 
extended if institutions can be developed in the near future so that 
farm families can progressively participate in industrial expan-
sion by becoming owners of stocks in industrial enterprises just as 
they have already participated by providing labor to the 
expanding industrial sector. It may be necessary for the 
government to step in by organizing intermediaries in the form of 
"mutual funds" which can collect rural savings for investment in 
industry, thus altering the distribution of industrial assets which 
are growing rapidly. 
Another set of government measures has had the effect of 
especially accelerating development in the lagging agricultural 
sector. Special funds over and above the level of private 
investment have been earmarked in recent years for investment in 
the accelerated development of agriculture. Central government 
funds totalling NT$2.43 billion have been provided for this 
purpose in the 1977 fiscal year. As of 1975 year-end, projects 
totalling NT$2.58 billion (including central government and other 
funds) in expenditure had been approved out of the 1976 fiscal 
year program.20 A portion of the expenditures is channeled 
through programs for irrigation, flood control, etc. under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial authorities. The bulk of these 
expenditures is aimed at expanding the infrastructure of the 
agricultural sector. Efforts such as this are aimed at modifying 
sectoral balance and income disparity between sectors. There may 
be some question about the rate of return obtained from such 
special efforts. The issue clearly is one of balancing growth 
against distribution and touches upon the central question that 
1H. See Kuo, op. cit .. 1974. The income tax, however, does not seem to have 
significantly altered the differential between farm and non-farm .incomes. 
19. The number of listed stocks increased over 14 times between 1962 and 
1973. The increase in their market value was over 43 times. See Kuo, op. cit. 
20. See rE!ports in the Central Daily News (Taipei), January 4 and 7, 1976. 
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economic development, not to mention the overall development of 
a society, may have multiple goals. 
Finally, there are two important sets of measures that have 
begun to be implemented in 1976. One is the ruling that the heads 
of government-related banking institutions must henceforth be 
rotated so as to avoid the emergence of financial fiefs. The second 
development is the progressive implementation of the law limiting 
urban land ownership and taxation of large capital gains derived 
from such ownership. This is both to avoid overconcentration of 
ownership of urban property and to discourage land speculation 
and wealth accumulation based on large "unearned" increments. 
Thus the authorities are evidently coming to grips with emergent 
issues affecting distribution. 
The Anti-Poverty Program (Hsiao-k'ang Chi-hua) 
In considering income distribution we must obviously exam-
ine not only the relative shares of successive segments of the 
population on the income ladder, but also especially the absolute 
income levels of the lowest income groups. Another effort aimed at 
a particular segment of the population is Taiwan's anti-poverty 
program. This effort to reduce the number of persons in absolute 
poverty and to elevate the income level of persons at the bottom of 
the income ladder deserves closer attention. The issue was 
· officially recognized by the provincial government of Taiwan in 
October 1972 as a major plank in its program.21 Already in 1967 a 
set of unified standards was adopted by the Taiwan provincial 
government in defining and registering "poverty households." 
According to these standards the poorest or "Step 1 poverty 
households" consist of those households whose members are 
"unable to work" and are devoid of all assets or income.22 They 
are therefore completely dependent upon relief and government 
21. For reference see Tai-wan-sheng T'ui-hsing Hsiao k'ang-chi-hua Kung-tso-
shou-ts'e [Anti-poverty Program Manual, edited and published by the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, May 1973) and Tai-wan-sheng Cheng-fu She-hui-ch'u 
King-tso-pao-kao [Work Report of the Office of Social Mfairs, Taiwan Provincial 
Government before the Seventh Session of the Fifth Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 
March 31, 1976]. 
22. The following twelve categories of persons are defined as "without ability 
to work": · 
1. Persons under 16 years of age. 
2. Persons in school under 18. 
3. Persons under _18 who have no earnings from work and who have 
only widowed mothers or grandparents. 
4. Parents in active military service. 
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aid. The medium or "Step 2 poverty households" are those whose 
total income is not more than one-half of the stipulated 
expenditure at "subsistence level" and not more than one-quarter 
of whose members can work. The minimum or "Step 3 poverty 
households" are those whose total income is not more than two-
thirds of the subsistence level and not more than one-third of 
whose members can work. "Subsistence level" is defined as 
NT$200 per capita per month or NT$2,400 a year. The "poverty 
line," at two-thirds of NT$2,400, is therefore set at NT$1,600 per 
person per year. For a family of five persons a total annual 
income of NT$8,000 (approximately US$200) would put it on the 
poverty line.23 
As of 1967 there were 110,036 poverty households in Taiwan, 
outside Taipei. In addition, there were 8,929 poverty households in 
the municipality of Taipei. In combination there were 118,965 
poverty households in all Taiwan. This total amounted to 5.11% of 
total households in Taiwan in that year, 5.28% for Taiwan 
province and 3.31% for Taipei. Between 1967 and 1971, as a result 
of growing economic prosperity, the number of poverty households 
declined steadily, averaging 8.9% a year for all Taiwan. A sharp 
decrease was further registered immediately after the inaugura-
tion of the anti-poverty program in 1972, and the decline of 
poverty households has continued since. 
5. Persons serving prison or probationary sentence whose unexpired 
term exceeds six months in duration. 
6. Persons who are disabled or mentally ill and who have no 
earnings from work. 
7. Men over 60 and women over 55 without earnings from work. 
8. Persons registered as missing for more than six months. 
9. Persons who have been seriously ill for more than three months 
and cannot work and are without regular income. 
10. Widowed single parents who have to care for one or more children 
under 6 years of age and are without regular earnings. 
11. Orphaned children under 12 years of age who are cared for by 
grandparents and are without regular income. 
12. Women without regular earnings who are six months pregnant 
and have to support their own children under three years of age. 
The above stipulations are those of the Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Similar regulations with minor ·variations exist in the Taipei Municipality. 
23. The Taipei Municipality poverty standard, as revised in November 1973, 
divides poverty households into two categories only. Step 1 poverty households are 
defined identically as the first step poverty households under the Provincial 
Government regulations. The Step 2 poverty households are defined in the same 
way as the. minimum poverty households under the Provincial Government 
regulations. However, the minimum subsistence level is fixed at NT$300 a month 
instead of NT$200. · 
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Statistical data on the anti-poverty program are more readily 
available for "Taiwan province" outside the Taipei municipality. 
As can be seen from Table 11, the number of poverty households 
fell from 74.2 thousand in 1971 to 25.7 thousand in 1975. The total 
number of persons in such households declined from 391 thousand 
to 104 thousand during the same period. While statistics 
concerning Taipei are less current, there was also a decline from 
8.4 thousand poverty households in 1971 to 7.0 thousand in 1973. 
As of 1973, only 1.59% of all households in Taiwan outside Taipei 
and 1.64% in Taipei were still classified as poverty households. 
Table 11. Number of "Poverty Households" and Persons 
Poorest Medium Poverty Minimum Poverty Total 
House- House- House- House-
holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons 
1971 16,992 27,196 18,887 110,822 38,368 253,445 74,247 391,463 
1972 17,536 28,634 17,182 100,274 33,250 218,001 67,968 346,909 
1973 14,461 23,744 11,006 58,062 17,675 114,556 43,142 196,362 
1974 11,587 18,882 9,065 48,191 11,254 70,907 31,906 137,980 
1975 25,726 103,952 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government: 
It should be borne in mind that poverty households are 
defined on the basis of per capita income. A poverty household of 
many persons can therefore have a larger family income than a 
non-poverty household smaller in size. Therefore,. one cannot 
assume that households below a certain income level in statistics 
of income distribution by household would automatically consist 
of poverty households. However, most of such households are 
probably below the poverty line. Thus the decline in poverty 
households and the reduction of the number of households in 
lower income levels on the income distribution ladder discussed 
earlier go hand in hand. 
With the rise of retail prices, the required expenditures at the 
stipulated subsistence level have also increased. However, a study 
conducted in 1971 showed that even if the subsistence level 
expenditure had been fixed at 50% higher, or NT$300 per person 
per month outside the Taipei municipality, the number of poverty 
households under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan provincial 
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authorities would only be raised by 7.8%. This is considerably 
below the 36.5% decrease in poverty households registered in 1973 
as compared with 1972 when the anti-poverty program was 
officially inaugurated. Thus the decline in poverty households 
during the first half of the 1970s is quite real and should be 
attributed largely to both economic expansion and efforts under 
the anti-poverty program.24 In the post-1973 oil crisis period, price 
inflation has further increased expenditures at subsistence level. 
However, by defining household income, which is compared with 
the fixed subsistence level expenditure in determining the poverty 
line, at "standard" wage levels by occupation substantially below 
the actual wages received, some, if not all, of the effect of inflation 
has been offset. 
The anti-poverty program includes nine major activities: (1) 
expansion of relief and institution care, (2) aid to production 
through small business loans and construction of marketing 
facilities, (3) active job placement, (4) expansion of occupational 
training in cooperation with factories and vocational schools, (5) 
construction of low-cost housing in order to improve environmen-
tal hygiene, (6) promotion of family planning including free 
family visits and advice, (7) promotion of school attendance by 
school age children, as well as vocational and adult education, 
from poverty households through such measures as tuition loans, 
(8) promotion of community production and welfare activities in 
order to expand the base of the anti-poverty program beyond the 
level of government effort alone, and (9) integration of the 
program as a social movement with education, mass communica-
tion, and the establishment and expansion of special relief funds. 
The basic approach of the program is threefold: (1) increasing 
employment and employability, (2) broadening the movement by 
enlisting the resources of the society as a whole, which helps 
reduce the fiscal and manpower burden on the government, and 
(3) increasing both emergency aid, which helps minimize the 
emergence of new poverty households, and long-term aid to those 
who really cannot help themselves. 
Table 12 shows that the size of the poverty households varies 
considerably with the degree of poverty. The poorest, or Step 1 
poverty household, averages only 1.6 persons per household while 
the average number in the medium poverty household varies from 
5.9 persons in 1971 to 5.3 persons in 1974, showing a steady 
decline during the period. For the minimum poverty household, 
24. Lu Kuang, Tai-wan Ti-ch'il To-P'ing-chung Wen-ti (The Poverty Problem 
in Taiwan). She-hui Chien-she Social Reconstruction (Taipei, 1975) pp. 1-24. 
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the average number of persons per household varied from 6.6 in 
1971 to 6.3 in 1974. These figures suggest that the medium and 
minimum poverty households are poor partly because of the large 
size of the family. However, since the large family probably 
contains persons who could become employed, it may also stand a 
better chance of escaping poverty if employment can be found. On 
the other hand, the small size of the very poor families indicates 
that for them poverty is probably a chronic condition due to old 
age, physical disability or, at the other end of the income ladder, 
lack of adult care. (See the discussion on single person households 
at the end of this chapter.) 
Table 12. Number of Persons per "Poverty Household" 
All 
Medium Minimum Poverty 
Poorest Poverty Poverty Households 
1971 1.6 5.9 6.6 5.3 
1972 1.6 5.8 6.6 5.1 
1973 1.6 5.2 6.5 4.6 
1974 1.6 5.3 6.3 4.3 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Table 13. Percent Distribution of Poverty Households 
by Degree of Poverty 
Medium Minimum 
Poorest Poverty Poverty Total 
1971 22.9 25.4 51.7 100.0 
1972 25.8 25.3 48.9 100.0 
1973 33.5 25.5 41.0 1.00.0 
1974 36.3 28.4 35.3 100.0 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
An examination of the distribution of poverty households by 
degree of poverty as shown in Table 13 indicates that the above 
interpretation is essentially correct. In 1971, nearly 52% of the 
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poverty households were in the minimum poverty category while 
the medium poverty and poorest households accounted for 25% 
and 23%, respectively. By 1974 the poorest households were 
responsible for 36% of a much smaller total of poverty households 
while the medium poverty group accounted for 28% and the 
minimum poverty group 35% of the total, respectively. The larger 
relative share of the poorest group indicates the existence of a 
hard-core poverty category requiring long-term aid. The largest 
reduction of the relative share of the minimum poverty group is, 
on the other hand, indicative of the increased employment of its 
members to which the anti-poverty program has contributed. 
One major thrust of the anti-poverty program is to encourage 
poverty households to declare themselves as "self-reliant house-
holds." Such a declaration entails a pledge to accept vocational 
education, employment guidance, etc. that would help uplift the 
household above its poverty status. Annual surveys are conducted 
to follow up on the current status of the poverty households, 
including the self-reliant households. The survey also includes 
households that have risen above the poverty line. The 1974 
survey showed that 7% of the members of the poverty households 
were chronically ill and 6% were physically handicapped. In 
contrast, the same two categories accounted for 4.1% and 3.3% 
respectively of the self-reliant households, and the ratios were 
even lower - 2.8% and 2.6% respectively - for households that 
had risen above the poverty status. Furthermore, the proportion of 
persons "able to work" increased from 24% of the members of the 
poverty households to 32% in the self-reliant households and 35.5% 
in households that had risen above the poverty line. Sixty-six 
percent of those who were able to work in the poverty households 
were burdened by family misfortunes while about 14% were ill or 
disabled. The incidence of these two major reasons for poverty 
conditions declined to 60% and 8.7% respectively for the self-
reliant households and 51% and 7% respectively for households 
that had risen above the poverty line. Furthermore, among the 
members of these households that successfully escaped the 
poverty line, according to the same survey, 15.7% had complained 
about loss of employment or lack of employment opportunities 
and 13% of lack of training or work experience. These statistics 
again indicate that the most effective means .to eliminate poverty 
in Taiwan have been increases in employment and employability. 
Table 14 shows the percent distribution by type of aid under the 
anti-poverty program that has contributed to removing house-
holds from the poverty status. Family planning was credited with 
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26% of the program's success, followed by vocational training and 
employment aid, 24%; medical, surgical and emergency aid, 15%. 
Other single categories that have proved significant are family 
subsidy, 9%; housing improvement, 7%; and production and 
marketing aid, 4%. 
Once poverty households have found employment for their 
members, their income naturally increases. The 1974 survey 
indicates that the median annual income of such households that 
had risen above the poverty line was NT$25, 763 (US $678). At the 
same time, the median annual income of the self-reliant house-
holds whose members had found employment was NT$19,534 (US 
$514). 
Table 14. Types of Aid Contributing to Removal of Poverty 
Status under the Anti-Poverty Program · 
Percent 
1. Family planning 26.3 
2. Vocational training and employment aid 24.3 
3. Medical, surgical and emergency aid 15.2 
4. Family subsidy 9.0 
5. House improvement 6.7 
6. Production and marketing aid 4.3 
7. Other 14.2 
Total 100.0 
Source: Department of Social Mfairs, Taiwan Provincial Qovemment. 
More recently, Taiwan's anti-poverty effort has begun to focus 
its attention on households in certain specific occupations, 
notably the salt producers and segments of fishermen families. 
The anti-poverty program has also consistently included the 
aborigine households living in central Taiwan. The entire anti-
poverty program is a facet of income distribution that deserves far 
more attention and study. 
III. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
Eastern Europe and Mainland China 
The experience of Taiwan in income distribution in relation to 
its economic policy and socio-political environment can be 
compared with that of mainland China and other communist 
countries, as well as with that of other non-communist Asian 
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countries, both developing and developed. In making the first set 
of comparisons, one's interest turns very naturally toward the 
PRC as "the other China," although brief reference might be 
made to some European communist countries as well. See Table 
15. 
Table 15. Income Share of All Households 
Per Capita Lowest Middle Top 
Year GNP /U.S.$) 40% 40% 20% 
Yugoslavia 1968 529 18.5 40.0 41.5 
Taiwan 1972 503 21.7 39.2 39.1 
Poland 1964 850 23.4 40.6 36.0 
Hungary 1969 1140 24.0 42.5 33.5 
Bulgaria 1962 530 26.8 40.0 33.2 
Czechoslovakia 1964 1150 27.6 41.4 31.0 
Source: For Taiwan, see page 13 of text. For the East European countries, see 
Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth, pp. 8-9 
According to available estimates (mostly from U.N. sources) 
cited above, if comparison is made with several East European 
communist countries in the mid to late 1960s, Taiwan in 1972 
would find itself situated between Yugoslavia and Poland in terms 
of the income shares of the lowest 40% and the highest 20% of 
income recipients respectively. The same would be true for Taiwan 
in 1964. In a very general way one can speak of income 
distribution in Taiwan in 1972 as being slightly more "equal" 
than it was in Yugoslavia in 1968 and slightly less "equal" than 
in Poland in 1964. Yet, in contrast to both Poland and Yugoslavia, 
Taiwan is a market economy with ownership of private property. 
Because of inadequate official data from Peking, no such 
overall comparison of income distribution can be made directly 
between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. However, several 
indicators can be used to make partial comparisons so that a 
plausible overall impression can nevertheless be inferred. 
First, regarding the income differential between the agricultu-
ral and non-agricultural sectors, we have already noted above the 
declining ratio between farm and non-farm family incomes in 
Taiwan in 1964-72. The ratio worsened in 1973, a year of 
unprecedented industrial boom before the oil crisis. See Table 16. 
However, if the municipality of Taipei is excluded, the 
corresponding differentials would be significantly lower: 1.23 in 
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Table 16. Change in Ratios of Farm and Non-Farm Family 
Incomes 
I. Average farm family income 
II. Average non-farm family income 
Ratio of II:I 
1964 1972 1973 
(NT$ per annum, constant 
1972 prices) 
32,013 
32,740 
1.02 
49,090 
64,497 
1.31 
54,544 
81,373 
1.49 
As shown in Table 17, these income differentials are not 
significantly affected by comparing the average disposable 
incomes after tax.a 
Table 17. Average Disposable Incomes After Tax 
1966 1972 1973 
A. Average disposable income per 
farm household" 30,423 46,481h 52,123" 
B. Average disposable income per 
non-farm households 32,718 61,293h 77,3948 
Ratio of B:A 1.08 1.32h 1.48• 
Sources: (a) These disposable income estimates are calculated by Han-yu 
Chang, "Taiwan Ching-chi fan-chan kuo-ch'eng-chung so-te fen-p'ei chih fen-hsi" 
(An Analysis of Income Distribution in the Process of Taiwan's Economic 
Development), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly), Volume 
26, No. 4, Taipei, December 1975, Tables 2-1 and 2-2, pp. 12-13. 
(b) Kuo, op. cit., July 1975, Table 13. 
1972 and 1.35 in 1973. This can be seen from the data for Taiwan 
Province (i.e., Taiwan excluding Taipei) in Table 18. 
When the average disposable income is calculated on a per 
capita rather than per household basis, the excess of non-farm 
household income would rise to 50% in 1972 and 65% in 1973. 
Apparently the larger size of the farm household made the farm 
sector even worse off on a per person basis. 
If comparison is made between the data for Taiwan including 
Taipei and those excluding Taipei, it is quite clear that the higher 
income households in the capital city make the income differential 
between the farm and non-farm sectors much higher than it would 
otherwise be. Furthermore, inclusion of Taipei makes the 
worsening of the differential between 1972 and 1973 proportion-
ately somewhat greater (from 1.31 to 1.49) than it would otherwise 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE ROC 101 
be (from 1.22 to 1.36). This phenomenon points to the greater 
concentration of higher income families in the capital. 
Table 18. Income Differentials for Taiwan Province 
A. Average income per farm family 
B. Average income per non .farm family 
Ratio of B:A 
A. Average disposable income per farm 
household• 
B. Average disposable income per non-farm 
householda 
Ratio of B:A 
Source: (a) Chang, op. cit. 
C. Average disposable income per 
person in farm households 
Estimate (1) 
Estimate (2) 
D. Average disposable income per 
person in non-farm households 
Estimate 
Estimate 
Ratio of D:C 
Estimate 
Estimate 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
1966 
4,244 
5,628 
6,206 
8,620 
1.46 
1.53 
1972 1973 
49,033 
60,Ql0 
1.22 
46,429 
57,022 
1.23 
1972 
7,140 
9,348 
10,776 
16,174. 
1.50 
1.73 
54,352 
73,957 
1.36 
51,934 
70,318 
1.35 
1973 
8,153 
12,047 
13,472 
20,920 
1.65 
1.73 
Source: Chang, op. cit. Estimate (1) is based on Survey reports on family 
income and expenditures. Change also presents an alternative estimate (2) based 
on farm household accounts. 
While sectoral income disparity between agriculture and non-
agriculture, together with the greater disparity attributable to 
Taipei within the non-agricultural sector, plagues Taiwan as a 
distributional problem, as it does other developing countries, the 
disparity is by all counts even greater on the Chinese mainland. 
According to one American estimate,25 the money income of the 
25. Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in· the People's 
Repulic of China, 1953-65 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1967), p. 
13. 
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average mainland Chinese non-agricultural worker was around 
¥560 a year in 1960 or about four times that of the average 
peasant, thus inferentially making the latter's income about ¥140 
a year. While the -¥560 figure refers to the worker, the average 
annual income of the entire worker-employee (chih-kung, or 
worker and staff) group was ¥656 in 195826 and remained at the 
roughly constant level of ¥650 in 1971.27 (The official press 
compared this 1971 figure with that of 1952, noting that it was a 
50% increase, but omitted to compare it with the 1957 or 1958 
benchmark level.) It is not clear whether the average worker's 
income also remained stationary in 1958-71, although any 
increase that may have occurred could not be significant since the 
average of the numerically larger worker-employee group, which 
includes the numerically larger sub-group of workers, became even 
slightly lower, ¥650 instead of ¥656. 28 Peking's policy to keep the 
worker's income low is essentially intended both as a means of 
maintaining a high rate of capital investment and of keeping the 
income disparity between farmers and non-farmers within 
bounds. 
· According to a British author, a survey of rural-urban income 
differentials in Kiangsu suggested that on the average the urban 
worker's income in 1957 was probably twice that of the peasant 
working on a cooperative farm. 29 Allowing for changes in the 
pricing of goods both bought and sold by the urban and rural 
workers, some narrowing of this differential may have occurred in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
In two production teams whose accounts are used as 
illustrations in texts for training financial and accounting 
workers, the average per capita annual incomes of peasant 
households in 1971 were ¥-108 and ¥-139 respectively (Table 19). 
Other per capita figures given for both production brigades and 
26. The Ta Kung Pao (Peking), May 24, 1958. 
27. NCNA International (Peking), September 18, 1971. 
28. In his testimony on the allocation of resources in mainland China, 
Michael Field stated that 
The average wage of a worker in China now [1975] is about the same as it was 
in 1957, .... In real terms ... , so there has been no appreciable increase in 
the standard of living. 
In various times, e.g., 1967, 1968 and 1974, "There were demands for increased 
wages and for better times." See "People's Republic of China: An Economic 
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second 
session, May 18, 1972), p. 72. 
29. See Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 50-51. 
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communes in six geographically widespread areas, possibly for 
different years, vary from ¥94 to as high as ¥176 and are 
generally in the same order of magnitude as the two textbook 
examples cited before. Still other average annual farm household 
incomes in 1957 vary from ¥171 for Kansu province to ¥306 for 
Szechwan, ¥399 for Hopei, and ¥454 for Kiangsu. 30 Depending 
upon the number of full-time workers and the size of farm and 
non-farm households, alternative ratios of non-farm to farm 
household incomes can be obtained as shown in Table 20. 
Table 19. Annual Income in 1971 
Per farm household 
Per farm worker 
equivalent 
Per capita 
A Production 
Team in 
Liaoning• 
475.4 
(in current yuan) 
369.7 (1.3 persons/house-
hold) 
138.6 (3.4 persons/house-
hold) 
A Production 
Team in 
Hunanb 
432.0* 
108.0 
Sources: a. Department of Agricultural Economics, Liaoning Academy of 
Finance and Economics, ed., Cheng-yang Tso-hao Shen-ch'an-tui Ts'ai-k' uai 
Kung-tso, (How to Do Financial and Accounting Work in the Production Team 
Properly) (Shenyang: Liaoning Jen-min Publishers, 1973), p. 105. 
b. Hunan Revolutionary Committee, Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and 
the Hunan Financial and Accounting Training Program, ed., Nung-ts'un Jen-min-
kung-she Sheng-ch'an tui K'uai-chi, (Accounting in the Production Team of an 
Agricultural Commune) (Hunan: Jen-min Publishers), p. 84 
*estimated. 
In spite of the inadequacy of data, one can probably conclude 
that the average income of non-agricultural households in 
mainland China in the early 1970s was about twice that of 
agricultural households and that it might be three to four times as 
large, if not more. 31 The differential was in any case significantly 
larger than the current ratio in the Republic of China. 
30. See People's Daily (Peking), May 5, 1957. 
31. According to a U.S. Government analyst, "In 1970-71, industry-related 
production had caught up with agriculture-related production, and the 15 percent 
of the people in the urban areas were producing six times as much per capita as 
their country brethren." Although the differential between urban and rural 
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Table 20. Alternative Income Ratios 
(I) (II) 
Non-agricultural Household Household Average Agricultural 
Income 
Annual 
income per 
full-time 
workers 
(a) 
¥650 X 1.5 
(b) 
2 
Income 
Assumed 
number 
of full-time 
equivalent 
workers per 
household 
(a) ¥ 975 
(b) ¥1300 
Household Income 
1957 
(II) 
Kansu ¥171 
Szechwan 306 
Hopei 399 
Kiangsu 454 
1971 
Liaoning 475 
Hunan 432 
Ratio of 
(I) to (II) 
(a) (b) 
5.70 7.60 
3.19 4.25 
2.44 3.26 
2.15 2.86 
(a) (b) 
2.05 2.74 
2.26 3.01 
Within the agricultural sector, the pattern of income distribu-
tion among farm households was sharply altered in mainland 
China through the initial redistribution of land from former 
"landlords" and "rich peasants" to "poor peasants," accompanied 
by the reduction of farm laborers.32 However, inequality has 
increased subsequently for several reasons. First, whenever 
distribution according to labor is the dominant form of distribu-
tion in the PRC rather than distribution according to need, 33 
inequality among households can come about as a result of 
unequal distribution of labor and skills among them. The relative 
emphases of the two forms of distribution have continued to be a 
incomes per capita is not the same as average non-agricultural and agricultural 
family incomes, this differential is in the same area of magnitude as estimates in 
the text suggest. Furthermore, it is also about double the ratio of the non-
agricultural sector and the agricultural sector in Taiwan in terms of per capita 
value-added in 1972 (3.18:1). See page 18 of text. 
The quotation is taken from Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy 
and Economic Results, 1949·71," in "People's Republic of China: An Economic 
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second 
Session, May 18, 1972), p. 41. 
Ashbrook also thought that the bulk of the new agricultural inputs had gone to 
the favored communes and brigades so that an important ideological controversy 
dealt with the contrast between "rich brigades" and "poor brigades." 
32. See Peter Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), for extensive calculations on changes 
in class and income distribution. 
33. "Need" is presumably defined by the party cadres rather than the income 
recipients. 
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matter of controversy for nearly two decades. Secondly, under the 
system of distribution practiced in 1971, each member of the 
production team is rewarded principally according to the number 
of work points he earns through labor. However, the value of a 
work point depends upon the total number of work points 
accumulated by all the team members and the net income 
available for distribution among them. The net income is, in turn, 
the difference between gross income and the aggregate amount of 
taxes, compulsory purchase by the state, production cost, 
collective consumption, collective investment, payment to the 
higher level production brigade, and addition to the team's 
inventory. Since these deductions are of fairly stable proportions, 
disparity in the gross income of different production teams is a 
source of disparity in income distribution. Differences in gross 
income occur regionally due to differences in soil, climate, and the 
nature of crops (e.g., industrial crops versus cereals). In 1957, 
among the four provinces of Kansu, Szechwan, Hopei and 
Kiangsu, the difference varied from 1 to 2.65. In the same year, in 
Shensi province, the range of variation among different agricultu-
ral regions was from 1 to 6.4. Similarly, the composition of 
agricultural production in terms of livestock, fruits, fishery 
products, and crops also varies among provinces, and changes in 
their respective procurement or market prices would affect relative 
income regionally. A final source of income disparity consists of 
differences in income derived from private plot and free market 
sales. 
Within the industrial sector, a rough comparison can be made 
between Taiwan and Mainland China in terms of income 
distribution in several ways. In the first place, the wage rate 
differential between the lowest and highest rates on an 8-grade 
scale employed in the PRC appears to be noticeably wider than 
the corresponding differential between unskilled and skilled labor 
in Taiwan's industrial sector. According to Peking's wage scale of 
1955, the highest wage rate (grade 8) was generally a little over 
three times that of the lowest. The corresponding ratio of the wage 
rate at grade 6 to that of grade 1 was generally around 2.2 to 2.4.34 
Some adjustments in wage rates have taken place since 1955, 
especially in the 1963 wage reform, but the differential may not 
34. See Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the 
People's Republic of China, 1953-1965 (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1968), Table 2, p. 21. 
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have varied greatly.35 In contrast, the wage differential between 
unskilled and skilled labor in manufacturing in Taiwan during 
1970 varied from a low of 1 to 1.43 in the cement industry to a 
high of 1 to 2.19 in the electronics industry.36 The Taiwan wage 
differential in 12 different manufacturing industries in July 1970 
can be seen from Table 21. 
Table 21. Average Monthly Wage in Taiwan (NT$) 
Clothing 
Synthetic fibers 
Motor cycles 
Cotton textile 
Cement 
Industry 
Food Manufacturing 
. Plastics 
Plywood 
Electric Appliances 
Pharmaceuticals 
Electronics 
Wool textiles 
I II 
Skilled Unskilled Differential 
Labor Labor 1111 
3,090 
2,960 
2,930 
2,600 
2,520 
2,510 
2,480 
2,460 
2,340 
2,300 
2,280 
1,950 
1,590 
1,760 
1,130 
1,420 
1,910 
1,640 
1,410 
1,470 
1,660 
1,510 
1,070 
1,450 
1.62 
1.56 
1.96 
1.83 
1.43 
1.49 
1.66 
1.67 
1.50 
1.73 
2.19 
1.54 
Source: Chen Hsi-chao, "Taiwan Ti-ch'ii Ch'an-yeh Yiian-kung Yi-tung Yen-
chiu" (Turnover of Production Workers in Taiwan), in Li Ch'eng (ed.), Taiwan Jen-li 
Ts'u·yilan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Human Resources), (Taipei: Lien· 
ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 484. 
What has happened in mainland China is a concentration of 
a far larger group of persons in the lower wage grade, and this has 
had the effect of yielding a very low income inequality. However, 
the average wage rate as well as the total wage bill have been kept 
very low through very high profit rates which are, however, 
appropriated by the State as a result of nationalization of 
35. Cf. Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 96. 
36. In mainland China the comparable ratios in 1955 were 2.19 (grade 6 to 
grade 1) and 3.00 (grade 8 to grade 1) in the cement industry and 2.22 (grade 6 to 
grade 1) and 3.04 (grade 8 to grade 1) in light industry as derived from Charles 
Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's Republic of China, 
1953-65 op. cit. There are also substantial regional differentials in industrial 
wages. See Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972, op. 
cit., p. 52. 
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industry.37 Without attempting to construct income distribution 
estimates for all households in mainland China, which cannot be 
done for lack of data, especially in more recent years, one can 
probably safely assert: 
1. that income distribution in the industrial sector, as well as 
in the agricultural sector, shows a high degree of equality in the 
small geographical and enterprise units, but this is modified by 
regional disparity to a degree that we cannot determine; 
2. that there is a very wide differential between farm 
household and non-farm household incomes, the disparity being a 
great deal larger than the corresponding disparity in Taiwan; 
3. that the average non-farm worker's income (say at ¥650 a 
year, or approximately US$325) at the official exchange rate 
would yield more than $650 for a two full-time working member 
family, this family income being only 40% of the average non-
farm family income in Taiwan (about NT$64,500 or US$1,612, 
also at the official exchange rate). If the average mainland 
Chinese farm household has no more than one-half to one-quarter 
of the non-farm household's income, while farm family income in 
Taiwan is only 30% below that of the non-farm family, the farm 
family on the Chinese mainland would probably enjoy an income 
varying from 14 to 29%- which one can conservatively place at 
30% - of the corresponding farm family in Taiwan.38 
Finally, both Taiwan and mainland China grant subsidies to 
individuals and groups, thus altering the distribution of real 
income. In the case of Taiwan, the nine-year free schooling 
introduced in 1969 has probably benefited the low-income groups 
more than those of higher income. It has therefore contributed to a 
reduction of real income inequality in Taiwan, both in the short 
run and in the long run. While such subsidies also exist in 
37. Recent studies of Jung-chao Liu, State University of New York at 
Binghamton, have dealt with the comparison of wages and profits between China 
and India. 
38. If the non-farm family income in Taiwan is denoted by 100, the 
corresponding figure for mainland China, as discussed in the text, would be 40. 
One-quarter to one-half of the 40 would yield a figure of 10-20 as the corresponding 
value of the mainland Chinese farm family's income. If the Taiwan farm family 
has an income 30% below that of the non-farm family, its income level can be 
denoted by 70. CC)mparing 10 or 20 with 70 we obtain percentages equal to 14.3 and 
28.6, respectively. Granted that such comparisons based on official exchange rates 
raise methodological issues, they are nevertheless illuminating as rough indica-
, tions of orders of magnitude. 
108 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Communist China, the effect need not be the same and may even 
be in the opposite direction, either because the subsidies to 
different groups are not of the same quality- barefoot doctors do 
not provide the same medical service as the modern medical 
facilities in the cities - or because the subsidy is only granted to a 
certain group which may happen to be the higher income group, 
thus increasing rather than diminishing the income gap. An 
example of the latter genre is the low residential rent in cities, 
which benefits only the urban dwellers. Distributive justice in 
mainland China is often based on class origin in the pre-
communist period, thus departing from the criterion of current 
economic status. In Taiwan measures to modify income distribu-
tion do not contain an element of retribution. 
Non-communist Asian Countries 
An interesting comparison can be made between Taiwan and 
South Korea among the non-communist Asian developing coun-
tries. 
Both countries underwent asset redistribution in the agricultu-
ral sector through land reform. Both did not suffer from initially 
large inequalities in the distribution of assets in the non-
agricultural sectors inasmuch as Japanese-owned assets were 
taken over by the respective governments after World War II. On 
the other hand, the destructive Korean war had a further levelling 
effect in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors 
from which Taiwan fortunately escaped. Like Taiwan, Korea also 
went through an initial phase of import substitution before it 
turned toward export promotion, and it was after 1964, especially 
in the 1970s, when the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports 
began that, again like Taiwan, Korea entered a stage of very rapid 
economic growth. Largely because of the war, however; Korean 
agriculture did not enjoy the kind of rapid growth simultaneously 
with asset redistribution through land reform. Hence the initially 
equalizing effect of land redistribution was not compounded by 
growth. Furthermore, the disparity between farm and non-farm 
income in Korea might be widening more than it has done in 
Taiwan. 
In combination, these factors have given South Korea an 
income distribution resembling but somewhat more unequal than 
that of Taiwan. On the other hand, while there probably was little 
change in the Korean pattern between 1964 and 1970,39 there was 
39. See Irma Adelman on "South Korea" in Chenery et al., Redistri-
bution with Growth (Annex 1974), pp. 280-285. 
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continued improvement in the Taiwan pattern as shown in Table 
3. It is also possible that the available Korean data have 
underestimated the very large incomes.40 In the absence of post-
1970 information and Korea's rapid economic and export growth 
since 1970, one cannot state unequivocally whether the Korean 
and Taiwan patterns of income distribution are now closer or 
farther apart than before. 
If comparison is made between Taiwan and lndia,41 a 
significantly greater income inequality seems to prevail in lndia. 42 
This would seem to be attributable, inter alia, to the following 
factors: first, India has been unable to implement its policy of 
land redistribution which it has consistently advocated as an 
integral part of economic planning. The difference between the 
Taiwan and Indian experiences in this respect would seem to lie 
both in their disparity in size and in the political conditions facing 
the two countries. Second, India has not adopted a foreign trade 
orientation in its development strategy as has Taiwan. Nor has 
India followed an agricultural emphasis in its initial phase of 
development. Again, the very much larger size of the Indian 
economy and greater resource availability in comparison with 
Taiwan have contributed to the two countries' different ap-
proaches. Ideological differences between the political leaders of 
the two constitute another important factor. Finally, given its 
development strategy, it would be all the more important for India 
to resort to government measures to modify asset and income 
distribution. Yet for the same reasons as those that have stymied 
land reform, it seems that India has been unable to take sufficient 
and appropriate corrective measures to redistribute income. 
Taiwan, on the other hand, presents a contrasting experience. 
Because of the many resemblances the economic development 
of Taiwan bears to that of Japan, an interesting comparison can 
be made with Japan from the point of view of income distribution. 
First, according to the Japanese employment status survey, the 
Gini index of the agricultural sector increased from 0.3097 in 1962 
to 0.3470 in 1971 during a period of very rapid economic growth. 
40. See Hakchung Choo, Review of Income Distribution Studies, Data 
Availability and Associated Problems for Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan, 
Korea Development Institute, Monograph 7406 (1974). 
41. For a brief discussion on the Indian case, see Chenery et al., Redistribu· 
tion with Growth (1974), op. cit. 
42. Various estimates of income distribution data in India are given in 
Chapter III, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution," Economic Survey of 
Asw and the Fllr East, 1971, Uniied Nations Publication E/CN.ll/1047, pp. 49-64. 
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On the other hand, income distribution in the non-agricultural 
sector became more equal during the same period, declining from 
0.3231 in 1962 to 0.3199 in 1971. These divergent movements had 
the net effect of reducing tte Gini index of income distribution for 
all households from 0.3351 in 1962 to 0.3261 in 1971.43 The 
changes paralleled those of Taiwan after 1968 which we have 
previously pointed out. 
One of the reasons for the improvement in income distribution 
in the non-agricultural sector during this period of rapid growth 
was the disappearance of surplus labor, especially unskilled labor. 
On the other hand, among the factors working for greater 
inequality was an increase in the number of "non-standard" 
households, that is, households headed by single persons or 
persons either just entering or just retiring from the labor force. 
The last factor was partly a result of demographic changes in the 
age composition of the Japanese population and partly an 
outcome of migration from rural to urban areas, accompanied by 
the formation of separate households by young workers who tend 
to be poorer. In the agricultural sector, greater use of capital 
equipment, especially on the larger farms, had the effect of 
increasing the importance of property income. On the whole, an 
allegedly narrow distribution of property in Japan may also have 
had the effect of creating greater inequality. Lastly, the disparity 
in the rate of growth of productivity and earned income in 
agriculture verses non-agriculture also had the effect of widening 
income disparity between the two sectors. 
On the basis of Taiwan's experience as discussed earlier, the 
disparity of growth between agriculture and non-agriculture, the 
shift of rural workers to industry - although young Chinese 
women working in the export processing zones have not really set 
up separate households and are still regarded as contributors to 
the income of the farm households from which they have come -
and the gradual disappearance of labor surplus all bear strong 
43. These data are quoted in Richard Osamu Wada, Impact of Economic 
Growth of the Size Distribution of Income: The Postwar Experience of Japan, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii (May 1975). Wada's study also 
presents an analysis of income distribution adjusted for various understatements 
of income. According to his data, there continues to be a widening of income 
disparity in Japan although the trend had slowed down during the latter phase of 
the 1956-71 period. The phenomenon noted above in the case of Japan is also 
discussed by Simons Kuznets as common to developed countries where separate 
households headed by young people, including many households of single persons 
who leave their parental homes early, tend to increase disparity in income 
distribution. See Simon Kuznets, op. cit. 
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resemblances to the experience of Japan. It remains, however, to 
be seen whether the distribution of property income in Taiwan 
will in fact become more unequal or whether governmental 
measures to modify distribution will succeed in offsetting this 
potential development. 

Chapter III 
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL 
GROWTH IN TAIWAN 
CHI-MING Hou 
In a recent conference on Taiwan's agricultural development, 
Walter P. Falcon has remarked, "In the past quarter of a century 
we have come to look to Taiwan for innovative policies and 
institutions to strengthen the role of agriculture as a supporting 
sector in development." 1 How impressive is Taiwan's growth 
record in agriculture? What has been the pattern of agricultural 
production? What have been the input-output relationships? What 
have been the sources of agricultural growth? What role have 
government policy and institutional innovations played? What 
are the problems and prospects for future growth? 
It is obviously not possible in one short essay to offer an in-
depth analysis of all these issues. I will simply try to examine 
them briefly with emphasis on the relationships among institu-
tional arrangements, technological change, and output growth. 
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 
The increase of agricultural production in Taiwan since 1945 
has been very impressive (see Table 1), with a growth rate 
averaging 6.2 percent a year for 1947-1975. During the recovery 
and rehabilitation stage after World War II- that is, from 1947 to 
1952 - the average a:r.mual growth rate was nearly 14 percent 
(Table 2). By 1952, the previous peak level reached in 1939 was 
restored. (During the years from 1939 to 1945, agricultural 
production declined sharply at 12.3 percent a year. In 1945, the 
level of production was the same as in 1910.)2 
1. Walter P. Falcon, "Lessons and Issues in Taiwan's Development," in T. H. 
Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan 
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 284. 
2. S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Agricultural Development and Its Contribution 
to Economic Growth in Taiwan," in Economic Digest, No. 17, JCRR, Taipei, 1966, 
as cited in You-tsao Wang, "Technological Changes and Agricultural Development 
in Taiwan, 1946-1965," which was first presented at the Conference on Economic 
Development of Taiwan, Taipei, 1967. Wang's article was reprinted in Taiwan 
Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) 
(Taipei: Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), pp. 67-118. 
114 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Table 1. Index of Agricultural Output in Taiwan 
(1971 = 100) 
Farm Forestry Livestock Fishery 
Year Total Crops• Products Products Products 
1946 20.3 26.8 10.6 10.3 7.7 
1947 25.4 33.5 16.8 12.1 9.3 
1948 32.8 38.2 28.1 14.7 13.0 
1949 33.5 44.6 20.7 15.0 12.4 
1950 37.4 48.7 25.9 20.0 13.2 
1951 39.0 48.7 28.5 26.2 15.9 
1952 42.3 52.3 35.3 27.3 18.5 
1953 46.3 56.7 36.0 33.8 19.0 
1954 47.3 57.1 38.0 34.4 22.7 
1955 47.6 56.3 40.0 35.7 26.2 
1956 51.2 61.1 37.8 38.1 28.1 
1957 54.9 64.6 43.8 42.6 31.0 
1958 58.6 68.2 50.1 47.8 31.8 
1959 59.6 68.0 64.2 47.4 33.9 
1960 60.4 69.1 66.6 45.8 35.3 
1961 65.7 74.2 76.0 50.7 40.6 
1962 67.4 75.2 77.9 55.0 42.2 
1963 67.5 74.2 77.6 56.4 45.4 
1964 75.6 83.5 95.9 59.9 49.4 
1965 80.5 90.2 97.9 61.6 51.4 
1966 83.1 91.6 90.3 68.3 59.0 
1967 88.3 95.4 91.9 78.0 66.7 
1968 93.5 95.3 91.4 89.5 91.2 
1970 98.7 99.9 95.7 98.3 95.3 
1971 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1972 102.6 101.1 93.7 107.9 107.1 
1973 108.0 102.1 88.5 127.2 119.6 
1974 108.5 107.6 81.8 117.5 114.0 
1975 106.3 104.7 74.7 109.8 125.0 
• Includes food products and other crops such as fibers, tobacco, tea, and 
coffee. 
Source: For 1946-52, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975 
(Republic of China: Director-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, 1975); for 
1953-1975, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976 (Taiwan Economic Planning 
Council, 1976) 
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Table 2. Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural 
Output in Taiwan 
~----
Farm Forestry Livestock Fishery 
Year Total Crops Products Products Products 
1947 25.1 25.0 58.5 17.5 20.8 
1948 29.1 14.0 67.3 21.5 39.8 
1949 2.1 16.8 -26.3 2.0 - 4.6 
1950 11.6 9.2 25.1 33.3 6.5 
1951 4.3 0.0 10.0 31.0 20.5 
1952 8.5 7.4 23.9 4.2 16.4 
1953 9.5 8.4 2.0 23.8 2.7 
1954 2.2 0.7 5.6 1.8 19.5 
1955 0.6 - 1.4 5.3 3.8 15.4 
1956 7.6 8.5 - 5.5 6.7 7.3 
1957 7.2 5.7 15.9 11.8 10.3 
1958 6.7 5.6 14.4 12.2 2.6 
1959 1.7 - 0.3 28.1 - 0.8 6.6 
1960 1.3 1.6 3.7 - 3.4 4.1 
1961 8.8 7.4 14.1 10.7 15.0 
1962 2.6 1.3 2.5 8.5 3.9 
1963 0.1 - 1.3 - 0.4 2.5 7.6 
1964 12.0 12.5 23.6 6.2 8.8 
1965 6.5 8.1 2.1 2.8 4.0 
1966 3.1 1.4 - 7.8 10.9 14.8 
1967 6.3 4.1 1.8 14.2 13.1 
1968 6.7 4.1 5.4 7.1 9.2 
1969 - 0.7 4.0 - 5.7 7.2 9.2 
1970 5.6 4.8 4.7 9.8 4.5 
1971 1.3 0.1 4.5 1.7 4.9 
1972 2.6 1.1 - 6.3 7.9 7.1 
1973 5.3 1.0 - 5.5 17.9 11.7 
1974 0.5 5.4 - 7.6 - 7.6 - 4.7 
1975 - 2.0 - 2.7 - 8.7 - 6 .. 5 9.6 
Average 
1947-52 13.5 12.1 26.4 18.3 16.6 
1954-60 4.6 3.6 8.7 7.0 8.6 
1961-65 6.0 5.6 8.4 6.1 7.9 
1966-70 4.2 2.1 0.3 9.8 13.4 
1971-75 1.5 1.0 - 4.7 2.7 5.7 
1947-75 6.2 5.0 8.4 9.3 10.8 
1953-75 4.3 3.2 3.7 6.9 9.4 
Source: Table 1. 
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After 1952, total agricultural production continued to grow, 
but at a lower rate. It increased at an annual rate of 4.6 percent 
from 1953 to 1960 and at 5.1 percent in the 1960s. The acceleration 
was particularly noticeable for livestock and fishery products. For 
farm crops,3 the annual rate of increase was 3.6 percent for 
1953-1960 and 3.8 percent for 1961-70. 
But starting in 1971, the rate of growth has declined 
substantially for all groups of products. For total agricultural 
production, the average growth rate was 1.5 percent from 1971 to 
1975; for farm crops, 1.0 percent; and for livestock products, 2.7 
percent. Forestry products declined at nearly 5 percent a year from 
1971 to 1975. Only fishery products managed to grow at nearly 6 
percent a year during this period. 
If the average of a five-year period is used, the growth rate 
started to decline rather sharply for farm crops and forestry 
products since 1961-65. Farm crops grew at 5.6 percent a year in 
1961-65, and then only 2.1 percent in 1966-70. Forestry products 
hardly increased at all in 1966-70, after an annual increase of 8.4 
percent in 1961-65. But livestock and fishery products continued 
to increase at an accelerated rate until 1970. 
For the 23 years from 1953 to 1975, the average growth rate of 
total agricultural production was 4.3 percent, considerably higher 
than the growth rate of population, which averaged about 3 
percent for the same period.4 
Among the categories of agricultural production, the growth 
rates varied substantially. For farm crops and forestry products, 
the average growth rates were 3.2 percent and 3.7 percent, 
respectively, for 1953-75. But for livestock and fishery products, 
they were 6.9 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. 
3. Farm crops include: (a) rice; (b) other dry land crops, such as sweet potato, 
barley, wheat, millet, bam-yard millet, sorghum, corn, buckwheat, soybean, 
multiflora bean, other beans and fresh edible sugar cane; (c) special crops: tea, 
sugar-cane, tobacco, coffee, peanut, sesame, rapeseed, arrow-root, cassava, reamie, 
flax, jute, ambai hemp, cotton, tachia rush, triangle rush, perfume plants, 
citronella, sisal, derris, and peppermint. 
4. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975 (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 
1975), p. 4. The growth rate for 1969 is not included because of change of statistical 
coverage. 
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Table 3. Annual Growth Rates of Production of Farm Crops in 
Taiwan 
(Percent) 
Common Crops 
Other Dry 
Land Food Special 
Years Total Rice Crops Crops Fruits Vegetables Mushrooms 
1947-52 9.9 10.0 10.3 27.8 17.0 11.4 
1953-60 3.2 2.6 5.4 5.0 7.5 3.9 
1961-65 3.9 4.2 4.3 6.1 20.6 7.1 142.1 
1966-70 1.0 1.1 0.2 -3.3 9.1 14.2 - 5.1 
1971-74 3.8 3.8 4.3 8.1 12.7 4.4 16.7 
1947-74 3.8 3.8 4.3 8.1 12.7 8.0 
1953-74 2.2 22.2 2.6 2.7 11.6 7.1 
Source: Computed from Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (op. 
cit.). (Annual growth rate is calculated by using previous year as base.) 
Divergent growth rates also occurred among various farm 
crops. For major food grains, the growth rate was substantially 
lower than that of fruits, vegetables, and mushrooms, as Table 3 
shows. The explanation probably lies at least in part in Engel's 
Law and the expansion of external markets. 
For the population in Taiwan, Engel's coefficient (food 
expenditure as a proportion of total private consumption expendi-
ture) declined continuously in the past two decades. It was 56 
percent in 1951, 51 percent in 1961, and 41 percent in 1971.5 The 
income elasticities of demand for major farm products are, in 
general, low, though with great variance. They have been 
estimated as follows:6 
Rice 
Fish 
Pineapples 
Pork 
Sugar 
Duck 
Vegetable 
Chicken 
Citrus fruits 
-0.0219 
0.3069 
0.5921 
0.5958 
0.6637 
0.8032 
1.0129 
1.0139 
1.6934 
(1961-69) 
(1952-69) 
(1952-69) 
(1953-69) 
(1962-69) 
(1963-69) 
(1952-69) 
(1963-69) 
(1952-69) 
5. T.H. Lee and Yueh-eh Chen, "Change in Food Consumption Patterns," in 
T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 325. 
6. The income elasticity of demand is defined as (6clc) I (6yly), where Cis 
per capita consumption (in physical units) and y is per capita real disposable 
income. The coefficients given in the text are estimated by Han-yu Chang. See his 
"Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chan Ko-ch'eng-chung Liang-shih Hsu-ch' iu Chieh-kou ti 
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For products for which income elasticity of demand was high, 
growth rates were also high, namely, fruits, vegetables, livestock, 
and fishery products. For food grains, the income elasticity of 
demand was low; so was their growth rate. 
For certain farm products, foreign markets have helped their 
expansion. This is particularly true for fruits and vegetables. The 
increase of exports of mushrooms and bamboo shoots, for 
example, has been phenomenal. The degree to which a product is 
dependent on exports may be measured by the ratio of domestic 
production to domestic consumption, which may be called the self-
sufficiency rate. A coefficient of less than one indicates imports, 
and a coefficient of more than one indicates exports. The 
coefficients of self-sufficiency of various farm products are given 
in Table 4. It can be seen that, up until the end of the 1960s, 
Taiwan was about self-sufficient in rice and meat, had a great 
deal to export for fruits, vegetables, and sugar, and was dependent 
on imports for wheat, corn, soybeans, and milk. For food crops as 
a whole, Taiwan was about self-sufficient. 
Table 4. Self-Sufficiency Rates of Major Food Items in Taiwan 
(Percent) 
1952-56 1957-61 1962-66 1967-71 1952-71 
Rice 111.9 106.5 108.4 103.8 107.6 
Wheat 10.1 13.4 7.9 3.4 8.7 
Corn 95.0 61.7 69.4 17.1 60.8 
Soybeans 19.4 31.2 27.9 13.6 23.0 
Fruits 126.3 131.5 197.7 179.7 158.8 
Vegetables 99.9 99.8 139.4 156.4 123.9 
Sugar 834.3 823.1 687.5 461.7 701.7 
Meat 100.0 100.7 100.5 100.9 100.5 
Milk 7.5 6.2 14.3 14.5 10.6 
Sea Products 91.6 99.2 101.1 117.6 102.4 
Total Food 103.2 100.0 03.5 95.7 100.6 
Source: T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: 
The Taiwan Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974). 
Pien-hua yU Chan-wang" (Demand for and Supply of Food in Taiwan: Structural 
Changes and Prospects) in Taiwan Yin-han Chi-kan (Quarterly Journal of the 
Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1971). 
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But, from 1971 to 1975, farm crops increased at only 1 percent 
a year, whereas population increased nearly 2 percent, so the self-
sufficiency rate must have declined. According to one estimate, 
the self-sufficiency rate of food grains has actually dropped from 
100 percent in 1968 to 88 percent in 1974.7 
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS 
Agricultural inputs or the factors of agricultural production 
are conventionally classified into three categories: land, labor, 
and capital. Technological improvements either in production 
techniques or in organizational changes may be treated as a 
separate input. 
Land 
Taiwan is very densely populated and has been so for 
decades. It has become impossible to increase the area of 
cultivated land. From 1946 to 1970 the annual rate of increase of 
cultivated land was only 0.4 percent, much less than that of 
agricultural population, which was 2.5 percent from 1951-55 to 
1956-60, 2.7 percent from 1956-60 to 1961-65, and 1.4 percent 
from 1961-65 to 1966-70.8 As a result, the area of cultivated land 
per capita on farm continued to decline, from 0.21 hectare in 1952 
to 0.15 hectare in 1970. 
Agricultural population, after peaking in 1969, has continu-
ously declined at a rate of 1.56 percent a year for 1970-75. At the 
7. See Yu-kang Mao, "Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Chih Fang-hsiang yii 
Tiwei" (Prospects for Agricultural Develpment in Taiwan) in Taiwan Ching-chi 
Fa-chan Fang-hsiang chi ts'e lilh yen t'ao hua (Conference on Prospects and 
Strategy for Economic Development in Taiwan) (Taipei: The Institute of 
Economic Academia Sinica, 1976), p. 10f). 
For altemative estimates and discussion on food self-suffiency rate, see Yu-
yuan Pien, Taiwan Liang-shih Tzu-chieh-Lil chih yen-chiu (On Self-Sufficiency of 
Food Grain in Taiwan) in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu (eds.), Taiwan Nung-
yeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei: 
Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 610. 
8. See Ko-chih Liu, "1945 Nien 1-lai Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chang Yii J(m-k'ou 
Chih Ch'uan-mein Kuan-ch'a" (Economic Development and Population in Taiwan 
Since 1945: An Overview) in Tsung-hsien Yu and Cheng Li (eds.), Taiwan Jen-li 
Tzu-yuan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Human Resources in Taiwan) (Taipei: Lien-
ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 37. 
Total agricultural population was 3,523,000 in 1946, 4,257,000 in 1952, and 
6,152,000 in 1969, the peak year. Thereafter, it declined continuously to 5,598,000 in 
1975. It was 5,997,000 in 1970. From 1970 to 1974, the annual rate of decline was 0.8 
percent. The 1946 figure is given in You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 170. For other years, 
see Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 53. 
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same time, there was also a slight increase in the area of 
cultivated land. Consequently, the area of cultivated land per 
capita on farms increased to 0.16 hectare in 1975.9 However, 
efforts have been made to increase sown (or crop) areas, thanks to 
abundant labor, irrigation, chemical fertilizers, early maturing 
varieties, control of crop pests and disease, use of farm machinery, 
and favorable weather conditions. Total crop area increased from 
about 1,506,000 hectares in 1952 to 1,702,000 in 1966, or about 13 
percent over a period of 14 years. It has declined since 1966, 
however. In 1975 it was 1,659,000 hectares, only about 10 percent 
more than in 1952.10 
The multiple cropping index (ratio of crop acreage to total 
cultivated acreage) increased continuously from 118 in 1946 to 172 
in 1952, and 190 in 1966. Thereafter, it declined to 175 in 1973 and 
went up to 181 in 1975.11 The decline since 1966 probably reflected 
the increasing scarcity of labor, for multiple cropping is a highly 
labor-intensive operation at planting and harvesting seasons. The 
decline in prices received for winter crops was probably another 
contributing factor. 
Leading multiple cropping systems in Taiwan include: rice-
rice-sweet potato, rice-rice-soybean, rice-rice-corn, rice-rice-tobacco, 
rice-rice-vegetable, and rice-vegetable-rice. In 1970, practically all 
of Taiwan's flax, tobacco, and wheat, and over 80 percent of its 
soybeans, 52 percent of its corn, and 61 percent of its vegetables 
were grown in paddy fields under multiple cropping. The yield of 
rice under multiple cropping is usually only 3 to 10 percent less 
than under single cr0pping.12 
LABOR 
The number of agricultural workers increased at an annual 
rate of 3.4 percent in 1946-51. From 1951 to 1970, it increased at 
only 0.3 percent a year (Table 5). 
9. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 54. 
10. Ibid., p. 52. 
11. Ibid. 
12. T. H. Shen and Y. T. Wang, "Technological Adjustments," in T. H. Shen 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 375-379. 
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Table 5. Annual Rate of Growth of Agricultural Inputs in 
Taiwan, 1946-70 
(Percent) 
1946-51 1951-60 196D-70 1946-70 
Total input 7.8 2.7 3.2 3.9 
Cultivated land 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 
Crop area 6.0 0.9 0.3 1.7 
Labor 
Working days 6.6 1.7 0.9 2.4 
Number of workers 3.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 
Fixed capital 4.2 2.4 4.8 3.8 
Current inputs 
Fertilizer 32.0 8.0 3.5 10.6 
Total 23.0 8.5 10.4 12.3 
Source: T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, "Agriculture as a Base for Socio-Economic 
Development" in T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of 
Development: The Taiwan Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction, 1974). 
The number of working days in agriculture increased at a 
substantially faster rate than the number of workers. For 1946-70, 
the annual rate of increase of working days was 214 percent, but 
that of number of workers only 0.9 percent (Table 5). This means 
that the average working days per worker increased substantially. 
In 1946-47, the number of working days per agricultural worker 
was only 73 days a year. It increased to 148 days in 1969-70. For 
the female worker, it was 75 days in 1946-47 and 152 days in 
1969-70.13 The increase in the number of working days per worker 
per year suggests a more intensive utilization of labor, or possibly 
a decline in underemployment or disguised unemployment. 14 
13. Wen-hui Lai, "Trend of Agricultural Employment in Postwar Taiwan," 
presented to the Sino-American Conference on Manpower in Taiwan (Taipei: Ho-
tso Jen-li Tzu-yuan Hui-i Lun-wen Chuna-chi (Papers of the Sino-American 1972 
Manpower Conference). Lai's estimate of the number of working days per year is 
different from what is implied in Table 5. 
14. The issue of disguised unemployment is too complicated to be discussed 
here. According to one study, the rate of utilization of farm labor was only 46 
percent for both 1956 and 1962. (This rate is defmed to be the ratio of labor used in 
farm work and side occupations to available farm labor.) This seems to suggest the 
existence of large disguised unemployment. See Ch'ing-jung Liu, "Taiwan Nung-
tsun-chung Chih Ying-ts'ang-hsing Shih-yeh wen-t'i" (Rural Disguised Unemploy-
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The increase of farm labor input (in terms of man-days per 
year) was associated with the increase in multiple cropping and a 
shift to more labor-intensive crops, such as fruits, vegetables, 
mushrooms, and asparagus. Labor input per hectare crop 
increased from 97 working days in 1945-47 to 151 in 1969-70. 
Labor input per hectare of cultivated land increased from 122 
working days in 1945-47 to 272 in 196.9-70.15 
Farm labor has not only increased in quantity; its quality has 
also witnessed substantial improvement. In 1956, for example, 39 
percent of agricultural workers were illiterate, and 51 percent had 
an education at the level of primary schools. Only 3.8 percent had 
a high school education.16 In 1975, 24 percent were illiterate, 55 
percent had a primary school education, and 13 percent had an 
education at the high school level.17 
CAPITAL 
Capital input may be divided into fixed capital (such as farm 
implements and equipment, farm buildings, and irrigation 
facilities) and working capital (such as fertilizers, feeds, seeds, 
pesticides, and insecticides). Farm fixed capital increased at 4.2 
percent a year during the recovery period, that is, 1946-51. In the 
1950s, it increased at 2.4 percent, and in the 1960s, 4.8 percent. 
From 1946 to 1970, it increased at an annual rate of 3.8 percent 
(Table 5). 
Farm working capital increased even faster. The correspond-
ing annual growth rates were 23 percent (for 1946-51); 8.5 percent 
ment in Taiwan), in Taiwan Jen-li Tzu-yuan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Human 
Resources in Taiwan) (Taipei: Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 426. 
But the wage data do not seem to suggest such large-scale disguised 
unemployment. Real wages in manufacturing rose at an average annual rate of 3.4 
percent and 4.0 percent in 196Q-64. Taking the nonagricultural sector as a whole 
(mining, manufacturing, and public utilities), real wages rose at an annual rate of 
1.3 percent in 1954-59 and 3.6 percent in 196Q-64. See Chi-ming Hou and Yu-chu 
Hsu, "The Supply of Labor in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and 
Economic Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of Economic Academia Sinica, 
1976), p. 347. It might be that, contrary to the Lewis-Ranis-Fei model, a rising wage 
rate might not be entirely incompatible with the existence of rural disguised 
unemployment. A rising wage rate might have been necessitated by a rising 
"minimum" living standard in the cities. Seasonality of farm work would make 
any estimate of disguised unemployment an exceedingly difficult task. 
15. Wen-hui Lai, op. cit., p. 129. 
16. Ko-chih Liu, "Growth and Utill.zation of Human Resources in Taiwan," in 
Tsung-Hsien Yu and Cheng Li (eds.), op. cit., p. 86. 
17. Computed from Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research 
Institute, Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan, July 1975, p. 56. 
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(1951-60); and 10.4 percent (for 1960-70). For the period from 1946 
to 1970, it increased at an average annual rate of 12.3 percent 
(Table 5). 
Of all farm capital inputs, chemical fertilizer and feeds are 
most important. For example, in 1961-65, chemical fertilizers 
accounted for 32 percent of all capital imputs, and feeds, 38 percent. 
The relative share of various capital inputs are given in Table 6. 
Table 6. Percentage Share of Farm Capital 
Inputs in Taiwan (1946-65) 
(Percent) 
1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 
Chemical fertilizer 13.77 32.12 33.90 32.45 
Seeds 23.36 14.84 12.43 10.59 
Feeds 36.62 34.04 36.31 37.83 
Pesticides and 
insecticides 1.19 1.65 3.61 7.89 
Depreciation of farm 
building & equipment 16.06 12.52 9.91 8.09 
Water fee 9.00 4.85 3.84 3.15 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: You-tsao Wang, "Technological Change and Agricultural Develop-
ment in Taiwan," Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lunwen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's 
Agricultural Development) (Taipei, Lieng-ching Publications Co., 1975). 
Water conservation work and irrigation are extremely 
important in Taiwan, as paddy rice is the staple food and monthly 
rainfall is very uneven. According to one study, the increase of 
rice production was influenced greatly by irrigation; from 1950 to 
1960 each 1 percent increase in irrigated area brought about a 2.5 
percent increase of paddy rice yield. 18 But the expansion of 
irrigated area was rather limited - it has remained around 
500,000 hectares, or about 60 percent of the total cultivated area. 19 
18. The regression is as follows: 
Y = -186.5523 + 0.4971F + 2.47861 - 0.0047P 
(0.7273) (0.6880) (0.0036) 
R2 = 0.97 S = 2.4918 
where Y = paddy rice yield 
F = quantity of fertilizer application 
I = irrigated area 
P = ice of rice. 
The calculation was done by E. L. Rada and T. H. Lee, as cited by T. H. Shen 
and Y. T. Wang, op. cit., p. 371. 
19. You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 166. 
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Chemical fertilizers have been used quite heavily in Taiwan. 
Table 5 shows that the rate of increase of fertilizers (primarily 
chemical fertilizers) was substantially larger than that of 
cultivated land or crop area. From 1946 to 1970, the use of 
chemical fertilizers per unit of crop area went up by about 9 
percent a year. In terms of cultivated area, it went up by more 
than 10 percent a year. The trend has continued since 1970. 
In 1970, total chemical fertilizer used was 653,545 metric tons. 
In 1974, it increased to 1,136,604 metric tons, or 74 percent. Total 
crop area actually declined from 1,653,000 hectares in 1970 to 
1,645,000 hectares in 1974. Area of cultivated land increased only 
slightly from 903,000 hectares in 1970 to 917,000 hectares in 197 4. 20 
In absolute terms, chemical fertilizer used in 1974 was 0.69 metric 
tons per hectare of crop area, or 1.24 metric tons per hectare of 
cultivated area. 
Farm mechanization has played an important role in 
Taiwan's agricultural development. Since the early 1950s, power 
tillers have been increasingly used to supplement or replace water 
buffaloes. Since the 1960s, when farm wages began to rise 
substantially, labor-saving machines have become widely used. 
They include power sprayers, power threshers, corn shellers, jute 
decorticators, sweet potato diggers, grain dryers, hand soybean 
planters, peanut threshers, tea cutters, and rice transplanters. The 
rapid increase of farm machines and the decline of draft animals 
may be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7. Increase of Farm Machines and Decline of 
Draft Animals in Taiwan 
(1,000's) 
1960 1969 
Draft Animals 417.1 305.2 
Power tillers 3.7 24.6 
Power sprayer 0.3 14.8 
Hand sprayer 104.2 181.6 
Hand duster 10.8 22.4 
Rice thresher 177.3 198.5 
Pump 8.4 52.0 
Grain dryer 1.7 
Source: T. H. Shen and Y. T. Wang, "Technological Adjustments," in T. H. 
Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Tawian 
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974). 
20. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975, pp. 48 and 58. 
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FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
The rate of growth of total agricultural output in Taiwan has 
been consistently larger than that of total agricultural input, 
implying that factor productivity has increased. As Table 8 
shows, total factor productivity increased at 1.7 percent per year 
from 1946 to 1970. 
Table 8. Annual Rate of Growth of Agricultural Factor 
Productivity, 1946-70 
(Percent) 
Increase Increase in Productivity 
Increase Increase in total per 
in total in total input ha. of 
output input productivity worker arable land 
1946-51 10.2 7.8 2.4 6.3 9.2 
1951-60 4.7 2.7 2.0 4.4 4.6 
1960-70 4.2 3.2 1.0 3.9 3.9 
1946-70 5.6 3.9 1.7 4.6 5.2 
Source: T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, "Change in Food Consumption Patterns," in 
T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Tawian 
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 298. 
As in the case of total output and total input, total factor 
productivity increased at a decreasing rate, averaging 2.4 percent 
a year in 1946-70. It is not entirely clear why this happened, but, 
given the constant amount of total cultivated area, it seems that 
the law of diminishing returns asserted itself, despite all the 
technological progress that took place. 
The rate of increase of average productivity of labor (output 
per worker) was about the same as that of the average 
productivity of land (output per unit of arable land) from 1950 to 
1970. The increase of capital (Table 5) was evidently the main 
determinant of labor and land productivity.21 Total capital per 
21. This can be demonstrated as follows: Let Y be output and L, N, K land, 
labor, and capital, respectively. 
y y L 
- =-. 
Similarly, N L N 
y y K 
---
Thus,. L K L 
y y K L 
- =-.-. 
N K L N 
Since, in the Taiwan case, both Yl K and LIN have declined (see note 22), 
the increase in Yl N must have been due to an increase in Kl L. 
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unit of labor as well as per unit of arable land increased 
substantially during the period. 
According to one estimate, capital investment per unit of 
cultivated land increased at a rate of 8.65 percent a year from 1946 
to 1965.22 Capital investment per worker increased at a much 
lower rate, because labor increased faster than land. The increase 
of capital intensity brought down the efficiency of capital. For the 
period from 1946 to 1965, the average productivity of capital 
declined at 0.71 percent a year. 
The increase of land productivity implies an increase of crop 
unit yield. The unit yield of all crops rose by about 26 percent from 
1946 to 1951 and by 70 percent from 1951 to 1968.23 Among 
different crops, unit yield increased fastest for fruits and slowest 
for vegetables for the period 1946-65. The growth rates of yield for 
various crops are given in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9. Annual Growth Rate of Yield Per Unit of Crop 
Area in Taiwan, 1946-65 
Food Crops 
Special crops 
Fruits 
Vegetables 
All crops 
(By Groups) 
Source: You-tsao Wang, {op. cit., Table 6), p. 105. 
3.45 
4.67 
5.39 
0.43 
3.63 
22. You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 179. For the period 1946-65, Wang's results on 
Taiwan's agricultural factor productivity are as follows: 
Productivity of labor (per worker) 
Productivity of labor (per man-day) 
Productivity of capital (fixed and current) 
Productivity of land (per unit of cultivated area) 
Aggregate input productivity 
Capital-land ratio 
Land-labor ratio 
23. T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, op. cit., p. 293. 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(1946-1965) 
7.21 
4.16 
-0.71 
7.87 
2.25 
8.65 
-0.60 
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Table 10. Annual Rate of Increase of Yield Per Unit of Crop 
Area in Taiwan, 1953-1974: By Individual Crops 
(Percent) 
Crops 1953-64 1965-74 1953-74 
Rice (brown) 3.3 0.7 2.1 
Sweet potatoes 3.6 1.3 2.5 
Wheat 5.2 1.5 3.5 
Soybeans 5.4 2.9 4.3 
Peanuts 3.7 2.4 3.1 
Cotton 7.6 0.2 4.2 
Jute 4.1 -2.8 0.9 
Tea 4.5 3.9 4.2 
Bananas 6.7 3.6 5.3 
Pineapple 6.0 0.7 3.5 
Citrus fruits 2.4 4.0 2.9 
Sugarcane 3.1 2.2 2.7 
Sugar 2.2 0.1 1.2 
Brown sugar 6.6 4.0 5.4 
Citronella -0.3 2.0 0.8 
Mushrooms NIA 8.9 N/A 
Watermelon 0.9 4.9 2.7 
Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1975 (Taipei: Economic Planning 
Council, 1975), pp. 53-57. 
Note: N/ A = not available. 
Since the increase of both cultivated and crop area was fairly 
small, especially since 1960, the increase in agricultural output 
has been brought about largely through increases in unit yield. 
The rate of increase of unit yield has declined since 1965 for 
nearly all principal crops, as shown in Table 10. For rice, for 
example, the average annual rate of increase of unit yield was 0.7 
percent in 1965-74, compared with 3.3 percent in 1953-64. 
ORGANIZATION AND POLICY 
The above analysis suggests that the increase in agricultural 
production in Taiwan has been associated with intensive 
utilization of labor, more use of capital, and introduction of 
modern technology. But what has brought about the changes in 
agricultural inputs? Why did the farmer want to work harder? 
Who supplied the capital? Who introduced technology? Who was 
the agent of technological diffusion? Has all this been a result of 
the interplay of market forces alone? Or were there other 
instruments of change? What role did the government play? 
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While an exhaustive study of all this cannot be made here, the 
following institutional arrangements and government policy are 
generally regarded as crucial ingredients of agricultural develop-
ment in Taiwan. 
LAND REFORM 
In 1949 the government began a rent reduction program for 
all private tenanted land, with a ceiling of rental rate being 37.5 
percent of total annual main crop yield. The latter was fixed by 
the government (or agreed upon by landlords and tenants) at the 
1948level. But since actual crop yield has increased substantially 
in later years, the effective maximum rate has been much lower 
than the fixed 37.5 percent. 24 
In 1951 the government started to sell farm lands that it had 
taken over from the Japanese colonial government and Japanese 
settlers and corporations in 1945, and had, in large part, leased to 
farmers. These lands were offered for sale to tenant farmers at a 
price equal to 2.5 times the annual main crop yield, to be paid in 
20 installments over ten years. In 1949, the Chinese government 
owned a total of 180,000 hectares of land. It sold 130,000 hectares 
to 177,000 tenant families from 1950 to 1973.25 
In 1953, the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program was formally 
launched. Under this program, a landlord was required to sell to 
the government all his tenanted land in excess of three hectares of 
paddy field (of medium grade) or its equivalent, at a price equal to 
2.5 times the crop yield; 70 percent of the payments were in bonds 
in kind and 30 percent in stocks of government enterprises. The 
bonds in kind bore an annual interest rate of 4 percent and were 
redeemable in installments over a period of ten years. The land so 
purchased by the government was then sold to its original tenants 
or farmhands at the same price as that paid to the landlords. The 
payment was also in installments over a period of ten years with 
an annual interest rate of 4 percent. Under this program, a total of 
140,000 hectares of land was purchased from 106,000 landlords 
24. For the details, see Chao-chen Chen, "Land Reform and Agricultural 
Development in Taiwan," in Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, 
1967 (Taipei: China Council on Sino-American Cooperation in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 1967), pp. 126-153; Yu-kang Mao, "Population and the Land 
System in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and Economic Development in 
Taiwan, 1976, pp. 163-191; Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in 
Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1968); Yhi-
min Ho, Agricultural Development of Taiwan (Nashville: Vanderbilt U. Press, 
1966). 
25. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 174. 
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and sold to 195,000 tenant families. 26 Those farmers who 
cultivated their own land were not affected by this program, 
regardless of the amount of land they owned. 
The land reform programs have had drastic effects on land 
tenancy. The rent reduction program lowered the value of the 
farm land leased to tenant farmers and encouraged the landlords 
to sell the land to their tenants. A total of 66,328 tenant families 
bought 34,453 hectares of farm land between 1949 and 1953.27 The 
sale of public land and the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program directly 
reduced tenancy and increased ownership. 
In 1949, of total farm households in Taiwan, some 39 percent 
were tenant farms (as it had been for decades), 25 percent part-
owner farms, and 36 percent owner-operator farms. The propor-
tion of pure tenant farms was reduced to 21 percent in 1953 and 
9.7 percent in 1974. The proportion of owner-operator farms 
increased to 55 percent in 1953 and 79 percent in 1974. Before land 
reform, about 61 percent of private cultivated land was cultivated 
by owners; thereafter, it increased to 85 percent in 1953. By 1974 
the ratio was 91 percent.2s 
It is generally felt that the sharp increase in owner-operator 
farms has been not only politically and socially desirable, it has 
also had desirable economic consequences. The owner-operator 
may be expected to work harder when he does not need to share 
the fruits of his labor with his landlord. It is also likely that what 
would be used as payment for rent is now at least in part saved for 
capital investment in land. To the extent that the rental income of 
the landlords is not used for investment in land, either because it 
is used for consumption by the landlords or other farmers 
(through loans by the landlords) or because it is used for 
investment in nonagricultural sectors, capital formation in 
agriculture may be increased. 
According to one estimate, the marginal propensity to save of 
new farm owners in Taiwan was as high as 49 percent for 
1952-62.29 But there are no data to show how the former landlords 
disposed of their income. 
It has been suggested that the land reform program has 
resulted in smaller size farms, which has resulted in inefficient 
26. In 1953, there were altogether 872,738 hectares of cultivated land and 
702,325 farm families. (Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 51 and 54.) 
27. Chao-chen Chen, op. cit., p. 135. 
28. Ibid., p. 144 and Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 175. 
29. Chao-chen Chen, op. cit., p. 148. 
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operation. Before the Land-to-the-Tiller program, 58 percent of all 
farms had less than 3 hectares of land; thereafter, the ratio 
increased to 77 percent.30 But part of this change must have been 
due to an increase in the number of farm households. It must be 
remembered that the land reform program did not involve 
breaking up the large owner-operated farms. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence to suggest that smaller size means less efficiency in 
terms of output per unit ofland. On the contrary, one study shows 
that in 1965 the value of total output per hectare of cultivated area 
was NT$40,900 for farms of less than 0.5 hectare. It was only 
NT$26,700 for farms of more than 0.5 hectare. But on a per man-
year basis, it was smaller for farms of less than 0.5 hectare: 
NT$20,000 compared with NT$25,400 for farms of more than 0.5 
hectare.31 
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) 
This Joint Commission of China and the United States, 
created under the U. S. China Aid Act of 1948, has played a 
crucial innovating role in agricultural development in Taiwan. It 
has assisted the government in planning and coordinating 
agricultural programs and has provided technical and financial 
assistance to various agencies and organizations, private as well 
as public. Its activities have formed an integrated agricultural 
and rural development program, including technological improve-
ments and institutional changes and readjustments.32 It has 
introduced new and improved varieties and breeds, better cultural 
methods, irrigation, and the scientific application of fertilizers 
and pesticides. For organizational developments, it has assisted 
the land reform programs and the reorganization of farmers' 
associations, irrigation associations, and fishermen's associa-
tions. It has also played a role in the improvement of marketing 
procedures and facilities, the development of the rural credit 
system, and the promotion of family planning programs. 
30. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 176. 
31. Hsi-Huang Chen, "Economic Analysis of Small Farms," in Tsung-Hsien 
Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., pp. 378-379. 
32. Wen-fu Hsu, "The Role of Agricultural Organizations in Agricultural 
Development in Taiwan," in Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, 
1976, p. 121; T. H. Shen, "Organizations to Promote Agricultural Development," in 
T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 346-365; You-tsao Wang, "Agricultural Development," 
in Kowie Chang (ed.), Economic Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Cheng-chung 
Book Co., 1968), pp. 217-223; T. H. Shen, The Sino-American Joint Commission on 
Rural Reconstruction: Twenty Years of Cooperation for Agricultural Development 
(Ithaca, Cornell U. Press, 1970). 
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JCRR staff has provided technical assistance in the planning 
and implementation for the agricultural sector of the Four-Year 
Economic Development Plans which started in 1953. JCRR has 
served as a coordinator on matters relating to the overall national 
agricultural plan. 
JCRR has also provided funds for the agricultural programs. 
(The U.S. China Aid Act of 1948 provided that up to 10 percent of 
all U.S. economic aid to China could be used to carry out JCRR 
programs.) For example, from 1951 to 1965, JCRR approved more 
than 6,000 projects carried out by various agencies and spent a 
total of NT$4,000 million and US$7 million. A total of NT$13,330 
million was used for investment in agriculture in Taiwan from 
1953 to 1965. (NT$6,270 million of the total represented private 
investment and NT$7,060 million public investment.)33 
The Farmers' Association 
The Farmers' Associations are a federation of cooperative 
organizations and are operated at the township (district) level, the 
county level, and the provincial level. Township Farmers' 
Associations are the grass-roots organizations that are directly 
controlled by the farmers. 
The Farmers' Associations are engaged in a wide variety of 
both government-sponsored and self-initiated activities. The 
government-sponsored functions have included distribution of 
fertilizers and feeds, collection and purchase of rice, and 
participation in agricultural extension services. The latter include 
not only production technology of crops and livestock, they also 
include farm management and organization and training of 
young people to become better farmers. Adult farmers enroll in 
farm discussion groups, farm women take part in home improve-
ment clubs, and farm boys and girls join 4-H clubs. The Farmers' 
Associations have been effective agents of dissemination of 
technology. They are also engaged in purchasing farm supplies, 
marketing and processing farm products, receiving deposits, and 
making loans. They are truly multipurpose cooperatives.34 
33. Chi-tseng Shih, "Real Assets of Farming Households in Taiwan," in 
Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., p. 537. 
34. 1'. H. Shen, "Organizations to Promote Agricultural Development," op. cit., 
pp. 354-357; Mao-Ying Chiu, "Farmers' Associations and Economic Development," 
in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., pp. 173-196. 
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The Rice-Fertilizer Barter Policy 
This policy was begun in 1950 for the purpose of raising rice 
production by the farmers on the one hand and rice collection by 
the government on the other hand. Government-imported fertiliz-
ers were given to farmers in exchange for rice, with the exchange 
ratio being determined by the government. Thus the government 
gained a large supply of rice, which was used for exports. In 1966, 
for example, rice acquired by the government under the rice-
fertilizer barter program constituted 70 percent of all rice obtained 
by the government. (Other sources included taxes in kind, rental 
in kind, and purchases.)35 
The advantages to the farmers of the rice-fertilizer barter 
program were twofold. First, all farmers were guaranteed a supply 
of fertilizers, which were the most important input of rice 
production and yielded high returns. Without this program, the 
poor and small farmers would probably have been denied such a 
supply because of lack of funds and inability to borrow at 
reasonable terms. Second, the farmers were free from risks due to 
price instability. The rice-fertilizer ratio was fixed in advance. 
This system was not without its shortcomings. Farmers had 
no freedom of choice regarding quality or quantity of fertilizers 
used, nor could they grow other crops without losing their 
fertilizer supply. All the inconveniences of barter trade existed. 
And the rice-fertilizer exchange ratio was not adjusted to reflect 
changing market conditions and worked to the disadvantage of 
the farmers. 36 The system was finally abolished in 1973. (In the 
early 1970s, the government-owned fertilizer industry became 
well-established.) 
A New Agricultural Policy 
Agricultural production increased at a rapid rate in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but the rice-fertilizer barter system effectively trans-
ferred part of the increase out of agriculture. When this was 
combined with the fact that nonagricultural production grew even 
faster than agricultural production, the gap between per capita 
farm and nonfarm incomes and living standards widened. In 
1968, for example, per capita income of farm people was only 58 
percent of that of nonfarm people. In 1954, the ratio was 75 
35. Yu-hsien Yu, "An Analysis of Prices of Farm Outputs and Inputs in 
Taiwan," in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op, cit., p. 201. 
36. Tso-yung Wang, "Rural Reconstruction," in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien 
Yu, op. cit., pp. 443-446. 
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percent.37 To cope with this and other problems, a new agricultu-
ral policy was adopted by the Chinese government in 1969. 
The main objective of the new policy was to reduce costs of 
agricultural production and marketing by such measures as 
reduction of fertilizer price and irrigation fees, farm mechaniza-
tion, lower interest rates, and lower taxes. In 1972, it was 
announced that the government was prepared to earmark in two 
years a total of NT$2 billion in grants and almost an equal 
amount (NT$1.8 billion) in loans to improve agriculture. Specific 
measures included establishment of specialized agricultural 
production areas, improvement of farming techniques (including 
farm mechanization), and strengthening of rural infrastructures. 
(A specialized agricultural production area means that all farms 
producing certain items in a locality are urged to form a large 
production and marketing unit to facilitate joint purchases and 
joint production operations.) 
The adoption of the new agricultural policy reflected the 
changing role of agriculture in the economy. The agricultural 
sector may no longer be regarded as a crucial source of financing 
economic development, and the rural people may now equally 
share in the fruits of economic growth. In 1953, agriculture 
contributed 34 percent of gross domestic product and 87 percent of 
total exports. By 1970, the corresponding shares had become 15 
percent and 12 percent.38 
But all the above does not mean, of course, that there had 
been no increase in farmers' income and living standards. Per 
capita income of farm families rose, in 1952 prices, from NT$1,375 
in 1954 to NT$1,836 in 1970, or about 1.8 percent a year.39 
By 1970, 93 percent of farm families had electric lights, 70 
percent had electric fans, 53 percent had radios, 70 percent had 
sewing machines, 17 percent had a television set, 36 percent had 
running water, and 50 percent had water from sanitary wells. In 
1970, 70 percent of the persons working on family farms had a 
primary school education, or higher.40 These were no small 
achievements. 
37. T. H. Shen, "A New Agricultural Policy," in T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 39. 
38. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975 (Republic of China: 
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan), p. 191; 
Kuo-shu Liang, "Taiwan's Agricultural Trade and Economic Development," in T. 
H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 117. 
39. Per capita income data at current prices are from T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, 
"Agriculture as a Base for Socio-Econovic Development," in T. H. Shen (ed.), op. 
cit., p. 299. Index of Consumer Prices is from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975, 
p. 157. 
40. Ibid., pp. 433-435. 
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ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 
The rate of increase of agricultural production has slowed 
down since 1971, averaging 0.98 percent a year for the five years 
from 1971 through 1975. This may be compared with the average 
annual rate of increase of 5.6 percent during the five years from 
1961 to 1965.41 This slow growth in recent years has occurred at a 
time when the following phenomena have also occurred. 
First, agricultural employment has declined continuously in 
absolute numbers since 1969, with the exception of 1974 when 
there was a decline in industrial production and some industrial 
workers returned to the countryside. From 1969 to 1973, the 
average annual rate of decline was 1.53 percent.42 Such a rate of 
decline, if continued, implies that an increase of agricultural 
production at, say, 4 percent a year (roughly the historical rate), 
would require an increase of labor productivity of nearly 6 percent 
a year. This may be compared with the annual rate of increase of 
labor productivity (agricultural output per employed person per 
year) of 1.91 percent for the five years from 1971 to 1975.43 For the 
period 1946-70, the annual rate of increase was 4.6 percent (Table 
8). The rate of increase of productivity of the agricultural worker 
has also declined sharply in the past few years. 
Second, the average size of farms in Taiwan was never large 
and has been getting smaller. In 1925 it was 1.97 hectares. By 
1950 it was reduced to 1.36. It continued to decline and reached 
1.03 in 1970. In 1974, it increased to 1.05.44 What is worse is that 
the percentage share of the smallest farms has increased over the 
years. In 1955 some 34 percent of all farms had less than 0.5 
hectares of land. In 1970, the ratio reached 44 percent. In 1955, 53 
percent of all farms had less than 1 hectare; by 1970, nearly 72 
percent had less than 1 hectare.45 As noted earlier, labor 
productivity in small farms (less than 0.5 hectare) is substantially 
lower (by more than 20 percent) than that in larger farms. 
Factors affecting farms size are complicated. Aside from the 
increase in the number of farm households, the land tenancy 
system probably has also been important. The small farmers are 
41. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 56. 
42. Calculated from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 16. Employment 
data are from the Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan (Taipei: 
Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research Institute, 1974). 
43. Calculated from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 16 and 55. 
Agricultural employment data are from the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan. 
44. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 167. 
45. T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 419. 
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reluctant to sell their farms because of the risks involved in 
nonagricultural jobs. They are also reluctant to lease their land to 
others for fear of losing their land to the tenants under the land 
reform regulations. 
As a result, part-time farming has increased. Many farmers 
find it necessary to supplement their incomes with nonfarm jobs 
locally or in near-by towns or cities. Friends or relatives are asked 
to take care of their farms during their absence, which may last 
from several days to several weeks. This arrangement often leads 
to inefficient operation. 46 
In 1960, 52 percent of all farms were part-time farms. By 1970, 
the ratio increased to 70 percent. For farms of less than 0.5 
hectares, 70 percent were part-time farms in 1960 and 83 percent 
in 1970.47 The productivity of part-time farms is substantially 
lower than that of full-time farms, as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Productivity of Full-time and Part-time Farms 
in Taiwan, 1967 
Full-time Part-time Farms 
Farms (A) (B) 
Income per house· 
hold (NT$) 26,004 23,360 13,727 
Income per man-
equivalent (NT$) 17,248 12,990 5,935 
Rate of return on 
capital investment 
(%) 7.13 6.03 1.86 
Returns per NT dollar 
input (NT$) 1.94 1.89 1.46 
Source: Terry Y. H. Yu, "Economic Analysis of Full-time and Part-time 
Farms in Taiwan," as cited in T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy 
of Development: The Taiwan Experience. 
The problems for agricultural development in Taiwan today 
seem clear. To increase farm output and to reduce income 
inequalities between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, 
which is a stated goal of the government, farm labor productivity 
would have to be increased. One model of raising farm labor 
productivity would be the American approach: development of 
highly capital-intensive techniques (farm mechanization), but 
that would require a much larger farm size than is found today in 
Taiwan. Land consolidation would, in turn, require a set of 
46. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 180. 
47. Ibid., p. 177. 
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institutional innovations whereby the inefficient part-time 
farmers would be willing to sell or lease their land to others and 
find employment in nonagricultural sectors. This is probably 
what should or would happen. Agricultural employment still 
accounts for 30 percent of total employment (1975)- a very high 
proportion by the standards of industrially advanced countries. 
Rapid industrial development would surely require a shift of labor 
from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sectors. The question 
is how to make such a shift without undesirable social consequen-
ces. Reliance on market forces alone for such a shift would 
probably mean an increasing disparity between farm income 
(especially for the small, part-time farms) and nonfarm income-
something the government tries to prevent. Innovative job-
training and reallocation programs for small, part-time, and low-
productivity farmers would thus be called for. 
Another approach to raising farm labor productivity is to 
retain the present dispersed farm ownership and part-time 
farmers but to find ways whereby the small farms could form 
cooperative and large operating units. Such large operating units 
would make it possible to introduce mechanical technology. The 
Chinese government has apparently already taken steps to 
encourage this path of development: cooperative purchasing and 
marketing, joint operations and management, and specialized 
production area. But farm mechanization means labor-saving. If 
it is deemed desirable to keep part-time farmers on the farm, 
plenty of part-time nonfarm jobs have to be provided. This would 
require a pattern of industrial development with highly dispersed 
locations. It would also require a pattern of industrial manage-
ment whereby jobs may be performed by part-time workers. It 
might be argued that socially, morally, or ecologically, it is 
desirable to combine farm and nonfarm work and minimize urban 
growth, but whether this is economically desirable or feasible 
remains to be studied. 
It would not be an easy task to accelerate the increase in farm 
labor productivity when the separation of land ownership and 
operation is to be avoided, when a structural transformation of 
labor from farm to nonfarm employment is to continue during a 
period of declining agricultural labor force, and when income 
inequalities between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are 
to be reduced. Aside from an increase in capital investment in 
agriculture, a new set of institutional arrangements, or even an 
industrial development strategy would have to be innovated. But, 
in the past two or three decades, Taiwan has never lacked for 
innovative policies and institutions. 
Chapter IV 
MANPOWER, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPORT-LED 
GROWTH-THE TAIWAN EXPERIENCE 
HENRY Y. WAN, JR. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 30 years, the economy of Taiwan has 
experienced one of the best records of continuing development in 
the world. This record is usually considered in one of two contexts: 
1. As an exceptional observation in a cross-country study. 
The superior performance of Taiwan is usually attributed 
to some "atypical conditions." No in-depth follow-up is 
offered in that context. 
2. As a single-country case study, where the interactions 
between Taiwan and the other economies are not emphas-
ized. This approach tends to gloss over those conditions 
without which a resource-scarce economy like Taiwan can 
never prosper. 
The more recent papers by Balassa1 and Cole,2 and the book 
by Pauuw and Fei3 have remedied some of the omissions. The 
present study is intended to close the gap further. 
The story of the Taiwan "economic miracle" is one of 
sustained rapid growth. Despite its meager resources and heavy 
defense burden, the Taiwan economy exhibits a growth rate of per 
capita gross domestic product that ties with South Korea and 
Japan as the highest for the entire world outside of the oil-
producing countries. Both the rich and the poor have gained in the 
development process, and income distribution did not worsen as 
rapid expansion took place. Without industrial strikes, real wages 
have been rising rapidly, and unemployment is negligible. The 
monetary authority has accumulated a sizable foreign reserve, 
and the exchange rate has always been firm. Price stability is 
attained in most years and domestic saving has risen to 25 
1. Bela Balassa, Changing Patterns in Foreign Trade and Payments (New 
York: Norton, 1964). 
2. D. C. Cole, "Market Penetration by Asia's Super Exporters," in Hong 
Wontack and Krueger, eds., Trade and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korean 
Development Institute, 1975). 
3. D. Pauuw and John C. H. Fei, The Transition in Open Dualistic Economies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). 
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percent or more of national income. Taiwan is nearly self-
sufficient in food grain and the industrial sector is expanding very 
fast. Life expectancy at birth is 66 years for men and 72 years for 
women; the birth rate has fallen to less than 2 percent per year. 
With 16 million people crowding on an island where population 
density exceeds that of the Netherlands, residents are amassing 
modern consumer durables briskly: one TV set per 17 individtlals 
and one motorcycle for every 13. Postal service is the best in Asia, 
and high-rise buildings transform the skyline. 
No economist anywhere has seriously challenged the broad 
outline of such a record. Moreover, no other developing economy is 
superior to that of Taiwan on all dimensions. South Korea may 
have grown faster recently but has heavier foreign debts and 
frequent devaluations. Israel has a worse balance of payments. 
Singapore has a worse employment situation, and Hong Kong is 
not training enough skilled workers. Given the international 
situation as well as the initial economic conditions, even critics 
would be hard-pressed to suggest a policy alternative that would 
guarantee a much better overall growth performance. 
Manpower appears to be the single most important factor 
underlying the development process. It is the availability, the 
continuous upgrading, and the effective use of such manpower 
that characterizes the Taiwan experience. With some modifica-
tion, this experience should be applicable to all economies, 
developing or developed, market oriented or otherwise. 
II. A BACKGROUND SKETCH4 
Taiwan: A Rapid Survey 
Taiwan is an island of 13,885 square miles, slightly smaller 
than either Switzerland or the Netherlands, or the combined area 
of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Less than one 
third of this is arable. Irrigation and much chemical fertilizer are 
required for good crops. The rest of the area is mountainous, 
covered by forests of indifferent commercial value. Coal, lime-
stone, and natural gas are present in quantities insufficient for 
local needs. The same holds for hydroelectric energy. For "The 
Beautiful Island," nature has not been bountiful. 
Under Japanese rule, 1894-1945, Taiwan supplied tropical 
produce and rice to fulfill the import-substituting goal of the 
Japanese Empire. Japan left three legacies: (1) good roads and 
4. Unless otherwise stated, data on Taiwan came from Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book of various years (Taipei: CIECD and Economic Planning Council). 
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port facilities, (2) some food processing industries, and (3) a 
peasantry conducive to technical change. The naval blockade and 
aerial bombing in World War II reduced (1) and (2) to pale 
shadows of their old selves. 
The postwar years, 1946-1952, were a time of turmoil and 
trial. During the first three years, the government of the Republic 
of China at Nanking was locked in desperate civil strife. The best 
administrators and technicians went to Manchuria; all resources 
were mobilized for war. Nothing could be spared for Taiwanese 
reconstruction. War damage was noticeable in Taipei until 1949. 
Railroad shipping reached its prewar peak only by 1951.5 The 
recovery has not been rapid. From 1952 to 1956, both Japan and 
Mainland China were no longer sheltered markets. About 1.2 
million evacuees had to be absorbed in an economy of less than 7 
million. Military preparedness assumed top priority to stop any 
invasion forces across the strait of Pescadores. Inflation raged: 
3400 percent in 1949, 306 percent in 1950, 66 percent in 1951, and 
23 percent in 1952.6 The currency reform in 1949 failed to stem the 
tide, and the government deficit was financed by money issue. As 
a last resort, a multitude of controls were clamped down on trade 
and foreign exchange to preserve the remaining foreign assets. By 
late 1950, much needed U.S. aid came on the heels of the Korean 
War. Yet the repeated reversals suffered by the UN Command in 
the first year of the war did not inspire investors anywhere off the 
Asian mainland. 
The decade 1953-62 was one of consolidation and stabiliza-
tion. With U.S. aid, both the double-digit inflation and exchange 
rate devaluation came to an end by 1960. Import substitution 
policies were adopted to secure supplies of chemical fertilizer, 
textiles, and cement. Under the 1953 land-to-the-tiller program, 
shares of state enterprises were distributed to landlords to secure 
their titles. Titles were given to tenant farmers against their 
installment payments in grain over a decade. A series of trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization measures were adopted between 
1958 and 1963.7 Per capita real income grew at the average annual 
rate of 3 percent, a creditable but average record for other LDCs. 
5. N. H. Jacoby, United States Aid to Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 
82. 
6. C. Y. Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-1972 (New York: Praeger, 
1973), Table 2-3, p. 46. 
7. Much credit is due to the late Professor T. C. Liu and to Professor S. C. 
Tsiang, See M. H. Hsing, "Taiwan," in J. H. Power, G. P. Sicat and M. H. Hsing, 
The Philippines, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Pulicies (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971 ), p. 200 footnote. 
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Some structural change of the economy also occurred. The 
percentage of rice and sugar-traditional staples exported from 
Taiwan-in total exports fell steadily, reaching 50 percent in 1960. 
The changing structure of the economy is depicted by the 
following figures: 
Percent 
of Employment 
Percent 
ofGDP 
Agriculture Industry Agriculture Industry 
(1953) 61 
(1962) 55 
9 
12 
38 
29 
18 
26 
Percent 
of Export 
Agri-
cultural 
Good and Products 
93 
49 
Indus-
trial 
Prod-
ucts 
7 
51 
The years 1963-73 represented a period of sustained growth. 
Various fiscal schemes- e.g., tax holidays and tariff rebates on 
imported material processed for exports - were adopted to 
encourage foreign investment and export. Export cartels for farm 
products, export processing zones for manufactured exports, 
industrial parks designed for land purchases and setting up 
infrastructure were all adopted. The government recognized that 
close international economic contacts may promote both economic 
prosperity and international support to forestall or offset diplo-
matic reversals. In this period, population growth slowed down 
from 3.2 percent to under 2 percent. Per capita real GDP grew at 
an average rate of 7 percent per year. The changing structure of 
employment, GDP, and exports has continued. The data on 
employment and GDP will be shown later. The structural change 
of exports continued, the percentage of agricultural goods and 
products fell from 43 percent to 17 percent and the percentage of 
industrial products went from 55 percent to 83 percent. Within the 
"industrial exports," 90 percent were manufacturing products. 
Structural changes also took place. 8 
The fastest growth between 1966 and 1971 belonged to the 
electronics industry. This industry attracts most of the foreign 
investment and exports most of its output. Its subsectors, 
telecommunication and generators/motors, grew at annual rates 
of 80 percent and 54 percent. In 1971, 60 percent of textile products 
were exported. The subsectors of knitted products and processed 
apparel also grew at 65 percent and 41 percent per year between 
8. The only data available in that period are from "Household registry", a 
record believed to be biased in overstating the farm population, as people leaving 
farms may not register. The trend shown is probably correct. 
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1966 and 1971. Another industry that attracted foreign investment 
and exported much of the output is rubber, chemical, and 
petroleum products. Its output growth in 1963-72 kept pace with 
the industrial sector as a whole -i.e., its output rose by five times. 
Finally, food, beverages, and tobacco industries increased their 
output by a factor of 2.5 in that decade. Consequently, their 
weight among all manufacturing outputs fell over time. During 
this period of rapid growth, the average increase of wholesale 
prices was 3.5 percent. The official exchange rate to the U.S. 
dollar remained at 40:1 throughout, and there was scarcely any 
difference between the official and black market rates. Unemploy-
ment was insignificant, but the real wage was rising. The ratio of 
exports to GDP rose to about 50 percent.9 
The years 1974-76 were a period of external disturbances and 
internal adjustment. Near the end of 1973, the rise of world prices 
over Taiwan prices caused an explosive export boom. Stock-in-
trade was quickly depleted and export revenue was instantly 
transformed into domestic money supply. The shortage of 
soy beans was followed by the oil crisis. The government briefly 
subsidized imported farm produce at an untenable fiscal cost. 
When this measure was finally abandoned, it was coupled with a 
sharp increase of public utility rates. In early 1974, prices rose by 
more than 50 percent in one year. By then the recession in the 
developed world deepened. Export markets for a while disinte-
grated and factories started laying off workers. Per capita GDP 
fell but prices stabilized under a tight monetary policy. As 
recovery in Japan and the United States finally came, the Taiwan 
economy also started to recover, a process that is going on today. 
The surprising resilience of the economy shows that even during 
an acute international recession Taiwan could weather the storm 
without resorting to quotas and controls. This study will focus on 
the period before the Yom Kippur War, since the worldwide 
stagflation in its aftermath is still not quite over and it is too early 
to analyze the events. 
Japan And The Far East Four: 
The Perspective 
The industrialization of Germany, Russia, and Japan is by 
now a familiar tale. Rapid tempo, gigantic scale, basic industrq, 
and special institutions designed to mobilize savings characterize 
their development process.10 Attempts to exulate such examples 
9. Perspective on Industrial Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1973), pp. 73-74. 
10. See, for instance, Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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were made after World War II by India, Indonesia, and others in 
starting with heavy industries of modern design, but with poor 
results.u At the other end of the spectrum, when the export-· 
propelled growth of Latin American states suddenly ended during 
the Great Depression and World War II, they took up the theory 
and practice of import-substituting industrialization.12 The expe-
rience was frustrating: initial success and heightened hope, 
followed by stagnation and disillusion. The same was true for the 
Philippines.13 
In fact, in the late 1950s, the Taiwan economy was in a 
similar plight: overvalued exchange rate and underutilized plant 
capacities. 14 In the past 20 years, four Far East economies -
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan -have had the 
highest observed sustained growth of per capita GDP (Tables 
1-4). Yet there are important variations. To understand the 
development process in Taiwan, one may conveniently consider 
the development process of this group. (See Chart 1.) 
11. See, for instance, J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, India: Planning for 
Industrialization: Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1951 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960). 
12. See, for instance, Albert 0. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971), Chapter 3. 
13. G. P. Sicat, Economic Policy and Philippine Development (Manila: 
University of Philippines Press, 1972). 
14. Kuo-hsu Liang, "Trade and Employment in Taiwan," in Proceedings of the 
Sino-American Conference on Manpower in Taiwan, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 
1972, p. 240, reported that factories producing tennis shoes, paper, etc. in 1959 had 
utilization rates from 23 to 67 percent. With few exceptions, improvements were 
dramatic by 1969. Pauuw and Fei, op. cit., proposed a theoretic explanation about 
why import-substituting industrialization must fail. 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Japan 
West Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
France 
Netherlands 
Facts at a Glance 
1973 
Population Density %GNP 
(million) per km2 (U.S.$) 
33 334 378 
16 429 655 
4 3980 1416 
2 3761 1890 
-
55 
108 291 3782 
62 249 5671 
56 229 3088 
55 182 2515 
52 95 4797 
13 329 4435 
Table 1 
Average 
Annual Growth 
of 
% GDP constant prices 
196Q-65 1965-70 197Q-73 
3.6 9.0 8.7 
6.4• 7.0" 9.7 
8.1 5.9 5.9 
2.5 10.9 10.5 
9.0 10.6 7.4 
Other non-oil producers with rapid sustained growth of % GDP 
196Q-65 1965-70 197Q-73 
--- --- --- ---
Cyprus 
- 6.6 
Israel 4.9 5.6 
Greece 7.1 7.0 
Spain 7.3 5.2 
Portugal 5.5 5.1 
Tunisia 2.3 1.5 
Brazil 1.2 3.9< 
• Average of the% annual growth rate. 
b 197Q-72. 
c 1965-67. 
5.5 
6.1 
8.lb 
6.2 
7.9 
7.6 
7.2• 
Average 
Annual Growth 
of 
The Export/GDP Ratio 
196Q-65 1965-70 1970-73 
14.4 25.3 2H.6 
13.2 17.1 24.6 
0.5 5.8 1.0 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
4.5 4.0 l.:J 
Source: Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974, pp. 4, 19; United 
Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, New York, 1970, Vol. III, pp. 175-177, and Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1973, 1975, pp. 152-153; United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, pp. 128·131, and 
Demographic Yearbook 1973, 1974, p. 103; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, China: A 
Reassessment of the Economy, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 42-43. 
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Table 2. Percent Distribution of GDP (Employment) 
Singapore 
Agr. Mfg. 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1973 
4 
3 
2(.5) 
2(.5) 
• Percent of NDP. 
b Percent in 1972. 
c Percent in 1966. 
12 
15 
23(30) 
27(36b) 
South Korea 
Agr. Mfg. 
37 14 
39(59) 18(9) 
28(51) 22(13) 
26(5Qb) 26(14b) 
Taiwan• 
Agr. Mfg. 
33 17 
27(44C) 20(17C) 
19(37) 24(20) 
16(31) 30(27) 
Japan 
Agr. 
13 
10(25) 
7(17) 
6(13) 
Table 3. Percent Distribution of GDP from Mfg. Industries 
South Korea 
Fd. Text. 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1973 
40 
33 
29 
23 
• Percent in 1963. 
29 
23 
21 
30 
Taiwan 
CWM/M Fd. 
17 44 
27 35 
35 24 
34 17 
Japan 
Text. CH/MM Fd. Text. 
15 22 13• 8• 
15 33 12 7 
14 43 10 6 
18 50 8 6 
Mfg. 
33 
32(24) 
36(27) 
38(28) 
CH/MM 
53" 
57 
62 
61 
Source: See note to Table 1; George J. Staller, "Fluctuations in Economic Activity: Planned and Free-Market 
Economics, 1950-1960," American Economic Review (June 1964), p. 391. 
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Table 4. Ch/M/M - Chemical Products, Basic Metal and Machinery 
Share of U.S. and Japan in Exports (%) 
South Korea Taiwan Japan 
U.S. Japan Sum u.s. Japan Sum u.s. Japan Sum 
1962 22 43 65 24 24 48 21 5 26 
1965 23 25 60 22 21 53 28 6 :l4 
1968 52 22 74 36 16 51 34 6 40 
1971 50 25 74 43 12 56 35 7 42 
Source: David C. Cole, "Market Penetration by Asia's Super Exporters," in Hong Wontak and A. 0. Krueger (eds.), 
Trade and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korean Development Institute, 1975); Economic Planning Council, Executive 
Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, Taipei, 1974, pp. 157, 272-273; United Nations, Statistical 
Yearbook 1960, New York: United Nations, 1967, pp. 535-537; Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York, United Nations, 1971, 
pp. 556-568. 
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Briefly speaking, the Far East Four and Japan all have 
meager natural resources and very high population densities. (In 
fact, all the Far East Four have higher population per square mile 
than Japan.) But the Far East Four have less capital per head, 
lower per capita income, and a far smaller domestic market than 
Japan. There is scarcely any R&D capability and all have large 
numbers of displaced or unemployed persons to support. The 
dependance ratio was high and population pressure was strong in 
the early stages. None of these economies are self-sufficient in 
food, yet they all have had rapid growth in per capita GDP and all 
enjoy fast growing export markets. In fact, exports increase faster 
than GDP in all cases. The structures of their GDP, employment, 
and exports have all undergone profound transformations, such 
that the manufacturing sector has increased by any of these three 
indices in all of the four economies. Within the manufacturing 
sector, the industry group of chemicals, basic metals, and 
machinery has gained over time relative to food processing, while 
textiles and apparel hold their own, relative to the aggregate 
manufacturing output. These structural transformations are 
similar to those experienced by Japan. All these economies have 
little difficulty in negotiating private loans or attracting private 
foreign investment, yet they all have high savings/income ratios, 
approaching that of Japan. All these economies have succeeded in 
displacing Japan in labor-intensive products on the American 
market, and the combined markets of America and Japan loom 
large in all these economies' exports. 
These four economies all enjoy domestic peace and order and 
are free from industrial disputes. Real wages steadily rise through 
the competitive market force, and they all maintain "realistic" 
exchange rates. Interest rates are all kept either equal to the 
international rate or sufficiently high to encourage domestic 
saving in the form of saving deposits. They all have liberal 
regulations regarding trade and foreign investment. They all have 
a high ratio of literacy and widespread education, especially 
among the young females who form the backbone of the textile 
and telecommunication labor forces. Public enterprise has a low 
profile outside the utility fields, and American and Japanese firms 
are the main foreign investors. 
Needless to say, they all face the contemporary world where 
(1) technology has made transportation and communication fast 
and cheap, (2) institutions (IMF, GATI, etc.) have facilitated 
international movements of goods and capital, (3) the world 
economy has provided long periods of steady expansion with only 
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short and mild recessions where "mass high consumption" in the 
developed "center" demands high-value, low volume goods such 
as radios, TV sets, minicomputers, plastic toys, etc., and (4) 
politics have made resources easily available (due to decoloniza-
tion), markets open (since the United States cannot afford to 
pauperize countries by prohibitive trade restrictions) and boundar-
ies closed for Japan and the United States regarding "foreign 
workers" (of South Africa, West Europe, and Israel). They may 
also explain, at least in part, the "trend acceleration" of the 
Japanese growth observed by Ohkawa and Rosovsky. 
The diversities among the Far East Four are equally telling. 
Historically, Taiwan and South Korea specialized in agriculture 
before industrialization. Hong Kong and Singapore specialized in 
entrepot trade. Singapore and South Korea originally received 
income from foreign garrisons; Hong Kong and Taiwan did not. 
South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed U.S. aid until 1971 and 1965, 
respectively. South Korea and Taiwan produce the bulk of their 
foodstuffs, and they also have sizable defense burdens, while 
Hong Kong and Singapore have little defense expenditure and 
must import food. Hong Kong has always been on a floating 
exchange rate. Taiwan has tied its exchange rate with the U.S. 
dollar, and South Korea has had a series of devaluations. South 
Korea, alone of the four, has had quite a bit of inflation. Singapore 
alone has still some unemployment, while Taiwan and Hong 
Kong have absorbed migrants from Mainland China since 
1949-50. Hong Kong pursues a strict laissez-faire ·doctrine, while 
the other three first adopted import-substituting industrialization, 
followed by export-promotion, investment-inducing policies. Politi-
cally, Hong Kong has no government, while in the other three, 
strong government guidance pervades in all spheres. Except for 
South Korea, all have Chinese populations and investors shift 
investment funds among the three. 
The combined population of the Far East Four is one-half that 
of Japan, or equivalent to any of the big four in the EEC: West 
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, or France. Hence, if their 
growth trends continue, these economies will be of considerable 
significance in their own right. 
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Table 5. Inter-Asian Market Transfer in U.S. Imports (%) 
Japan Korea Taiwan Hong Kong 
Textile (SITC 8411) 
1962 35.3 .3 3.7 27.7 
1965 35.3 3.8 3.8 27.4 
1968 31.9 5.8 5.3 29.1 
1971 21.8 12.9 10.0 28.2 
Footwear (SITC 8510) 
1962 43.0 0 0 0.3 
1965 32.5 2.3 .9 0 
1968 20.6 2.5 4.0 0 
1971 12.5 3.5 8.7 0 
Clothing Ace. Knit (SITC 8414) 
1962 17.0 0 0.9 11.5 
1965 14.9 1.1 1.3 23.0 
1968 11.4 10.9 7.9 25.2 
1971 13.2 13.5 26.4 20.8 
Radio (SITC 7242) 
1962 71.2 0 0 0.3 
1965 74.2 0.8 1.7 9.1 
1968 67.6 0.6 5.0 10.0 
1971 65.5 0.8 6.8 14.3 
Telecommunication (SITC 7249) 
1962 0 0 0 0 
1965 38.1 0 0 4.1 
1968 34.0 0 4.7 
1971 42.4 0 6.6 2.2 
Sources: Cole, op. cit, EPC, op. cit., 1974, p. 28. 
The relationship between Japan and the Four is complex, 
partly competitive and party complementary (Table 5). Their 
displacement of Japanese products is based upon differential 
wage trends.15 Since 1960, the rise of the Japanese wage rate 
outranks all other OECD countries. 16 By 1972, its wage rates were 
way above all other Asian economies, as shown in Table 6. The 
efficiency differences between these economies are not too great, 
as Table 7 illustrates. However, Japan plays various complemen-
tary roles to the Far East Four. As a trailblazer, Japan's success· 
has encouraged the Far East Four by example. Japan shares the 
15. See M. Y. Yoshino, "Japanese Direct Investment," in Frank Isaiah, ed., 
The Japanese Economy in International Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1975). 
16. See, for instance, Walter Galenson and Konosuke Ldaka, in H. Patrick and 
H. Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New Giant (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1976). 
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same disadvantages of lack of natural resources and dense 
population, and in fact, planners in Taiwan and possibly in South 
Korea use the Japanese experience as a reference. Japan is the 
major source of petrochemicals for synthetic fiber textiles and 
plastic products. It is also the major source of specialized alloy 
steel for the machinery industries. Moreover, Japanese compo-
nents are used in fabricating transportation equipment and 
electronic appliances throughout the Far East. 17 For the Taiwan 
electronic industry in 1971, 53 percent of the material and 
components for exported products came from Japan, 10 percent 
from America, and the rest were produced locally. The reason for 
favoring Japanese intermediate products is their high quality and 
low cost. In 1973, for example, silicon steel from Belgium was 30 
percent more expensive than Japanese and American steel was 50 
percent higher. 18 During the exploration of alternative supplies by 
experts in Taiwan, when Japan was under pressure from 
Mainland China to discontinue Taiwan trade, alternative sources 
were available for all inputs, but they were all costlier. 
17. See A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook of the Petrochemical 
Industry in Taiwan, The Outlook of the Non-Electrical Machinery and Equipment 
Industry in Taiwan, and The Outlook of the Electronics Industry in Taiwan 
(Taipei: MOE, 1973). 
18. A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook of the Electronics Industry in 
Taiwan, p. 47; The Outlook of the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry, 
pp. 36-37 (Taipei: MOE, 1973). 
Table 6. Monthly Wage Rates for Various Types of Labor Force, 1972 (in U.S.$) 
Japan Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Philippines Indonesia India 
Engineers 537 762 451 200 213 134 314 207 
Craftsmen 262 133 142 99 96 50 47 45 
Skilled workers 272 183 122 73 102 63 53 54 
Semiskilled workers 240 87 84 73 66 47 32 
Unskilled workers 120 60 82 45 68 42 26 16 
Assemblers 180 39 72 25 - 57 - 120 
Quality inspectors 257 82 87 35 42 76 53 15:3 
Management 901 869 647 467 388 486 - :360 
Sources: The Outlook for the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry in Taiwan, op. cit., pp. 42-44; EPC, op. 
cit., 1974, p. 28: United Nations, op. cit., 1970, pp. 91-93; United Nations, op. cit., 1974, pp. 574-575; JEC, 1972, p. 42; JEC, 
op. cit., 1975, pp. 42-43. 
Table 7. Cross-Country Efficiency Comparison of Female Semiskilled Worker in Electronics 
Indonesia 
Japan Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Philippines Malaysia Thailand 
Productivity 1 0.7-0.8 1 0.8-1.0 0.7-1.0 0.8 0.65-0.8 0.7-0.8 
Source: A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook for the Electronics Industry in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE, 1973), p. 35. 
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As distributors and buyers, Japanese firms often either 
purchase components from the Far East Four to fabricate in 
Japan (e.g., Taiwan electric motors) or procure the outputs and 
resell them under their own well-established brand names, 
through their well-developed marketing channels (e.g., canned 
food from South Korea and Taiwan). However, the Japanese 
government discourages the importation of labor-intensive pro-
ducts for domestic consumption, for fear of the pressure on smaller 
Japanese firms. 
Table 8. Change of Real Wage in Four Economies (1963=100) 
1962 
1965 
1968 
Hong Kong Taiwan 
96 
124 
154 
98 
111 
131 
South Korea Philippines 
105 
98 
131 
101 
86 
88 
Source: Sicat, G. P. Economic Policy and Philippine Development, op. cit. 
Table 17-4, p. 426. 
As an investor, Japan entered the Far East Four with two 
different motives: (1) to end-run American quotas on textiles19 and 
(2) to procure cheap labor (see Table 8) and meet the "American 
challenge" through their own offshore production strategy. The 
latter deserves some elaboration. Japan experienced a labor 
shortage for the first time about 1960, particularly for young 
females. American firms seized the initiative and invested in 
Taiwan to compete against Japanese products on the basis of the 
low wage, efficient semiskilled female labor in Taiwan. As a 
countermeasure, the Japanese followed suit. Subsequently, Main-
land China pressure induced the Japanese to diversify invest-
ments to South Korea and Singapore. 20 Japanese direct invest-
ments are usually more numerous in the number of projects but 
smaller in total amount in both South Korea and Taiwan,21 but 
more "pervasive" in penetrating all sectors, compared with 
investments from other countries. 
As a source of technology, Japan plays a major role. Lacking 
capabilities for engineering design as well as an industrial base, 
the Far East Four must import their production technology and 
19. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., p. 141. 
20. M. Y. Yoshino, op. cit. 
21. Wan-son Tae, Development of Korean Economy (Seoul: KDI, 1972), p. 80 
for South Korea, and A. D. Little International Co., Perspective on Industrial 
Development in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE, 1973), p. 41. 
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often their equipment as well from abroad. Since the Japanese 
wage rate (relative to the cost of capital) is in between that of the 
LDCs and the United States or West Europe (see Table 9), 
Japanese processes are usually more applicable to the Far East 
Four. In fact, the obsolete production processes from Japan are 
often transplanted to the Far East Four under license. In 1973, 
product designs of the Taiwan electrical machinery and equip-
ment industry were often five to ten years old. Of the 16 major 
firms, 14 received their technology from Japan in 1972-73.22 
Table 9. Hourly Labor Cost for Electronic 
Products in 1973 
Semiskilled assembler 
Skilled technician 
Junior engineer 
Electronic engineer 
Taiwan 
0.19 
0.62 
0.75 
1.00 
Japan Europe 
1.28 
2.50 
2.75 
3.50 
2.02 
3.38 
4.05 
7.76 
United States 
3.30 
4.80 
6.60 
9.60 
The last cited point is of most interest. During its own 
industrialization, Japan enjoyed a large domestic market and a 
population that excelled in assimilating technocultural influences 
from abroad. Production technology in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries was also fairly simple. None of the Far East Four 
has had any of these advantages. Their present mode of 
industrialization is a two-edged sword. In the short-run, by 
cooperating with foreign business, these economies can safely 
attain access to modern technology. They have successfully side-
stepped the do-it-yourself hurdle encountered by the Mainland 
Chinese in their backyard steel-making experiment. They also 
have avoided the gambles wagered and lost by India in its heavy-
industry strategy. But in the long-run, if they cannot break out of 
the habit of turnkey factories and licensed technologies, they can 
never join the ranks of advanced, small-sized industrial powers 
such as Scandinavia, Benelux, and Switzerland. 
To some extent, a competitive-complementary relationship 
also exists between the Far Bast Four. There is competition in 
their struggle for export markets and foreign investments. 
Shortages of labor and land make Hong Kong less competitive 
than Taiwan for certain industries. Table 8 depicts the faster rise 
22. The Outlook for the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry in 
Taiwan, op. cit., pp. 5, 30-31, and 34. 
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of real wages in Hong Kong during the 1960s. The upheaval in 
Hong Kong in 1967-a spillover of the Red Guard movement-also 
led some industries to migrate to Taiwan.23 Much ofthe "overseas 
Chinese" investment was Hong Kong-based and Japan-based. 24 
The rise of the textile and garment industries in Singapore is 
partly due to the transfer of capital from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.25 Rising wages in Taiwan also make the competition 
from South Korea much more effective. The demonstration effect 
certainly operates among the Far East Four. The success of the 
Hong Kong economy in the 1950s stimulated trade and foreign 
liberalization in Taiwan. 26 The success of the Kao-hsiung Export 
Processing Zone encouraged similar developments in South 
Korea27 and Singapore (i.e., Jurong City). 
The development process in Taiwan is not coincidental; its 
experience deserves more attention than has been accorded it. The 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are currently 
considering climbing on the bandwagon, with varying degrees of 
success. As ProfessorS. Ichimura remarked to this author, several 
years ago, there must be certain conditions in Taiwan conducive 
to development, otherwise, the same international circumstances 
should allow all Southeast Asian economies to grow equally well. 
The inquiry into those conditions will be pursued below. 
III. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE TAIWAN 
EXPERIENCE: PRELIMINARIES 
Various explanations have been posited to account for the 
successful development in Taiwan: 
1) The modernization of Taiwan agriculture. 
2) The import-substitution policy in the 1950s. 
3) The infusion of capital from U.S. aid. 
4) The infusion of technical and managerial labor force from 
Mainland China. 
5) The sagacity of economic policies. 
6) The availability of cheap, efficient manpower. 
23. E. H. Phelps-Brown, "The Hong Kong Achievements and Prospects," in 
Keith Hopkins, ed., Hong Kong, the Industrial Colony (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971). 
24. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., pp. 139-141. Of the 152 firms in the Kao-hsiung Export 
Processing Zone in 1969, 52 were from this category. 
25. You Poh-Seng and Lim Chong Yah, eds., The Singapore Economy 
(Singapore: The Eastern University Press, 1971), p. 203. 
26. M. H. Hsing, op. cit., pp. 189-190. 
27. Bong Jong Choe, "An Economic Study of the Masan Free Trade Zone," in 
Hong and Krueger, eds., op. cit. 
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History never repeats itself and available data rarely permit 
the settlement of a controversy beyond a reasonable doubt. But if 
the Taiwan experience is to provide any information for LDCs, at 
other places, other times, some scrutiny of the above six theses is 
essential. 
The Role of Agriculture 
The agriculture sector contributed in three ways to the 
development process: (a) it provided a reservoir of labor for 
industrialization without reducing agricultural output; (b) it 
provided foreign exchange revenue in the earlier years and made 
the economy self-sufficient in rice, vegetables, and meat (even 
though some feed has to be imported) so that valuable foreign 
exchange need not be spent on food imports; and (c) it provided 
capital formation in 1951-55 and 9 percent of NDP, or 40 percent 
of capital formation in 1956-60.278 Certainly the role of agriculture 
in Taiwan's development has been most helpful. But is its role 
indispensable? I doubt it. The close resemblance of the develop-
ment modes within the Far East Four was noted in the last 
section. Of these four, Taiwan is the only economy where 
agricultural modernization preceded industrialization. Hong Kong 
and Singapore have no agriculture to speak of. Their development 
was not hampered by the "import gap" or the "savings gap." True 
enough, because of points (b) and (c), the Taiwan economy 
overcame those two gaps; but the experience of Hong Kong and 
Singapore have shown there are other alternatives. The case of 
South Korea is also illuminating. An agriculture slow in its 
modernization, like that in South Korea, would imply a faster 
outpouring of manpower to the industrial sector.2s Under the 
conditions prevailing for the other three economies in the Far 
East Four, export-oriented industry would quickly mop up the 
released labor, financed by domestic savings, if possible, by 
foreign investments, if necessary. To argue that agricultural 
modernization is indispensable for Taiwan is tantamount to 
arguing that the nonagricultural sector in Taiwan would fail 
where the same sectors in South Korea, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore have succeeded. So far, no one has come up with the 
proof. 
Caution is required in generalizing this observation. It is 
possible for some LDCs to industrialize without raising agricultur-
27a. T. H. 'Lee, Inter-sectoral Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 
1895-1960 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). 
28. Pauuw and Fei, op. cit. 
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al output first. It is not possible for a collection of LDCs, with 
sizable population to pursue such a strategy. Otherwise, massive 
reversals would be suffered in the terms of trade. 29 
Import-Substitution-Industrialization (lSI) 
By now, most economists agree that it was wise for Taiwan to 
take its "outward looking" posture in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. But did import-substitution-industrialization serve an 
essential purpose along the "infant industry" lines? Quite a few 
economists have answered in the affirmative. Since both South 
Korea and Singapore had their own import-substitution phase 
before their rapid growth, the thesis deserves careful considera-
tion. The beneficiaries of the import-substitution policy in Taiwan 
were the textile, fertilizer, and cement industries. The textile 
industry is by far the largest and it has more linkages (with both 
petrochemicals and apparel) than cement and fertilizer. Conse-
quently, the issue can be settled then and there, if we can prove 
that the textile industry in Taiwan has gained or lost because of 
protection. Luck provides us a natural control sample-the textile 
industry of Hong Kong. Hong Kong has a miniscule domestic 
market and no tariff protection whatsoever. With less than 30 
percent of the Taiwan population, it has a much larger textile 
output. Moreover, its textile industry emerged in 1949-50 as some 
Mainland Chinese arrived with their equipment and capital. All 
the fiber has to be imported. These circumstances are similar to 
those of Taiwan. (See Table 10.) It has more modern equipment 
than even Japan and a higher intensity of utilization than 
anywhere else.3° From the textile industry, the forward linkage led 
to the establishment of the apparel industry. Together they 
employed half of the manufacturing manpower in Hong Kong. To 
argue that import-substitution was helpful in Taiwan, one must 
argue that the textile firms in Taiwan did not stagnate behind the 
protective barriers relative to their Hong Kong counterparts. 
Proponents of the historical usefulness of lSI have still far to go to 
document their case.31 
29. W. Arthur Lewis, The Development Process in the Case for Development: 
Six Studies (New York: Praeger, 1972). 
30. See Table 10. 
31. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., pp. 113-114 observed that in late 1953, a Taiwan 
producer of cotton yam would earn 42 percent more out of each bale by selling his 
product domestically rather than abroad, thanks to lSI. By early 1966, under 
export promotion, he would gain 30 percent more by selling abroad than selling at 
home. Over the years, the U.S. government has restricted imports of low grade 
textiles but exempted higher grade outputs. The entry into the high-grade market 
involves new equipment, new process, and the uninsurable risks including the loss 
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Table 10. Asian Loom Activity, 1965 
No. of Looms Hrs. Worked per 
(in thousands) %Automatic Loom per yr. 
Japan 371 34 4,786 
South Korea 9 52 6,401 
Taiwan 16 63 4,864 
Hong Kong 20 100 8,161 
Philippines 16 100 5,143 
Thailand 12 71 4,149 
Sources: N. C. Owen "Economic Policy" in K. Hopkins (ed.) Hong Kong, the 
Industrial Colony (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 148; EPC, op. cit., 1974, pp. 
79-80; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 2, 117, 168-169, 208-209; Economic Planning 
Council, Social Welfare Indicators, Republic of China 1975, Taipei, 1976, p. 46. 
The U.S. Aid Factor 
Between 1950 and 1965, Taiwan received US$1.5 billion in 
economic aid. This amounted to 10 percent of GDP in the mid-
1950s and 4 percent in the early 1960s.32 Without this timely 
assistance, both economic and perhaps even political stability 
would be in doubt. Jacoby speculated that without aid, recovery 
and growth would still be feasible but would be more painful and 
delayed-an assessment biased on the generous side regarding the 
viability of the politicosocial fabric. 
The interesting question for the other LDCs is somewhat 
different: the political conditions called for a defense burden 
around 10 percent to 12 percent of the GDP, in monetary value. 
This exceeds the magnitude of U.S. aid. With an adopted Harold 
Domar model, Jacoby asserted that the no-aid, no-defense effort 
would be worse off than the observed situation. This conclusion 
seems unwarranted. Jacoby's view is based upon the premises 
that rapid expansion of exports is impossible and the export/GDP 
ratio must remain quite low-assumptions contradicted by later 
events. He then argued that without defense efforts, the man-
power under arms would simply be unemployed and could not 
contribute to export revenue. In view of the latter events as well as 
of costly trained employees to competitors (Chinese do not share the Japanese 
custom of "one boss the whole life"). No doubt technical stagnation results under 
lSI. 
32. M. H. Hsing, op. cit., pointed out even those figures understate the benefits 
of U.S. aid since they were computed at overvalued local currency for the early 
period. 
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the performance of Hong Kong and Singapore, his conclusion is 
hardly tenable. In fact, the monetary value of the defense 
expenditure definitely understates the actual burden. In the early 
half of the period with aid, the armed forces represented a 
manpower equivalent to the combined employment of all indus-
trial and commerce sectors. In the latter half, the armed forces 
still freeze up a manpower equal to that of the industrial sector: 
manufacturing, construction, utilities and mining all included.33 
In other words, in equivalent numbers, such a civilian labor force 
produced about one-third of the national income. All in all, I 
submit that a no-aid, no-defense Taiwan would grow at least as 
fast as it did, other things being equal. 
The Technical/Managerial Manpower Arriving From 
The Chinese Mainland 
Japan did not encourage Taiwan youth to seek higher 
education during colonial days. Most of the students enrolled in 
the Taihoku Imperial University were Japanese. Taiwan students 
had to go to colleges in metropolitan Japan, which few could 
afford. Only half of high school enrollments were Taiwanese, 
studying in segregated schools of inferior quality. The repatria-
tion of Japanese at the end of World War II left Taiwan with 
administrative and technical anemia. The first wave of Mainland-
ers dispatched to Taiwan as well as Taiwanese returning from 
Japan did not improve matters much. By 1948, three years after 
Taiwan's retrocession from Japan, there were 37,000 persons with 
a college education in a population of 6.8 million-less than six 
per thousand-which is low even by the standard of many LDCs. 
The evacuation from the Mainland increased the total population 
to about 8 million, but the number of college graduates reached 
68,000 by 1949. (The difference need not be all due to arrivals from 
Mainland China, since the annual increases between 1946 and 
1947 and between 1947 and 1948 were 7,000 and 11,000 respec-
tively.) There is little debate that the increase in educated 
manpower exerted a positive influence on the development 
process. However, up to 1963, the growth performance in the 
period of consolidation and lSI was by no means spectacular 
compared with other developing countries such as the Philippines 
or Brazil. An average 3 percent per year growth of per capita GDP 
was grounded down below 1.5 percent. By 1963, there were 207,000 
persons with a college education in a population of 11.9 million, or 
33. Ibid, Chapter 9. 
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17 per thousand. Quite a few of the original 30,000-odd college 
graduates from the Mainland were by that time retired or dead. 
Historically, one can hardly deny that those technical/manage-
rial personnel from the Mainland performed their mission -to fill 
the gap before the next generation could arrive at the scene, and 
to educate, train, and lead the younger cohorts until they swelled 
the ranks for the industrialization task. But it would be grossly 
misleading if any LDC with an average complement of educated 
manpower would explain away their lagged performance behind 
Taiwan by the fact that no tide of educated emigres had hit their 
shores. The comparable initial condition is Taiwan, 1963, and not 
Taiwan, 1949. By 1963, the thinned ranks of the original educated 
emigres no longer supplied the wherewithal of the economic take-
off. 
The Sagacity of Economic Policies 
As the economic policies of the government changed over 
time, the broad question stated above is hard to answer. We shall 
focus on four classes of economic policies: 
A. Import-Substitution Policy. As we argued before, the 
import-substituting policy cannot be proved to be beneficial to the 
development process. On the other hand, the protection of the 
textile, fertilizer, and cement industries was designed to reduce the 
value of the import bill needed for producing clothing, food, and 
housing. With backward integration, the reduced import demand 
can be met out of reserves in case the export revenue declines. The 
policy is quite rational for promoting sociopolitical stability, in 
view of the volatility of sugar exports, which accounted for 60 
percent of the export value, in those days. 
B. Exchange Rate Stabilization Policies. The compli-
cated trade and foreign exchange control in Taiwan was imposed 
to protect the overvalued domestic currency. As an emergency 
device, these measures may be justifiable against public panic. 
After all, the United Kingdom went on and off "convertability" 
after World War II. It is the persistent defense of an untenably 
overvalued exchange rate and the bureaucratic abuses caused by 
a complex control scheme that did real harm. There are few who 
favor those control measures in their original forms. 
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C. Policies Encouraging Foreign Investment and 
Export. These measures are generally agreed to be necessary 
for the growth record since 1963. Basically, they stimulate 
technological transfer and spur domestic firms to adapt continu-
ously to the dictates of the world market. On the other hand, 
residual administrative red tape remains. In principle, if material 
imported for producing exports is entitled to tariff rebate, which 
should be equivalent to tariff-free imports of such material, then 
the export processing zones (EPZ) should offer no discernible 
advantage. The fact that firms favor EPZ sites testifies to the 
bureaucracy outside these enclaves. 
Most of the observed growth performance is attributable to 
items (a) through (c). In my view, (a) and (b) are possibly harmful 
for development. The liberalization measures made progress. But 
they have not gone far enough for firms outside the EPZ to enjoy 
conditions as favorable as inside the EPZ in which the situation 
approximated the laissez-faire situation in Hong Kong where 
economic policy is absent. 
However, all these are valid only relating to the observable 
performance of Taiwan to date. There is another class of policy. 
D. Selective Inventives To Promote Skill-Intensive 
Industries. Excepting Hong Kong, all the other three in the Far 
East Four are actively pursuing such measures. With high wages 
and scarce land, Singapore adopts "skill-promotion" policies by 
sheer necessity. Both Taiwan and Korea are acutely aware of the 
potential limitations of expanding labor-intensive industries. As a 
South Korean officer observed, 34 if and when all LDCs in the 
world produce labor-intensive products, the terms of trade are 
likely to swing decisively against economies like those of the Far 
East Four. In comparison, Hong Kong persists in specializing in 
textiles and apparel as well as plastic products. These are 
industries with low barriers to entry. The philosophy appears to 
be: no point in worrying about sharing the pie, if the pie grows 
fast enough. Since such industries as instrumentation, precision 
tools, etc. offer high value-added per worker and broad scope for 
efficiency increases but also call for skills with a long gestation 
period, Hong Kong may conceivably be left behind by the rest of 
the Far East Four in the future. 
34. Wan-son Tae, op. cit., p. 58. 
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In short, the economic policies adopted in Taiwan have some 
justification. The observable performance cannot be attributed to 
the superiority of such measures, if pitted against the laissez-faire 
of Hong Kong. Yet the skill-promoted policy in operation now may 
finally prove to be superior to laissez-faire in the future. 
The Availability of Cheap, Efficient Labor 
By the process of elimination, the availability of cheap, 
efficient labor appears to be the common initial condition causing 
the sustained rapid growth of all the Far East Four. Of course, 
there must be certain permissive conditions. Externally, cheap 
transportation and communication, relatively free movements of 
goods and capital, prosperity at the developed "center" and 
political conditions for some industrial powers to allow factories to 
emigrate but not workers to immigrate must be present. Internally 
the government must provide peace and order and control 
debilitating corruption and bureaucracy. (As the Lockheed case in 
Japan showed, not all corruption is debilitating to growth, a topic 
I shall not explore here.) Firms must also be spurred to compete 
internationally in order to keep their competitive edge undimmed. 
However, all these do not explain the mechanism of develop-
ment. Mter all, the cheapness of labor may lead to a once-for-all 
upward adjustment of the wage rate. Institutions may keep the 
adjustment process to approach completion for, say, two or three 
years. What accounts for sustained rapid growth must be found 
elsewhere. Capital accumulation is hardly an admissible answer. 
In the Far East Four, an adequate inflow of investment can take 
the place of domestic savings. R&D is not a suitable explanation. 
Currently, none of the Far East Four has much designing 
experimentation going on, to say nothing of organized research. 
An in-depth analysis will be offered in the next section. 
Such studies may appear superfluous at first sight. Would not 
laissez-faire take care of matters all by itself, judging from the 
"openness" of all the Far East Four who have attained rapid, 
sustained growth? History shows this is not so. If rapid sustained 
growth is the invariable lot for every practitioner of laissez-faire, 
the wind would be long since taken out of the protectionists' sails. 
Mter all, the quintessence of export-propelled growth before 1929 
did not witness indiscriminate rapid industrialization all over the 
world. A thorough understanding of the development mechanism 
may reveal the preconditions for development for the Far East 
Four, as well as the road ahead for skill promotion. 
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IV. CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAIWAN 
EXPERIENCE: THE ANALYSIS 
161 
For developed economies, the growth of per capita output is 
conventionally decomposed into causal factors of "capital deepen-
ing" and technical progress. In the context of the Far East Four, 
the upgrading of the labor force is the ultimate source for both 
elements. 
First, consider technical progress, by and large, a synonym 
for the borrowing of technology. Turnkey factories and license 
arrangements are open to all comers, provided locally favorable 
conditions warrant. For the Far East Four, natural resources are 
conspicuous by their absence and domestic markets are quite 
modest, at best. Cheap and efficient labor forms the only possible 
condition that may favor a particular industrial location. But 
wages rise with economic development, and continuously improv-
ing efficiency of labor is indispensable for technological transfer. 
Next, consider "capital-deepening". Parsimony is characteris-
tic of not all Asians. What spells the difference between risky, 
usurious consumption and hoarding of precious metal, land titles 
or beaux art on the one hand, and productive investment on the 
other hand, is a matter of investment opportunity. In the 
traditional industries of the Far East Four-be it entrepot trade in 
Hong Kong and Singapore or intensive farming in South Korea 
and Taiwan-precious little scope is present to absorb much 
domestic savings. In fact, even the textile industry appears to 
have been insufficient to absorb the "overseas Chinese" capital 
before Japanese and Westerners introduced new industry and 
technology into the area. Consequently, either the mobilization of 
domestic savings or the attraction of foreign investment into more 
capital-intensive undertakings requires the attraction of new 
industries. An efficient, cheap labor supply is indispensable in 
this regard. But the labor in the Far East Four is by far not the 
cheapest in the Far East, as efficiency again holds the key. 
In what follows, we shall consider in turn, (a) the supply of 
various types of labor in Taiwan (b) the demand for labor by 
various types of industries, (c) the form of labor upgrading that 
has occurred in Taiwan so far, and (d) the future prospects. 
The Supply of Various Types of Labor in Taiwan 
We shall use the various labor types required by the 
electronics industry as a concrete example. Broadly equivalent 
labor types are needed by other industries as well. Table 11 
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summarizes the requirement of formal training or experience for 
seven types of labor force. 35 
Table 11. Training and Experience Requirements 
for Various Types of Electronics Industry 
Labor Types 
Unskilled workers 
Semiskilled workers 
Inspectors 
Skilled workers 
Craftsmen 
Supervisors 
Superintendents 
Technicians 
Junior engineer 
Graduate engineer 
Requirements 
Formal Training Experience 
Junior High (general) and 1 month on·job training 
Several Years of on-job 
Vocational High School or training for the selected 
semiskilled workers 
College Education 
Technical Junior College and 2 + years of experience 
Bachelor Degree in 
Electronic engineering and 1 year of experience 
Bachelor Degree in 
Electronic Engineering and 5 + years of experience 
Although different industries differ in their manpower needs, 
these classifications are broadly applicable. The various volumes 
of A.D. Little Reports summarize the strengths and weaknesses of 
the manpower supply in Taiwan: 
1. The supply of unskilled labor is of little significance. No 
industry of prospective expansion potentials relies heavily upon 
unskilled labor. Farming may be the only major vocation where 
formal education plays an essential role. However, neither in 
Taiwan nor elsewhere does the development process rely upon 
intensive labor application on the farm. 
2. The supply of labor force readily trainable into semiskilled 
labor is the main strength of Taiwan for industrialization. The 
same points hold true for Hong Kong and for South Korea. 
Hardworking and intelligent, these workers attract industries to 
these economies. 36 The main source of such labor is the 
"traditional sector"- i.e., the agricultural sector in South Korea 
and Taiwan and the refugee families in Hong Kong. These 
35. A. D. Little International Co., Minicomputers, and Opportunity of 
Investment in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE), 1973. 
36. See C. Y. Lin, op. cit., K. Hopkins, ed., op. cit.; and Wan-son Tae, op. cit. 
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workers are mostly young men and women newly joining the 
manufacturing industries after 6 to 12 years of general schooling. 
The effect of such education will be considered below. 
3. The supply of skilled labor, craftsmen, and technicians 
falls short of their supplies, partly because of biased education 
priorities in earlier years and partly because of the inability of the 
existing small firms to train such labor on the job. This bottleneck 
is also acutely felt in South Korea and Singapore.37 This problem 
has been addressed in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. 
4. The supply of "junior engineers" is paradoxically abund-
ant. Social preference favors engineering rather than technician's 
training for well-to-do youth. The universities also tend to be able 
to raise more money than technical junior colleges and vocational 
high schools. In the end, since the economy is not yet highly 
industrialized, engineering students have little chance to gain 
experience to become "graduate engineers." Since they are not 
accompanied by an adequate complement of technicians, crafts-
men, and skilled workers, they have difficulties in obtaining 
suitable industrial employment. Brain-drain through migrating 
overseas and "promotion" into managerial/executive ranks 
further diminishes those who would be able to upgrade their own 
capability through experience. The same problem hurts South 
Korea to some degree. 
5. The supply of "graduate engineers" is usually very short. 
However, inasmuch as the demand per firm for such expertise is 
usually very small and high-skill industries are not yet in 
blossom, the shortage is not acutely felt. The hiring of "expat-
riate" specialists from developed countries is still possible, 
although very costly. 
Demand for Labor by Various Types of Industries 
Obviously, most industries need all labor types, and interin-
dustry dependence is also important. It is not our intention to 
delve into the manpower requirements of all industries: references 
for such information are available.38 However, the availability of 
cheap, efficient labor of certain types is crucial for the operation of 
certain industries, either because wage costs for that category 
loom large in the cost structure, or because the product quality 
critically depends upon the presence of certain expertise. The 
following listing is illustrative only:39 
37. Wan-son Tae, op. cit., p. 166; and You and Lim, op. cit., pp. 30D-301. 
38. E.g., M. A. Horowitz, M. Zyrnelman, and I. L. Herrnstatt, Manpower 
Requirement for Planning (Boston: Northeastern University, 1966). 
39. This is largely based upon the various volumes of the A. D. Little Reports, 
op. cit. 
164 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
1. The textile industry and telecommunication assembly 
industry. Cheap and efficient semiskilled labor is essential 
because the proportion of such wage cost is large in the cost 
structure. 
2. The petrochemical industry. Formally trained technicians 
and engineers are essential because of the character of the 
operations, even though their wage bill is not important in this 
capital-intensive sector. 
3. Industries producing high quality electric appliances. 
Experienced engineers are needed for product design, etc., so that 
elements of originality and utility can be balanced by technical 
and economic feasibility. 
4. The precision equipment industry. The reputation of the 
entire firm, or the image of the workmanship of an entire 
economy, is needed to market the product among the industrial 
buyers. 
The Taiwan economy, along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
South Korea, currently enjoy a comparative advantage in 
industries of type 1. For social reasons, presumably, Pakistan is 
capable of producing textiles for export, but cannot assemble 
television sets competitively. The A. D. Little team did not find it 
difficult for Taiwan to expand its petrochemical production. 
Apparently, the junior engineers and technicians, with perhaps 
some infrequent assistance from more experienced personnel, can 
handle such standardized operations quite well. This covers 
industries of type 2. For products of type 3, Taiwan has not 
seriously entered the market yet. The production of machinery 
and equipment of medium or lower quality is thriving in Taiwan. 
The shortage of experienced, skilled workers is easing over time 
and there are institutions providing specialized training. How-
ever, the shortage of senior engineers is much harder to alleviate. 
Industries of type 4 are largely a matter of the future. Only time 
and continued superior performance can make progress. 
The Upgrading of the Labor Force in Taiwan 
The improvement of labor efficiency in Taiwan is attributable 
to the following factors: 
1. The spreading of secondary education facilitates the 
rural-urban migration of the peasant youth. This increases the 
supply of an efficient semiskilled labor force. 
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2. The sociocultural values encourage young female workers 
to accept factory jobs at wage rates lower than the male 
semiskilled workers and possibly what they themselves could 
command in the service industry. 
3. The cumulation of experience under the Taiwan environ-
ment, and 
4. The gradual expansion of the industrial vocational 
education, the on-the-job training programs. 
The Role of Secondary Education 
Education has been expanded in Taiwan at all levels during 
the last 25 years. The percentage of school-age children in school 
and the percentages of primary, junior high, and senior high 
graduates admitted to the next higher level of schooling have 
either increased or remained the same. But the fastest increase 
belongs to the percentage of primary school graduates admitted to 
secondary schools. It went from 32 percent in 1950 to 84 percent in 
1973, i.e., more than doubling. (See Table 12.) The numbers of 
individuals with a junior high level of education (but not above) 
went up by a factor of 3.5 for the males and 4.4 for the females 
between 1953 and 1972, while the population has not quite doubled 
itself. 40 The junior high education seems to be of special 
significance. A student with 9 years of schooling at 15 years has 
more influence over his or her future than a primary school 
graduate at 9; the latter is likely to go back to the original family 
environment. The former has a high tendency to migrate to 
"greener pastures": the urban area for the rural youth. Even in 
1955, only 33 percent of the Taiwan population resided in cities of 
more than 20,000. The ratio rose to 46 percent by 1972. The figure 
may be somewhat low, as migrants may fail to report their 
movements. At any rate, Taiwan is still not highly urbanized, so 
that migration into urban areas, which secondary education 
encourages, is significant.41 
40. Statistical Yearbook and Explanatory Notes (Taipei: DGBAS, 1975). 
41. Ibid. 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1973 
Table 12. Taiwan School-Age Children in School and 
Graduates Attending School of Higher Levels 
School-Age Elementary School Junior High Grad. 
children in Grad. Adm. to Admitted to 
School (%) Junior High (%) Senior High (%) 
80 32 61 
96 51 80 
98 80 90 
98 84 65 
Source: Education in the Republic of China (Taipei) Ministry of Education. 
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Migrants into urban areas often lead to shanty-town squalor 
and urban unemployment in other developing countries. But 
armed with 9 years of education of the type prevalent in Taiwan, 
these youths have acquired such attitudes and habits that they 
become readily trainable as semiskilled workers. These are 
precisely the types of workers intensively used in textiles and 
electronic assembly operations, which supply the major exports 
from Taiwan. 
Semiskilled labor is not hard to train, provided the warder 
has the appropriate work ethic. In my opinion, the single most 
important factor transforming a youth of the traditional sector 
into an effective worker in the manufacturing sector is junior high 
school. Due to the young age of the students, primary school is 
usually less demanding on the children. Hence the marginal effect 
of 3 junior high school years appears to be considerable. Through 
these 9 years of education, a youth is conditioned to a structured 
life style, the habit of fulfilling the task under a reward system, 
and a capacity to attend to details. This is especially true under 
the types of schools in Taiwan where all schools use the same 
texts, and 89 percent of the subjects are "required" rather than 
selective.42 The peer pressure is strong, reinforcing where no 
formal system can hope to reach. Intense homework is done for 
competitive admission tests into schools of higher level. Finally, 
boys' and girls' schools are ranked by group academic scores. 
The Discriminatory Wage Structure by Sex 
Table 13. Age Distribution in Percent (1974) 
15-19 2G-24 25-29 30-34 35 + 
Agricultural labor force 12 8 8 11 61 
Manufacturing labor force 33 20 11 10 26 
Female labor force 46 29 6 5 14 
Source: Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan, Republic of 
China, Taipei, Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research Institute, 
July, 1974. 
The age distribution of the labor force, shown in Table 13, is 
particularly revealing. Manufacturing has a much younger 
distribution than agriculture. Hence, the young are recruited by 
manufacturing and the old remain on the farm. The spread of 
42. Education in the Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1974). 
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education thus makes the manufacturing workers better educated. 
The female manufacturing laborers are much younger than the 
males, corroborating the observations that female workers in 
Taiwan often start work at 15, the graduation age of junior high 
school. They work for at most six years and get married. 
Subsequently, they rarely return. The youthfulness of these 
workers and the brevity of their working life make such a labor 
force full of vitality and relatively immune to boredom. Moreover, 
since they support no family members and only earn their own 
living with some contribution to their dowry, they do not insist on 
high pay. In fact, performing semiskilled tasks, these women 
receive wage rates only about half of that of an unskilled (male) 
worker. Their alternative options are idling at home, working very 
long hours at retail shops, or serving as socially ·less desirable. 
domestic servants. Reputedly, girls prefer a factory job to a maid's 
position at twice as much pay. Their marriage prospects are 
supposedly much better if they work in factories. 
The situation is in sharp contrast with India. There, 
apparently by custom, assembly work is done by men who 
demand higher wages. The monthly wages in U.S. dollars during 
1973 for assemblers and unskilled workers were as follows: 43 
(1) (2) 
Assembler Unskilled worker (1)/(2) 
India 
Taiwan 
120 
25 
16 
45 
7.50 
0.55 
It is understood that the recent effort by Pakistan to assemble 
telecommunication equipment has not been successful because of 
high costs. In Pakistan, by custom, females who are qualified 
would not work in factories. 
In 1973, exports of textile products and electrical machinery 
and apparatus are the two most important items among all export 
products. 44 In September of that year the sex composition of three 
industries was as listed below:45 
Textile Apparel Electric Communication 
and Leather Generators Equipment 
Percent of women in labor force 70 63 72 
43. A. D. Little Co., Perspective on Industrial Development in Taiwan, op. cit. 
44. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974, op. cit. 
45. Statistical Yearbook (Taipei: DGBAS, 1975). 
MANPOWER, INDUSTRIALIZATION 169 
This strongly suggests the importance of the wage differential by 
sex and export competitiveness. 
The wage differential by sex provides the Taiwan economy a 
comparative advantage for industries intensively using the 
semiskilled female labor force, and the expansion of education 
provides an expanding supply of labor force emigrating out of the 
traditional rural sector. This, of course, is only part of the story. 
The great majority of the working women in those export-oriented 
industries do not stay long. The growth of labor efficiency which 
offsets the increasing Taiwan real wage must be largely explained 
by other factors. 
Learning-By-Doing 
Given the opportunity, efficiency may be acquired through 
experience. The upgrading of the individual labor in Taiwan is 
assisted by the following conditions: 
1. With a large and growing manufacturing sector, there is 
much opportunity to "manufacture up".46 In other words, 
experience can facilitate an industrial worker to shift to products 
of higher value-added (e.g., from bicycle to motorcycle to 
automobile). This is not usually the case with either farming or 
mining, where resource endowment plays the dominant role in 
product selection. 
2. Export emphasis causes the firms to take uninsurable 
risks to upgrade their products in meeting international competi-
tion. In doing so, workers also must upgrade their skills. 
3. Direct investments of foreign firms bring the economy 
face to face with modern productive and managerial methods. 
Either through learning-by-doing of the middle-layer executives, 
or through the experience of local firms in supplying parts or 
intermediary goods to foreign firms, the technical competence of 
the Taiwan labor force rises over time. 
Much of such learning takes the form of "doing other things." 
There is no convenient measure for such improvements. However, 
the continuous diversification of Taiwan's exports47 is indirect 
evidence, even though the formula measuring such diversity is 
admittedly ad hoc, dependent upon the classification scheme used 
for commodity classification. 
46. See Owen, op. cit. 
47. See Liang, op. cit. 
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The Expansion of Technical Vocational Education 
The conventional way of training skilled workers is on-the-job 
training. However, in Taiwan, most local firms are too small to 
provide effective training. The average employment per plant for 
the nonelectrical equipment industry was 17.3 in 1973.48 Public 
enterprises and some large firms do have their own training 
programs, yet supply falls short of demand. Although it is 
desirable for new firms to undertake their own training programs, 
without an adequate supply of skilled workers and technicians, it 
is hard to attract new firms. This jus::ifies the expansion of the 
vocational schools. The number of students going into senior high 
schools and senior vocational schools in 1950 and 1963 were as 
follows: 49 
Students in ('000) 
Percent Distribution of 
Senior Vocational 
School Students 
Senior High Schools Senior Vocational Schools Agr. Com. Ind. Other 
1950 
1963 
19 
191 
11 
233 
The Road Ahead 
33 
6 
38 
42 
26 
44 
7 
7 
Now that junior high school is free for all students (since 
1968) and with the rural population declining, the influence of the 
spreading of junior high school education is likely to recede in 
importance. Those intending to leave the rural sector would be 
largely gone pretty soon. 
If the international environment remains the same, the 
upgrading of skill in Taiwan should continue. The speed of such 
upgrading depends upon several factors, not the least of which are 
those sociocultural aspects that are hard to quantify. Certain 
cultural characteristics of the Chinese are not favorable to rapid 
development. 
1. As workers, the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan tend 
to be "employer satisfaction-oriented" rather than "task-oriented" 
like the Japanese or the Koreans. In other words, the latter devote 
full attention to performing the specified tasks. The Chinese 
48. A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook for the Non·Electrical 
Machinery and Equipment Industry in Taiwan, op. cit. 
49. Educational Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of 
Education, 1974). 
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workers try to do what they perceive as the best interest of the 
employer rather than the letter of the instruction. This makes the 
Chinese workers slightly less productive, if task-fulfillment is the 
measuring rod. 50 
2. As entrepreneurs, Chinese businessmen exhibit strong 
herd instincts and are reluctant to venture into new fields with 
technology unfamiliar to them. In both Hong Kong and Singa-
pore, it is the foreign investors who break into industries outside 
the familiar fields of commerce and textile products. Also, the 
Chinese firms seem to be slow in merger movements. Fragmented 
industrial structure means weakness in finance, workers' training, 
etc. 
3. The Chinese engineering practice seems to emphasize the 
strict emulation of licensed processes. Few attempts are made on 
new product designs. In licensing arrangements, they do not 
purchase "development analysis" as the Japanese do. Hence, the 
Japanese can often modify their borrowed techniques and plunge 
ahead on their own. 
As the Taiwan economy is leaving the labor-intensive phase 
for the skill-intensive phase, attitudinal changes in these three 
aspects appear to be of considerable importance. 
50. A. D. Little International Co. Reports, op. cit. 
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Chart 1. The Far East Quartet 
Singapore South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong 
Population Density High South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong 
Natural Resource Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Domestic Market Small Small Small Small 
P.C. Income v. Japan Low Low Low Low 
T R&D Capacity Limited Limited Limited Limited 
H Exchange Rate "Realistic'' "Realistic" "Realistic" "Realistic" 
E Foreign Investment Free, large Free, large Free, large Free, large 
M Education of Labor Force Good Good Good Good 
E Sustained Rapid Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Expansion of Export v. 
Output Fast Fast Fast Fast 
Manufacturing Sector Rapid Rapid Rapid Rapid 
Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Ease of Raising Foreign 
Loans Easy Easy Easy Easy 
Structural Change in 
Output and Export Drastic Drastic Drastic Drastic 
Strong Government Role Yes Yes Somewhat No 
Full Employment No Yes Yes Yes 
Self·sufficiency in Food No Nearly Nearly No 
Domestic Price Stability After 64' After '52 
v Moderate Most 
A 
inflation Years 
R Industrial Dispute Nearly Absent Absent Nearly I Absent Absent A Foreign Exchange Mid Tied to Floating T Devaluation $ I Foreign Aid Little Till 1971 Till 1965 None 0 
N Spending of Foreign Early Years s Troops Till 1970 Now Insignificant Little Little 
Defense Burden Yes Yes Yes No 
Access to Large Trade 
Area Free Sometimes No No Sometimes 
Exporte, Prior to 
Industrialization Entreport Rice Sugar Entreport 
Service Service 
Exporte, present Petro· Textile Textile Textile 
chemical Electronics Electronics Electronics 
Future Policy Goal Skill· Skill· Skill Laissez 
intensive intensive intensive Faire: 
export export export No policy 
Chinese Population Yes No Yes Yes 
Chapter V 
TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
YuAN-LI Wu AND KuNG-CHIA YEH 
Foreign trade has been crucial to Taiwan's economic growth 
and will probably remain so in the future. This essay examines 
Taiwan's evolving trade policy and external economic relations in 
an attempt to identify some of the key policy issues and lessons of 
development in the past and to assess its prospect for the future. 
Section I reviews the growth of trade and development in the last 
two decades. Section II discusses certain long-range policy 
problems at the present stage of development. 
I. STAGES OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS 
A statistical overview of the growth of Taiwan's foreign trade 
since 1952 (Fig. 1) suggests that its historical record can best be 
divided into four distinct periods: (1) from 1952, when postwar 
rehabilitation was about completed, and 1959, when foreign 
exchange and other economic reforms were instituted; (2) from 
1959 to 1965, when U.S. economic aid was officially terminated; (3) 
from 1965 to the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973; and (4) the post-
1973 period. 1 Developments in these four periods were markedly 
different in several respects: The first major difference is in their 
rates of growth. There was hardly any growth during 1952-59. 
The average annual growth of exports was only 4 percent. During 
the period 1959-65, an upward trend in exports began, rising at an 
average rate of 22 percent per year. Growth of exports accelerated 
to an unprecedented rate of 33 percent per year during the third 
period, 1965-73. In the fourth period, 1973-76, the growth rate 
dropped to 22 percent per year. 2 If allowance is made for price 
increases, the recent decline would have been even more marked. 
Developments in imports generally followed the same pattern. 
1. Volume of imports and exports shown in Fig. 1 are in current U.S. dollars. 
For source of data, see Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book, 1976 (Taipei, Taiwan, 1976), p. 177. (Hereafter cited as Data 
Book, 1976). 
2. For data on exports and imports in 1976, see Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 
The Republic of China. Vol. III, No. 2 (February 1977), p. 11. 
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Fig. 1. Growth of exports and imports, 1952-75. 
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The second major difference over the periods is in the relation 
of exports to gross domestic product (GDP). The changing role of 
exports in the growth process is indicated by the rise of the share 
of exports in gross domestic product, from 9 percent in 1952 and 
1959 to 17 percent in 1965 and 46 percent in 1973.3 The increase in 
the incremental ratio of exports to GDP is even more striking, 
reflecting the increasing significance of exports to output 
expansion. In 1952-59, the ratio of the absolute increase in 
exports to that in GDP in constant 197 prices was 10· percent; it 
rose to 28 percent in 1959-65 and to 71 percent in 1965-73. 
The third major difference in the various periods relates to the 
balance of trade. Taiwan had a persistent trade deficit during 
1952-70, financed largely by U.S. aid.4 An export surplus resulted 
during 1971-73, but the balance turned adverse in 1974-75. 
Why did the pattern of development vary and how was it 
related to the changing trade policies and development strategies 
in these periods? What were the rationales and consequences of 
these policies? What major lessons of development policy can be 
drawn from Taiwan's experience? These questions can best be 
discussed in terms of the challenges and opportunities Taiwan 
faced and its responses in each of the four periods. 
Trade and Import Substitution Policies in the 1950s 
To a large extent, the lack of growth of trade during the 1950s 
was caused by the government's adoption of a development 
strategy built around import substitution rather than export 
promotion.5 Theoretically, there are obvious advantages in 
choosing an import substitution policy. The most important is 
that it will foster infant industries and generate externalities for 
future development. 6 In addition, a protectionist policy, which is 
3. Percentage shares are based on totals in 1971 prices, given in Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, the Republic of 
China, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, Taipei, Taiwan, 1975 
(Hereafter, Statistical Yearbook, 1975), pp. 194-195. 
4. With the exception of the trade balance in 1964, which showed a small 
surplus. Data Book, 1976, p. 177. 
5. Some economists would have preferred to call these inward-looking and 
outward-looking policies for the simple reason that import substitution will occur 
even in the case of export promotion. See, for example, Donald B. Keesing, 
"Outward-looking Policies and Economic Development," Economic Journal, Vol. 
LXXVII, No. 306 (June 1967), pp. 303-320. In the present case we use these 
concepts interchangeably. 
6. United Nations, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its 
Principal Problems, New York: United Nations, 1950. 
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essential for the import substitution strategy, may raise the rate of 
return to capital in the import-competing sector and thereby 
induce an inflow of capital. 7 It is mainly on these grounds that 
many Latin American countries adopted such a policy. But there 
are also serious drawbacks. Protectionism may encourage the 
establishment of uneconomical plants, weaken the incentives to 
introduce modem techniques, and slow down the rise in productiv-
ity.s By contrast, developing manufactures for export would 
promote industries that can compete efficiently on the world 
market. World price competition would compel the producers to 
keep attuned to changing market conditions as well as changing 
technology, product design, and quality control.9 For an island 
economy like Taiwan's, there are additional reasons for adopting 
an outward-looking strategy. Since Taiwan has limited natural 
resources, its growth and economic viability must be predicated 
upon its ability to draw upon available resources in other 
countries. These external resources have to be paid for. Accord-
ingly, the sustained growth of the economy requires the concomi-
tant growth of exports. Indeed, the rapid growth of exports and 
GNP in the 1960s demonstrated the case quite clearly. The 
question then arises whether a policy stressing home markets for 
manufactures was misplaced and whether the expansion that 
began in the 1960s could not have started earlier. By the same 
token, one might ask whether the increasing emphasis· we find 
today in Taiwan on the development of the domestic sector by 
building up certain capital-intensive industries is a reasonable 
and wise policy. 
The answer to the question regarding the earlier period is that 
the range of options open to Taiwan in the 1950s was narrower 
than is commonly recognized. It is most unlikely that expanding 
exports of manufactures could have taken place even if it were the 
primary goal during the period, given the severe internal and 
external constraints Taiwan faced. at that time. 
7. For other possible benefits, see Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, 
World Trade and Payments, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973, pp. 554-557. 
8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Towards a New 
Trade Policy for Development, Geneva: United Nations, 1964, p. 22; John H. 
Power, "Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy," and Santiago 
Macario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America," in Gerald M. 
Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Second Edition, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1970, pp. 52D-527 and 528-533. 
9. See Keesing, op. cit., and Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Anne 0. Krueger, 
"Exchange Control, Liberalization and Economic Development," American 
Economic Review, LXIII:2 (May 1973), pp. 419-427. 
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The most serious economic problems in Taiwan in the late 
1940s and the early 1950s were inflation and a severe shortage of 
foreign exchange. In part, the inflationary pressure had its origin 
in the postwar shortages of materials, but it also reflected some 
structural imbalances in the economy. On the demand side, there 
had been an abrupt and substantial increase in population as a 
result of a large influx of people from the mainland. Furthermore, 
the move of the central government and the military forces to 
Taiwan imposed additional demands on the economy. On the 
supply side, the fundamental problem for Taiwan was that its 
industrial capacity was ill-equipped to meet the abrupt change in 
economic conditions. Under Japanese rule, the semicolonial 
economy became a source of supply of foodstuffs and raw 
materials to Japan and a market for Japan's manufactures. 
Consequently, Taiwan's agriculture was highly commercialized, 
and overhead capital was developed to support agriculture, such 
as irrigation networks, transportation and port facilities, and 
hydroelectric power supply. The limited productive industrial 
capacity was designed mainly to process food for export to Japan. 
In the 1930s, some heavy industries were built to assist Japan's 
war effort, such as aluminum and copper refining, chemical 
fertilizers, cement and petroleum refining. But nondurable 
consumer goods industries were conspicuously absent, because all 
along Taiwan had relied on imports from Japan. The return of 
Taiwan to China cut off this relationship. It was the upsurge of 
demand for these consumer goods that fueled inflation and put 
pressure on the balance of payments. 
To stabilize prices the government imposed controls on 
inventory speculation and the export of rice. At the same time, 
import and foreign exchange controls were tightened to stop the 
rapid drain of foreign exchange reserves. But these were 
essentially stopgap measures. A solution to the long-term problem 
had to be found. At this point, there were three options. The first 
was to return to the prewar policy of exporting primary products 
and importing manufactures. At first glance, existing conditions 
seemed to favor this approach. As noted earlier, the Japanese left 
behind substantial overhead capital in the agriculture sector so 
that output could be expanded with little additional investment. 
Moreover, the highly commercialized agricultural sector would 
readily respond to export opportunities. But several considerations 
made such a policy unattractive. 
First, Taiwan's traditional exports included rice, sugar, 
bananas, pineapples, and tea. These agricultural products went 
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largely to Japan. The rice surplus available for export was greatly 
reduced because of the abrupt increase in population and a slow 
growth in productivity. As a result of the return of Taiwan to the 
ROC, Japan was no longer the assured market for the other 
agricultural products. Some items, such as sugar, could have 
found a ready market in Mainland China but the political 
situation made that infeasible. Second, world demand for primary 
products is rather inelastic with respect to price so that expansion 
in exports is not likely to increase foreign exchange earnings fast 
enough to meet the growing needs. Third, even if the policy were 
successful, the high degree of commodity concentration would be 
risky. The concentration also would contribute little to initiating a 
balanced growth in the economy. Finally, the emphasis on 
agricultural expansion alone would not help to solve the 
unemployment problem. 
A second alternative was to develop industries for export and 
to promote development through trade. Again there were oppor-
tunities for Taiwan to follow this route. The inflow of technicians, 
managers, and entrepreneurs helped to fill the gap left by the 
evacuation of Japanese technical manpower. The population 
influx, discharged military manpower, surplus labor from the 
rural sector, and large numbers of high school graduates all 
contributed to the labor supply and kept the wages low. The high 
degree of literacy of the labor forces was also an advantage. 
However, these factors by themselves were not sufficient to 
provide Taiwan with a distanct comparative advantage in the 
production and export of manufactures. Social overhead capital in 
support of industrialization was short. So were domestic savings. 
The labor force, while highly literate and ample in supply, 
consisted entirely of farm labor at this stage and had yet to be 
trained to become a disciplined and skilled work force. Also, the 
entrepreneurs lacked experience in export marketing. Political 
uncertainties, excessive bureaucratic controls, inflation, and 
overvalued exchange rates all tended to discourage the inflow of 
private foreign capital, which could have filled part of the gap in 
savings, technology, and marketing skills. In such circumstances 
it would have been impossible for any new industries to compete 
effectively in world markets with such industrialized nations as 
Japan. 
A third alternative was industrialization by developing 
import substitution industries. This was the policy that the 
government adopted. Apparently, the choice was based on the 
following considerations. The separation of Taiwan from Japan 
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after the war and the restriction of imports created opportunities 
for the development of domestic manufacturing industries, 
particularly nondurable consumer goods such as textiles and food 
processing, the production of which required little capital and 
technology. Inefficient as these industries might be at the initial 
stage, they could survive in a protected domestic market whereas 
they would probably fail in international competition. Develop-
ment of these industries could absorb a large number of the idle or 
semi-idle into productive employment and utilize agricultural 
resources more fully. Moreover, output of these industries could 
help to stabilize prices and conserve foreign exchange. 
To carry out this strategy, a series of measures was introduced 
to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to enter into production of 
import substitutes. The first was the tightening of foreign 
exchange controls for infant industry promotion and protection. 
Because the exchange rates overvalued the Taiwan currency, 
there was an acute shortage of foreign exchange and it had to be 
rationed. Incentives for industrial investment were provided 
through preferential allocation of foreign exchange. The multiple 
exchange rate system adopted in April 1951 was structured to 
favor the import of plant equipment and U.S. aid-financed goods, 
including raw materials for import substitution industries. 
Meanwhile, part of the proceeds from exports of primary products 
controlled by the state - such as rice, sugar, and salt- was used 
to subsidize the development of industries in the public sector, 
such as fertilizers and petrochemicals. SiQ'lilarly, because of price 
inflation and other factors, the interest rate was rather high. 
Credit was made available at below market interest rates to 
private investors involved in import substituting activities.l0 
Another policy instrument to induce import substitution was 
tariff protection and import controls. The tariff schedule enacted 
in 1948 was designed primarily to protect domestic production of 
semifinished products rather than manufactures. It was therefore 
not compatible with the development strategy. In 1955, the tariff 
was revised to raise the effective rates on manufacture imports, 
but the revised schedules were still quite low and the government 
had to rely mainly on import controls to protect the infant 
industries. 
During this period, a land reform program was put into effect. 
While the objective of land reform was primarily political (to 
10. For details, see Lin Ching-yuan, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-72, 
New York: Praeger, 1973. 
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prevent widespread social unrest in rural areas), it nevertheless 
indirectly benefited the industrial development. The fixing of land 
rent at 37.5 percent of the main crops harvested and the low price 
policy for farm products left the former landlords with little 
incentive to reinvest in farming. In effect, there was a compulsory 
transfer of the former landlords' capital from land to other forms 
of assets more readily available for redirection of investment. The 
low price policy also contributed to the development of urban 
industrial centers by keeping workers' cost of living fairly low. 
In addition to all these measures, the continued inflow of U.S. 
economic aid was also a key factor that made the import 
substitution policy feasible.u During 1951-65, Taiwan received 
over US$1.4 billion in economic assistance. As noted earlier, the 
most serious problem that Taiwan faced at this time was 
inflation. The U.S. aid played a crucial role in bringing it under 
control through augmenting the supply of critically short 
resources, but the massive U.S. aid also contributed directly to the 
implementation of the development strategy in a number of ways. 
Like most developing countries at the initial phase of 
development, Taiwan depended heavily on external sources for 
capital, equipment, and raw materials. So far as capital formation 
was concerned, Taiwan faced a twofold problem. On the one hand, 
domestic savings were inadequate to finance the development 
program. The rate of gross domestic capital formation was about 
15 percent of GDP in the early 1950s, of which net national 
savings accounted for less than one-third of the total.I 2 The 
difficulty in mobilizing savings arose partly because of a sizable 
military burden and partly because of an underdeveloped money 
market in Taiwan. Under the circumstances, the U.S. aid 
contributed indirectly to development finance by providing part of 
the defense support, and directly to Taiwan's supply of savings by 
providing development loans or grant and aid-generated local 
currency funds. 13 During 1952-60, about 40 percent of total gross 
11. See H. T. Lin, "U.S. Aid and Taiwan's Economic Development," 
Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1967, 
pp. 295-322; Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1966. 
12. Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 1974, Taipei, Taiwan, 1974, pp. 30, 41 (Hereafter, Data Book, 1974). 
13. Under the aid program, the Chinese government was required to deposit 
Taiwan dollars equal in amount to the sales of U.S. aid commodities (mainly PL 
480 commodities or those financed by Defense Support). The original purpose was 
to sequester monetary claims on Taiwan resources and place them under joint US-
Chinese control, in order to curb inflationary tendencies and to use local funds to 
support other parts of the aid program. However, about one-half of the total was 
used for development finance. 
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domestic capital formation was financed by U.S. aid, foreign 
capital, and loans.14 A substantial portion of the foreign capital 
was allocated to the mining and manufacturing sector, and an 
even larger share to such infrastructure facilities as electric power, 
the Shihmen Dam, transportation, health and sanitation, and 
education.15 The construction of social overhead capital benefited 
not only the import substitution industries being developed but 
also the new industries yet to emerge in the subsequent period. 
Apart from a savings gap, Taiwan also faced a foreign 
exchange gap mainly because most of the capital goods needed for 
investment had to be imported.16 During 1952-60, capital goods 
acquired through the U.S. aid program amounted to some 44 
percent of the total capital goods imported.17 A second and 
perhaps more fundamental cause for the foreign exchange gap 
was the shortage of raw materials for the development of the 
domestic industries. This was because Taiwan, as an island 
economy, had few natural resources. Most raw materials and fuels 
had to be imported. Not surprisingly, over 70 percent of Taiwan's 
imports during 1952-60 consisted of raw materials. 18 Of this total, 
U.S. aid commodities accounted for 42 percent. 19 
Mainly as a result of the import substitution policy, there had 
been a discernible change in the economic structure. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP rose from 16 percent in 1952 to 22 percent 
in 1959, indicating a much faster rate of growth of manufacturing 
relative to other sectors.20 As may be expected, the most important 
branches of manufacturing included (a) food, beverages, and 
tobacco; (b) textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries; and 
(c) manufacture of chemicals, and chemical, petroleum, coal, 
rubber, and plastic products. These three branches accounted for 
78 percent of total manufacturing in 1952, and their share 
remained as high as 72 percent in 1959.21 Industrial growth, 
however, was not confined to nondurable consumer goods. Some 
other branches also expanded rapidly, such as nonmetallic 
14. Data Book, 1974, p. 41. Foreign private capital inflow during this period 
was negligible. 
15. Ibid., pp. 201, 203. 
16. H. T. Lin, op. cit., p. 303. 
17. Data Book, 1974, p. 205; Data Book, 1976, p. 183. 
18. Data Book, 1976, p. 183. 
19. Data Book, 1974, p. 205. 
20. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, Taipei, 
Taiwan, 1975 (Hereafter, Statistical Yearbook, 1975), p. 191. 
21. Ibid., p. 206. 
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mineral products (except coal and petroleum products), basic 
metal products, and fabricated metal products, machinery, and 
equipment. The share of these industries rose from 8 percent in 
1952 to 17 percent in 1959.22 Some new industries also emerged, 
such as monosodium glutamate, rayon fiber, plastics, and sheet 
glass. 
By and large, import substitution was highly successful. By 
the late 1950s, the percentage of imports in total supply (domestic 
output plus imports) was reduced to less than 10 percent for a 
number of industries.23 However, for inddstries requiring ad-
vanced technology and a sizable scale of production, such as 
heavy machinery and chemicals, the import ratio remained above 
30 percent of total domestic demand. 24 
Meanwhile, export of agricultural products still accounted for 
an overwhelmingly large share of total exports in 1969.25 The 
principal agricultural exports included sugar, rice, bananas, tea, 
and canned goods. These five items alone accounted for 87 percent 
of total exports in 1952 and as much as 69 percent in 1959.26 
Because Taiwan was previously tied to Japan, it was natural that 
Japan remained the largest market for Taiwan's agricultural 
products. 
SHIFT TOWARD AN OUTWARD-LOOKING STRATEGY. 
1959-1965 
Toward the end of the 1950s, the government's priority goal of 
restoring economic stability by and large had been achieved, 
although the shortage of foreign exchange remained acute. Per 
capita income was considerably higher than in 1952, but new 
problems emerged. Growth of some major industries slowed down 
as the domestic market for their products became saturated.27 
22. Ibid. 
23. See Hsing Mo-huan, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 18Q-181. 
24. Ken C. Y. Lin, "Industrial Development and Changes in the Structure of 
Foreign Trade," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, No. 15 (July 1968), pp. 
29Q-321. 
25. Data Book, 1976, p. 182. 
26. Ibid., p. 197. 
27. The growth rates for textiles and food, the two major industries, were 24 
and 16 percent per year in 1952-55, compared with 6 and 4 percent per year in 
1955-59. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 118. Many industries (woolen textiles, 
plywood, paper, rubber goods, soap, iron rods and bars, insulated wires, sewing 
machines, and electric fans) were operating at 4Q-70 percent capacity. Lin, 1968, p. 
303. 
TAIWAN's ExTERNAL EcoNOMic RELATIONS 183 
Labor supply was expanding faster than employment. 28 It was 
clear that the government must now decide on a new development 
strategy. 
Again the range of policy choices was limited. First, a shift 
back to primary exports was out of the question, despite 
substantial increases in the output of rice, pineapples, tea, and 
sugar.29 This was mainly because demand in Japan, the principal 
market for Taiwan's agricultural products, had declined. More-
over, the long-term considerations against heavy reliance on 
primary exports was as valid as before. Second, the prospect of 
pushing forward with the import substitution policy did not seem 
very promising. In the 1950s, this policy was quite successful (by 
almost any standards) when carried out in industries producing 
nondurable consumer goods and their inputs. Extending import 
substitutions to intermediate products, machinery, and durable 
consumer goods, would be rather costly because of heavy 
requirements of new capital and technology and because of the 
small domestic market for these products in Taiwan. 
Meanwhile, an outward-looking policy appeared the most 
attractive alternative because of favorable conditions at home and 
abroad.30 With massive U.S. aid, in the 1950s the government had 
been able to construct large-scale overhead capital in support of 
industry, as distinguished from the overhead left over by the 
Japanese that was primarily designed to serve the agricultural 
sector. A large well-motivated labor force with a high educational 
level and fairly low wages had been trained. The entrepreneurs 
had accumulated considerable experience in technical manage-
ment. Expansion of the nonendurable consumer industry in the 
1950s had created a sizable productive capacity. Interestingly, it 
was the import substitution policy of the 1950s that brought into 
being some favorable factors that were not previously available, 
providing Taiwan for the first time with a competitive advantage 
in international markets for labor-intensive products. 
28. Population 15 to 59 years of age increased 2.9 percent per year during 
1952-59, but employment (age 12 and over) increased at only 1.6 percent per year 
over the same period. Data Book, 1974, pp. 8, 11. 
29. See Data Book, 1974, pp. 53-56. 
30. For an incisive analysis of Taiwan's trade policy, see Kuo-shu Liang, 
"Trade and Policy in Taiwan 1952-1965," Conference on Economic Development 
of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1967, pp. 239-277; Bela Balassa, 
"Industrial Policies in Taiwan and Korea," Welwirthschaftliches Archiev, Vol. 106, 
No. 1, 1971, pp. 55-77; Kuo-shu Liang and Teng-hui Lee, "Taiwan," in Shinichi 
Ichimura (ed.), Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1975, pp. 209-346. 
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External conditions in the 1960s also favored such a change. 
In Japan, the economy just began its phase of sustained rapid 
growth. Consequently, its industrial and export structure shifted 
toward more capital- and technology-intensive products, thus 
opening the markets for labor-intensive products to countries like 
Taiwan. Meanwhile, the imports of many developed countries 
began to accelerate toward the end of the 1950s.31 
At this point, the government adopted several major economic 
reforms designed primarily to promote export growth. The first 
was a major foreign exchange reform in 1958. Before this time, 
Taiwan had a complicated multiple exchange rate system.32 The 
exchange rate grossly overvalued the Taiwan dollars in terms of 
foreign currencies. In 1958 a single exchange rate set at a more 
realistic level replaced the old system. The real significance of the 
reform was the devaluation of the currency, which helped to 
reduce the excess demand for foreign exchange and to encourage 
exports. 
The second major policy change was the liberalization of 
tariff and import controls. In 1959, tariff rates for a number of 
finished goods and their principal imported raw materials were 
reduced. Import controls, an important instrument for infant 
industry production, were now relaxed somewhat; a number of 
items were removed from control.33 The liberalization of controls 
heightened external competition and compelled the domestic 
producers to pay more attention to world market conditions and 
efficiency. 
A third policy change was the introduction of a set of 
measures to stimulate exports directly. These included an 
extension of the foreign exchange entitlements, preferential tax 
treatment of exports and raw materials for export industries, and 
low-cost export loans. Subject to certain restrictions, exporters of 
manufactured goods now could retain all the export earnings for 
most items for use in importing raw materials ~approved by the 
authorities) or for sale to other users. Import duties, defense taxes, 
31. Economic Report of the President, January 1967, Washington, D.C. 1967, 
pp. 17G-175. 
32. The system included special exchange rates applicable to negotiable 
foreign exchange certificates given to exporters, tax rebates to manufacturers for 
import duties on raw materials used in the manufacture of export products, and 
foreign exchange entitlements that permitted manufacturers to retain certain 
portions of their foreign exchange earnings for use in the purchase of imported raw 
materials. See Ching-yuan Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-72, New York: 
Praeger, 1973, pp. 74-76. 
33. Ibid., p. 93. 
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and harbor charges (and subsequently the salt tax and slaughter 
tax) on imported raw materials used in production for exports 
were now refundable. In 1957, the Bank of Taiwan introduced low-
cost loans to exporters, 6 percent for loans payable in fcreign 
exchange, 11.88 percent for those payable in local currency, very 
much below the current interest rate on loans to other borrowers. 
Other policies include export insurance by a government organiza-
tion, direct subsidies to a few industries, and market research by 
government institutes. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, was the set of measures 
to promote foreign investment in Taiwan. The attempt to attract 
foreign investment was not new. In 1954 and 1955 investment 
laws were enacted to encourage inflow of capital. Foreign 
investors were permitted to import plant and equipment and raw 
materials for their own use and other goods to be sold in domestic 
markets to generate local currencies needed for the investment 
projects. But as the margin between the official and the black 
market foreign exchange rates narrowed, the advantages to the 
foreign investor gradually disappeared. Beginning in 1959 the 
government relied more on tax incentives to attract foreign 
capital. A maximum income tax of 18 percent and a five year tax 
holiday for new investments were applicable to foreign capital. 
Other concessions included deferred payment of import duties on 
plant and equipment, payments to be made in installments after 
the plant began operation, and charges up to 7 percent of their 
annual dividends to allow for possible loss from exchange 
devaluation. 
Another measure to attract foreign investment was the 
establishment of export-processing zones (EPZ) in 1965. Foreign 
firms that set up production facilities within the zones were given 
certain advantages: plant sites with easy access to harbor and 
warehouse facilities and water and power supply were made 
available. Costs qf some of these services were reduced to levels 
competitive with those of other ports in the Far East. No import 
duties were to be imposed on plant and equipment. Red tape 
connected with applications for licensing of investment, imports 
and exports, and remittance was cut to a minimum. 
The shift of emphasis from an inward-looking to an outward-
looking strategy had important effects on the growth, structure, 
and direction of Taiwan's foreign trade. Exports rose at an 
impressive rate of 19 percent per year during 1959-65, compared 
with only 4 percent during the import substitution period 
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1952-59.34 Growth of exports was accompanied by a dramatic 
change in its commodity structure. The share of manufactured 
products in total exports averaged 41 percent during 1959-65, far 
above the average of 12 percent for 1952-58.35 The export of 
import substitution products accounted for a large proportion of 
this growth. Increases in the exports of food, beverage, and 
tobacco preparations, and production of textiles, leather, wood, 
paper, and related products constituted 58 percent of the total 
increase in exports in 1959-65.36 With the change in the 
commodity structure of exports, the direction of exports also 
shifted. 
Broadly, Taiwan's exports during this period were of three 
types. The first was the group of labor-intensive products (apparel, 
plywood, electronics) for markets in developed countries. Among 
these countries, Japan remained the most important, but its 
relative share declined. The share of total exports to such 
developed countries as the United States, Germany, Australia, 
and Canada rose sharply, from 11 percent in 1959 to 31 percent in 
1965. The second group consists of capital-intensive products such 
as cement, metal and metal products, and electrical machinery, 
which were sold to the developing countries. A third group was 
primary products, such as sugar and tea, which were exported to 
both the developed and developing countries. Of the three groups, 
the first expanded the fastest, especially since 1962. 
The growth of imports during 1959-65 (16 percent per year) 
was also much faster than during 1952-59 (3 percent per year). 37 
That this was so should not be surprising, for Taiwan's imports 
and exports were highly interdependent. Growth of exports 
generated the need for more imported capital equipment and raw 
materials and at the same time increased the capacity to import. 
Thus, during the period of rapid growth in 1959-65, capital goods 
imports constituted 25 percent of total imports, compared with 
only 17 percent for 1952-58.38 As for the sources of imports, about 
70 percent of all imports came from Japan and the United States 
during 1959-65. This pattern was little different from that of the 
previous period. 
34. Data Book, 1976, p. 177. 
35. Ibid., p. 182. 
36. Ibid., p. 180. 
37. Data Book, 1976, p. 177. 
38. Ibid., p. 183. 
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Capital Inflow and Export Growth, 1965-73 
As exports grew after the exchange reforms of 1958, U.S. 
economic aid began to phase out and in 1965 the aid program 
officially came to an end. Throughout this period Taiwan had a 
persistent trade deficit.39 To cushion the impact of the termination 
of U.S. aid, Taiwan obtained a loan of US$150 million from 
Japan. But the really significant factor that permitted a continued 
net import of resources was the inflow of private foreign capital. 
The foreign exchange reform and the tax incentives introduced 
around 1960 evidently initiated an upward trend in the inflow of 
foreign capital. The trend accelerated after the establishment of 
the export-processing zones. As of March 1977, there were 10 U.S. 
firms, 68 Japanese firms, and 68 firms jointly owned by U.S., 
Japanese, and other investors in the EPZs. Investments of these 
146 firms totalled US$109.0 million.40 Still other investors, many 
from Hong Kong, were also located in the EPZs. Inflows of capital 
since 1965, however, were by no means confined to investment in 
the EPZs. 41 The following figures clearly show how foreign 
investment rapidly grew since 1960:42 
Cumulative totals 
Investments (million US$) 
Number of cases 
Average per year 
Investments (1,000 US$) 
Number of cases 
Investment per case 
(1,000 US$) 
Foreign Investment Approvals 
1952-59 1960-65 1966-73 
20.1 
72 
2.5 
9 
280 
114.6 
224 
19.1 
37 
516 
962.7 
1.639 
120.4 
205 
587 
Not only did the number of cases and the amount of investment 
increase sharply since 1960, the average size of investment per 
case was also larger. 
Apart from improving Taiwan's balance of payments situa-
tion and increasing employment, the inflow of foreign capital was 
39. The only exception was the small surplus in 1964 due to the sugar price 
boom at that time. 
40. These data are provided by the Economic Planning Council, Executive 
Yuan, Republic of China. 
41. For example, of the U.S. investment in Taiwan up to 1976, totalling $418.8 
million. 96 percent were outside the EPZs. Data provided by Industrial Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Taipei, Taiwan. 
42. Data Book, 1974, p. 212. 
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instrumental in solving two key problems on which export 
expansion and economic growth depended. 
The first was the infusion of new technology needed to 
restructure Taiwan's output and exports in the face of changing 
market conditions in the late 1960s. The foreign investments were 
concentrated in such new industries as electronic and electrical 
products, chemicals, machinery equipment and instruments, and 
metal products. 43 These have been among the fastest growing 
industries since 1965.44 Along with textiles and apparel, they were 
also the fastest growing exports. 45 By 1973, industrial products 
dominated the export structure, accounting for 85 percent of total 
exports, and the commodity composition of manufacturing 
exports also changed markedly in favor of such items as electrical 
machinery and apparatus and high-quality textile products.46 
Unlike the principal exports of the earlier years, these products 
were developed primarily for exports rather than as import 
substitutes. 
Mainly as a result of these developments, the degree of export 
commodity concentration declined appreciably.47 This trend is in 
line with the development experience of other countries. As the 
economy becomes more industrialized, exports become more 
diversified. 
The other important problem that foreign investments helped 
to solve was that of marketing. A substantial portion of the 
investments was from Japan and the United States, the purpose 
of which was to utilize the labor in Taiwan to assemble and 
package parts into finished products for export directly to the 
United States. Foreign investment thus automatically provided 
marketing channels for Taiwan's exports, which was of enormous 
value to Taiwan where the supply of international marketing 
skills was still rather short. 
The close relationship between Taiwan's exports and foreign 
capital in general and between U.S. foreign investment and 
43. Data Book, 1976, p. 231. 
44. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 119. 
45. Data Book, 1976, pp. 180-181. 
46. Ibid., p. 182. 
47. According to calculations by Lee and Liang, op. cit., p. 280, the index of 
commodity concentration dropped from 56 percent in 1955 to 22 percent in 1970. 
The index is measured by 100VE(X1/X2 , where X1 ; represents exports of commodity 
i, and X, Taiwan's total exports. The higher the index, the higher the degree of 
commodity concentration. 
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exports to the United States are shown in Figures 2 and 3.48 
Mainly as a result of the increase in direct investments, the share 
of Taiwan's exports to the United States surpassed its share to 
Japan since 1967, and the United States became Taiwan's most 
important market. To be sure, neither effective marketing with the 
aid of foreign investors nor unilateral reform on the part of 
Taiwan would have sufficed had not the demand for Taiwan's 
exports expanded considerably during this period. Between 1966 
and 1973, U.S. total imports increased fourfold. During the same 
period, U.S. imports from Taiwan rose nearly fourteenfold. This 
sharp increase of Taiwan's exports to the United States was 
partly a reflection of the greater competitiveness of Taiwan 
products on the U.S. market, but the increase was also aided by 
the general expansion of U.S. imports. Furthermore, Taiwan's 
exports to the United States had been so small that the large 
increase during this period could in most cases be better tolerated 
by Taiwan's competitors. Given the competitiveness of Taiwan's 
products and the increasing U.S. demand for imports, the 
existence of U.S. as well as Japanese firms in Taiwan, both 
making exportable goods for the American market, contributed 
significantly to Taiwan's expanding share in U.S. imports. 
As exports expanded, so did imports, albeit at a lower rate. 
During 1965-73, imports increased by 27 percent per year.49 The 
composition of imports remained more or less unchanged during 
this period, with the share of capital goods stabilized at around 32 
percent, raw materials at 63 percent, and consumer goods at 5 
percent.50 The degree of import commodity concentration also 
remained at a fairly low level. 51 
Problems in the Post-Oil-Crisis Period 
At the time the worldwide energy crisis broke out, Taiwan 
ranked among the highest of the developing countries in the rate 
of economic growth and per capita income. But its very success of 
development through trade also created serious problems because 
Taiwan was now so dependent on trade that the economy became 
increasingly sensitive to abrupt changes in the outside world. The 
48. Data for exporti[! used for these calculations are from Data Book, 1976, and 
Chung·yang jih·pao (Central Daily News), Taipei, January 12, 1977. Data on 
foreign investments are provided by the Economic Planning Council, Executive 
Yuan, Republic of China. 
49. Data Book, 1976, p. 177. 
50. Ibid., p. ·183. 
51. Lee and Liang, op. cit., p. 280. 
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following ratios of exports and imports to gross domestic product 
in selected years since 1952 show the extent of Taiwan's 
dependency on external markets and sources:52 
52. Ratios are based on totals in current prices. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 
190; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, the Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan, Vol. III, 
No. 1 (January 1977), p. 18. 
Fig. 2. Correlation of the cumulative value of total overseas direct invest-
ments in Taiwan and Taiwan's exports to the world, 1952-76 (t = 1953-75). 
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Fig. 3. Correlation of the cumulative value of U.S. direct investments in 
Taiwan and Taiwan's exports to the U.S., 1953-76 (t = 1953-75). 
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Exports/GDP lmports/GDP 
1952 8 14 
1959 12 21 
1965 18 21 
1973 49 43 
1976 52 50 
The problem of high trade-GDP ratio is further compounded by 
heavy reliance on trade with Japan and the United States, as 
demonstrated by the following figures showing exports to and 
imports from the United States and Japan as percentage of 
Taiwan's total exports and imports:53 
Exports Imports 
Year To U.S. To Japan From U.S. From Japan 
1953 4.2 45.6 38.7 0 30.7 
1959 8.6 41.5 36.1 40.3 
1965 21.3 30.6 31.7 39.8 
1973 37.4 18.4 25.1 37.5 
1975 34.3 13.1 27.8 30.4 
Taiwan's exports to these two countries accounted for about 50 
percent of its total exports. The degree of heavy reliance on these 
two markets as a whole has remained unchanged in the last two 
decades. However, the share of exports to the United States rose 
sharply since the 1960s, while that to Japan declined for the 
reasons given above. 
Taiwan's dependence on these two countries for imports was 
even greater than its dependence for exports. About 70 percent of 
total imports came from these two countries in the period up to 
1965. The proportion fell to about 60 percent in the early 1970s. 
The decline was due to a reduction of the U.S. share after the 
termination of the U.S. aid in 1965. Japan's share, however, 
remained fairly high. The concentration of trade with Japan and 
the United States means that Taiwan's economy would be highly 
vulnerable to changes in these countries. 
The immediate effect of the oil crisis on Taiwan was an 
enormous trade deficit of US$1.3 billion in 1974. Taiwan's deficit 
with the oil-producing countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) 
53. Data Book, 1976, pp. 189, 191. 
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totalled US$0.7 billion, actually much less than its deficit with 
Japan, US$1.4 billion.54 In 1975, both total exports and imports 
declined for the first time since 1969. The total trade deficit was 
reduced to US$0.6 billion, but the deficit with Japan remained as 
high as US$1.1 billion.55 
In fact, for decades before the oil crisis, Taiwan had persistent 
deficits with Japan, for various reasons. Taiwan's exports to 
Japan consist largely of agricultural products, partly because the 
geographical proximity of the two countries lowers the transporta-
tion costs for bulky agricultural products, partly because of the 
similarity in the Chinese and Japanese diets, and also because of 
Japan's restrictive policy toward its imports of manufactured 
products. The growth of such imports has been slow despite 
Japan's rapid economic growth, because the income elasticity of 
demand for these products was rather low. Taiwan's demand for 
imports of capital goods (steel, machinery, chemicals) however, 
expanded by leaps and bounds. Again because of lower transport 
costs and the sizable Japanese investment in Taiwan, together 
with the traditional ties between the Japanese and the Taiwanese 
business community, imports of these capital goods were largely 
from Japan. 56 
Another serious problem in the post-1973 period was the effect 
of worldwide inflation on domestic prices. Wholesale prices in 
1974 rose by 35 percent and the consumers price index by 47 
percent over 1973.57 The sharp increase in prices inevitably forced 
the labor costs to go up despite the rise in unemployment.58 
By 1976 the situation had improved. The rate of inflation was 
greatly reduced. Exports and GNP turned upward again, and the 
rate of unemployment was much lower. However, the economic 
recovery does not necessarily mean a return to the smooth sailing 
of the last decade, for Taiwan now faces some new economic and 
political challenges. Competition from Hong Kong and South 
Korea has become keener as these countries have moved into 
textiles and electronics. Wages in Taiwan rose faster than in other 
countries so that Taiwan lost some of the advantages in low labor 
cost. Moreover, in the developed countries, the slowdown in 
economic growth and high rates of unemployment gave rise to 
54. Data Book, 1976, pp. 184-189. 
55. Ibid., p. 184. 
56. As of 1972, imports of transportation equipment, chemicals, electrical 
machinery, and equipment from Japan accounted for 53, 60, 75 and 64 percent of 
Taiwan's total imports of these products. Data Book, 1976, pp. 21Q-211. 
57. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Republic of China, Vol. III. 
58. Ibid., p. 5. 
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protectionist sentiments. More serious still, changes in the 
relations between Peking and Washington in recent years 
renewed fears about Taiwan's future. The political uncertainty 
could have adverse effects on the economy. In the first place, 
insecurity on the part of Taiwan might force the government to 
divert more resources from investment to defense preparations. 
Second, economic viability and growth depend heavily on foreign 
investment, which is apparently very sensitive to changes in the 
political climate. The rate of U.S. and Japanese investment in 
Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972 probably as a result of the 
ROC's international setbacks during those years and investors' 
concern over its future status. Another decline in new Japanese 
investment in Taiwan occurred in 1974 and 1975 following 
Japan's transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking 
in 1973, although the cause of the decline is somewhat ambigious 
because it coincided with the worldwide recession. Without the 
continued inflow of foreign capital that brings in new technology 
and marketing skills, it would be difficult to sustain high rates of 
export growth. Once again Taiwan has reached a critical stage, as 
it did in the late 1950s and early 1960s; however, the conditions 
are different, but so is Taiwan's economic capability. The 
economy's productivity and capacity to save and the stock of 
physical and human capital have grown tremendously over the 
last two decades. Of the ten major investments now under 
construction, seven are new additions to the infrastructure, which, 
when completed, will greatly increase the power-generating 
capacity and transportation facilities needed for future export 
growth. Above all, the government and the business community 
have accumulated substantial experience in adapting themselves 
to changing conditions. At each critical juncture in the past, the 
government had been able to take appropriate measures to 
promote the transition from one stage of growth to the next. 
Although Taiwan now faces many problems, the central question 
remains essentially the same as in the past: how to identify, 
develop, and exploit new areas of comparative advantage in the 
future international environment. In the search for solutions, 
political, economic, and strategic issues are inevitably involved. 
II. LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS 
As an economy develops, the commodity composition and 
country distribution of its external trade are bound to change. In 
the case of Taiwan, the rate of adjustment required is enhanced by 
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the speed of economic change inherent in the continuation of 
fairly rapid economic growth that the ROC authorities plan to 
maintain. There certainly are strong noneconomic reasons cailing 
for steady economic growth at an at least moderately high rate. 
Given Taiwan's island economy, this means continued large 
imports that must be paid for. Thus, exports must continue to rise, 
and it would be necessary, not merely desirable, to have a given 
amount of resources devoted to exports to earn an increasing 
amount of imports. Exports based on low wage, labor-intensive 
production methods will increasingly lose their edge in competi-
tion with the products of other countries as wage rates rise in 
Taiwan and as other countries with a much larger labor supply-
e.g., South Korea and several countries in Southeast Asia-
expand their manufacturing and export industries further. 
Taiwan's import demand for intermediate products can be 
progressively reduced through domestic production in what is 
sometimes described as the backward linkage process. However, 
both the production of intermediate products at home and 
expansion of more capital and technology-intensive exports of 
higher unit value will still require the inflow of technology from 
overseas and of some foreign capital in the case of "embodied 
technology." In addition, there will be a need to expand other 
sources of foreign exchange earnings than current exports. This 
need will still be there even if raw material imports become 
relatively more important as the proportion of intermediate 
industrial products in imports recedes. In light of the world's 
recent experience concerning the pricing and availability of 
primary commodities (including both raw materials and energy 
products), security of imported raw material supply is one aspect 
of its future trade pattern that Taiwan cannot ignore. 
Changes in the direction of Taiwan's foreign trade are also 
becoming increasingly necessary as the volume of trade increases. 
In some commodities, such as low-priced footwear and textiles and 
black-and-white TV sets, Taiwan products now account for a very 
large portion of certain markets, e.g., the United States. This 
phenomenon has evoked the usual outcry from local producers 
demsnding import tariffs and quotas, countervailing duties, 
"voluntary" restraint on the part of Taiwan exporters, etc. To 
some extent, this roadblock to Taiwan's export expansion can be 
bypassed through limiting sales of any specific commodity in any 
one market to a share of the total supply that would be regarded 
as tolerable by local competitors. (What would constitute such a 
share is another question.) This can be done by trying to sell in 
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more markets and by selling a larger number of exports in any 
given market. Diversification by commodity and by market must, 
therefore, be regarded as a most urgent task facing Taiwan's 
foreign traders. 
This and the following section will explore these issues further 
with particular attention to some of the more uncommon aspects. 
Augmenting Natural Resources Supply from Overseas 
The pattern of external trade of any country will change in 
the long run as its comparative advantage changes. Since 
comparative advantage is a reflection of the relative scarcities of 
resources, of tastes and preferences, and of given technologies, all 
of which are subject to change, the crucial question is how these 
factors might change for Taiwan, especially how resources and 
technologies might change. In the long run, in spite of its small 
size, Taiwan may turn out to possess new natural resources, 
hitherto undiscovered, that can be utilized in external commerce 
as a result of changes in technology and demand. However, in t~e 
absence of the emergence of radically new technologies, major 
new discoveries of hidden resources (such as off-shore oil and gas) 
in quantities sufficient to alter comparative advantage are 
fraught with greater uncertainty than some other developments 
that simply augment available resources through investment. In 
this regard, Taiwan's resource augmentation can proceed in 
several ways. As a matter of fact, a small beginning has already 
occurred in what could turn out to be a trend. 
In the first place, natural resources located overseas can be, 
and have been, acquired through investment. Like the Japanese, 
businessmen in Taiwan who have developed certain enterprises 
and technical expertise have begun to establish similar undertak-
ings in foreign markets. For instance, this has been done through 
investment in outlets and facilities for foreign sales. Manufactur-
ing facilities have also been located overseas to promote sales in 
local foreign markets, in industries in which the investors have 
already gained considerable experience at home-e.g., textiles, 
petrochemicals, and construction materials. In addition, overseas 
investment to provide for the supply of resources for domestic use 
in the future has also started, as yet only on a very small scale. 
The types of foreign investments by the Japanese are, of course, of 
far greater magnitudes. For example, timber land in Indonesia, 
corn-growing farms in Thailand, etc. have been developed by 
Taiwan-based investors. In due course, such acquisitions will help 
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assure Taiwan producers and consumers of continuity of supply 
and access to raw materials on potentially more advantageous 
terms. Most such direct investments will also present possibilities 
of exporting to third countries from overseas locations. 
All types of foreign investment by Taiwan investors will, 
directly or indirectly, provide foreign earnings that can be used to 
promote export sales or to increase imports, which again may 
either be for domestic production (or consumption) in Taiwan or 
for the production of exports. In short, the historically common 
case of a developing country itself becoming an investor country 
can and will be repeated in Taiwan. One might state even more 
emphatically that such developments must take place if Taiwan's 
economic growth is to continue. One of the effects of these 
developments is to alter the pattern of comparative advantage in 
the long run. 
From 1959 through 1975, 91 applications by ROC business-
men for investment in foreign countries, totalling $26.5 million, 
were officially approved. Their distribution by sector and by 
country is shown in Table 1. Forty percent of such investments 
are in various manufacturing industries; 19 percent in construc-
tion and construction materials; 13 percent in textiles; 10 percent 
in foreign trade; 8.5 percent in machinery and metal products. 
Only a little over 3 percent are for the development of mineral and 
agricultural resources. 
The accompanying data represent only officially approved 
investments from Taiwan. Some investments, however, have been 
made in the form of joint ventures in partnership with business 
interests in the host countries or third countries. Some "third" 
country (e.g., Hong Kong) interests conceivably may also be 
beneficially owned by Taiwan investors. At any rate, Taiwan 
exporters are permitted to retain, in foreign exchange, a small 
amount of their export proceeds for purposes of their overseas 
business operations. With annual exports currently (1976) running 
at the rate of about $8 billion, even 5 percent would come to $400 
million. 
There is some evidence that Taiwan investments abroad are 
substantially larger than those shown in Table 1. Obviously, one 
important source of such capital consists of residual export 
earnings retained abroad, as shown in Table 2. 
..... 
~ 
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Table 1. Overseas Investment by Taiwan Investors, Distribution by Country and Industry, 1959-75 
(Value in US $thousand based on approved investment applications) 
Construction Machinery Agriculture 
Material and Mining and and Metal Petro- and Miscellaneous Foreign 
Engineering Lumber Refining Textiles Products Chemicals Fisheries Manufacturing Trade Total Percent 0 
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount 0 z 
>-3 
Southeast Asia 1':1 
ASEAN s;: 
Malaysia 3 179 1 201 1 160 1 129 4 412 1 80 1 13 - 1 16 13 1,190 4.6 "C 0 Thailand - 2 379 - - 4 1,154 2 460 - 10 2,098 1 96 19 4,187 16.3 ::0 
Singapore 1 956 - - 5 1,272 2 251 1 408 - 1 374 - 10 3,261 12.7 ~ 
Philippines - - 1 80 1 60 - 1 69 - 1 250 1 100 5 559 2.2 ::0 
Indonesia I 354 - - 1 215 I 180 1 270 - I 1,500 1 225 6 2,744 10.7 >< 
Other - - - 2 180 1 194 - - 2 838 - 5 1,212 4.7 > Hong Kong 1 2,128 
- -
1 34 - - - I 82 2 103 5 2,347 9.1 00 
Japan - - - - - - - - I 50 1 50 0.2 ...... 
Okinawa - - - - - - - I 5 - I 5 0.02 ~ 
Republic of z 
Korea - - - - - - - 1 25 - 1 25 0.09 00 
Australia - - - 1 90 - - - - - I 90 0.3 >-3 
U.S.A. - - - 1 500 - - - 4 240 I 900 6 1,640 6.4 c: !::) 
Guam 3 1,336 - - - - - - 2 187 - 5 1,523 5.9 ...... 
Canada - - - - - - - I 25 - I 25 0.9 1':1 
Latin America 
- - -
1 500 
- -
2 1,063 2 1,050 5 2,613 10.2 00 -
West Germany 
- - - - - -
- - 1 22 1 22 0.08 00 
United Kingdom - - - - - - - - I 35 I 35 0.1 1':1 ::0 Middle East - - - 1 375 - - - I 3,125 I 113 3 3,613 14.1 ...... 
Africa - - - - - - - 1 463 I 21 2 484 1.9 1':1 
Total 9 4,953 3 580 2 240 15 3,355 12 2,191 6 1,287 1 13 29 10,275 14 2,731 91 25,625 100.0 
00 
Percent 19.3 2.3 0.9 13.1 8.5 5.0 0.05 40.1 10.5 100.0 
Source: Data provided by Economic Planning Council, Taipei, Taiwan. 
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Table 2. Other Foreign Investments by Taiwanese (US$ million) 
Investments Approved 
Reported Investments 
by Host Country in 1959-75 as 
as Taiwan Reported by 
Host Country Period and Remarks Investments the ROC 
Indonesia Approved invest- 16.0 2.7 
ments cumulative 
to 1975 
Philippines Investment by 85.1 0.5 
Board of Invest-
ment approved 
firms, 1968-75 
Thailand Total registered 22.6 4.2 
capital, 1960-May 31, 
1975 
Malaysia 1974-75 only 2.8 1.2 
126.5 8.6 
These data are obtained from the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), 
Jakarta; the Board of Investment, Manila; the Board of Investment, Bangkok; and 
the Federal Industrial Development Authority, Kuala Lumpur. 
If the data in Table 2 are correct, actual investments are at 
least 14-15 times the value of approved investments that have 
been made directly by Taiwan investors in four of the ASEAN 
countries during 1959-75. Since investments in Singapore and 
Hong Kong are bound to be sizable in view of the close relations 
maintained by businessmen in the three areas, one might hazard 
the guess that $200 million would be the minimum value of 
Taiwan's direct foreign investments in Southeast Asia to date. 
Since the official data on approved investments indicate a 
predominant concentration in light manufacturing and foreign 
trade, activities in overseas resources development accounting for 
a very small share, the majority of these investments appear to 
have been motivated by efforts to support and supplement 
external trade activities, as well as to extend established 
manufacturing to production in foreign markets. Investments for 
resource development, however, present an opportunity that 
Taiwan can ill afford not to exploit, and more should be expected 
in the future, the present small beginning notwithstanding. 
Geographically, Taiwan's existing approved foreign invest-
ments are concentrated in Southeast Asia, where manufacturers 
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from Taiwan frequently enjoy a technical advantage over local 
enterprise and where joint ventures with local ethnic Chinese 
interests are quite common practice. The ASEAN countries, for 
example, accounted for 46.5 percent of such approved investments 
through 1975, while Hong Kong took another 9.1 percent. Since 
Southeast Asia is a logical source of raw materials for Taiwan, as 
it is for Japan, it will probably take precedence over other areas as 
Taiwan businessmen increase their investments for resource 
development in the future. However, other major exporters of 
resources, such as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan's principal source of 
crude oil, and Bahrain, have also attracted Taiwan businessmen. 
Expanding bilateral trade and economic relations have arisen as 
a result of Taiwan's need to secure an oil supply from the Middle 
East, and growing trade relations have in tum fostered invest-
ment. (However, no investment in Middle Eastern oil has been 
attempted so far.) 
The Potential of Ocean Fishing 
A second method for an island nation to expand its supply of 
natural resources is to increase its access to the surrounding 
waters. "Farming the sea" in an ever-widening area, a natural 
development in these circumstances, is a function of the 
development of the fishing industry. Taiwan's fishing fleet today 
is no longer confined to the island's coastal waters or even the 
South China Sea. The Indian Ocean, the waters near Australia, 
and the American Pacific fishing grounds are frequented by 
fishing vessels from Taiwan. Perhaps the farthest these vessels 
have ventured is the exploratory shrimping trip to the South polar 
region undertaken by an experimental vessel in 1977, which used 
Capetown as its staging point. The potential of ocean fishing can 
be illustrated by the data in Table 3. 59 
59. Taiwan Fisheries Bureau, Fisheries Yearbook, 1975, Taipei, May 1976, pp. 
80 and 222 also report on activities in 1976, February 1977. 
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Table 3. Composition of Taiwan Fishery Production 
Deep Sea 
Inshore 
Coastal 
Aquaculture 
Total 
Total Production 
(thousand metric tons) 
1976 1965 
325,327 
317,327 
31,961 
135,450 
810,475 
135,949 
160,924 
30,655 
54,160 
381,688 
Index 
1965 = 100 
239.3 
197.4 
104.2 
250.0 
212.3 
Of the total volume reported in Table 3, 157,800 tons, valued 
at $314.2 million, were exported. Between 1965 and 1976, the 
increase in production was more than 2 times while that of export 
was nearly 28 times in volume and 11.4 times in value. These data 
are indicative of such overseas development as we have postu-
lated. 
Investing in Human Resources Overseas and 
Deferred Returns 
Any upgrading of exports by increasing their technological 
content will require a continuous increase in the supply of 
technicians, engineers, scientists, and modern managerial person-
nel. Better coordination of vocational, scientific and managerial 
education with (a) the specific manpower requirements of 
development, (b) domestic research and development, and (c) 
technological imports is extremely important. This topic is usually 
discussed in coimection with education and manpower planning 
for economic development. Our concern at this point is, however, 
with investment in · human resources overseas, which could 
subsequently rebound to the economic benefit of Taiwan. 
During the past 25 years, large numbers of Chinese graduate 
students have left Taiwan for advanced training abroad. The 
majority have chosen to specialize in the physical sciences and 
engineering, and many have subsequently remained abroad 
instead of returning to Taiwan. This P.henomenon is. generally 
thought of a "brain drain" to Taiwan. (See Table 4.) 
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Table 4. Distribution of Chinese Students in the 
United States by Field of Study, 1970 
Field of Study 
Engineering 
Natural sciences 
Social sciences 
Health professions 
Business 
Agriculture 
Humanities 
Other (including law, 
education, etc.) 
U.S. Graduate Students 
1973 
(in percent) 
7.94 
9.39 
11.91 
1.74 
10.72 
1.06 
4.60 
52.64 
100.00 
Chinese Students 
1970 
27.25 
33.59 
8.57 
3.59 
6.96 
2.35 
11.44 
6.25 
100.00 
Sources: These data are originally from U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Digest of Educational Statistics, 1973, p. 81; and 
Department of International Cultural Affairs, Chinese Ministry of Education, 
Taipei. They are taken from a paper on "The Professional Chinese-American" 
contributed by John Y. Ma of the Sinologisch Institut, Leiden, The Netherlands, in 
a forthcoming study on the economic condition of Chinese Americans. 
Between 1950 and 1974, 30,765 Chinese students were 
approved for advanced study abroad by the ROC Ministry of 
Education. The annual figure reached a peak of 3,015 in 1969 and 
averaged about 1,900 persons in the first half of the 1970s. An 
overwhelming majority of these students came to the United 
States, so that, as shown in Table 4, a comparison of their 
distribution by field of study with the corresponding distribution 
of U.S. graduate students as a whole would be illuminating. 
Thus, the United States is the principal focus of overseas 
investment in human resources in the technological fields by 
Taiwan investors. Utilization ofthis reservoir of human capital as 
its productivity increases with appropriate "maturing" will, 
therefore, be of vital importance in the long-run evaluation of 
Taiwan's comparative advantage. 
Understandably, if a person educated in Taiwan at considera-
ble private and public expenditure emigrates, earns his living 
abroad, sends no money home, and otherwise contributes little to 
the Taiwan economy, the resources invested will be a loss to 
Taiwan. In general, a university graduate from Taiwan who 
moves to a foreign country spends additional funds on education, 
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and the total investment he represents is even larger. However, 
whether there will be a waste of resources is by no means a 
foregone conclusion. Analogous to the installation of a valuable 
piece of equipment in a factory located abroad in an overseas 
investment project, such an overseas investment in human 
resources leads ultimately to waste from Taiwan's point of view 
only when there is little or no return. The crucial question, 
therefore, is whether a number of the graduate engineers and 
scientists might not at some future date become channels of 
communication in introducing new technology as well as 
managerial and business know-how into Taiwan that would not 
otherwise be available. They may not have returned in the past to 
participate in the island's regular labor force; they could, however, 
return in the future as investors and partners in joint ventures 
with resident Taiwan interests in new industries. 
A good example of this kind is the series of biennial seminars 
that Chinese engineers in the United States have organized since 
1966 for the benefit of Taiwan industry. The seminars began in 
response to specific queries initiated by major Taiwan industrial 
enterprises. The dialogue, once begun, soon extended to the 
introduction of new ideas from abroad and to a wider exchange of 
ideas in technological and management areas. In the early 1970s 
these seminars were establishing new industrial undertakings in 
which specific foreign firms were selected to provide for the 
further training of specialists and the installation of pilot plants. 
This development began with the electronics industry and will 
probably expand into other sectors such as precision machines 
and certain chemicals. It is a reversal of the process represented 
by the emigration of trained Chinese human resources. However, 
the counterflow of technological and managerial know-how is at a 
technical level substantially above that attained by the university 
graduates who left Taiwan earlier. It would be stretching the truth 
to point to this process entirely as the reaping of benefits of past 
investments in education by Taiwan in the form of the "matur-
ing" of prior overseas investment in human resources by Taiwan, 
because many of the senior personnel involved received their 
education in China long before the period covered by this volume. 
However, younger engineers, scientists, and managerial personnel 
are gradually appearing on the scene, and the "maturing" of their 
investment in human resources overseas by Taiwan investors 
(including both the ROC government and the private sector) could 
well become an expanding reality. 
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The kind of technological inflow described above had its 
beginning in 1966. Its effects on production and increase in 
productivity through technological upgrading has only just 
begun. One is probably correct in assuming that the effectiveness 
of this process is contingent upon the attainment by the Taiwan 
economy of a stage in economic development at which it will no 
longer be dependent in every case upon external sources for both 
financing and technology. This would seem to be the same 
condition under which licensing agreements with foreign busi-
nesses can begin to be effectively used to expand and upgrade 
production in any developing country. It is a variant of the 
technological inflow process that takes advantage of the "brain 
drain". 
Technical and Managerial Training of Ethnic Chinese from 
Southeast Asia - Effect on Future Export Marketing 
and Investment Abroad 
Still another often-ignored aspect of ROC external economic 
activities is the technical training Taiwan offers to students of 
Chinese origin from foreign countries, mostly from Southeast 
Asia. Where advanced technical training is denied to ethnic 
Chinese by certain foreign governments through a quota system, 
as in Malaysia, the availability of such training in Taiwan is a 
boon to those who cannot go to Europe or the United States for 
their advanced education and technical training. Statistics in 
Table 5 on ethnic Chinese students from foreign countries who 
have undergone such training in summer institutes in Taiwan are 
a good demonstration of the scope and potential of this pheno-
menon. 
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Table 5. Distribution of Ethnic Chinese Students 
from Outside Taiwan in Summer Training Courses 
By Field of Interest 1961-75 
Discipline 
Engineering and technology 
Electrical engineering 
Mechanical engineering 
Chemical engineering 
Agricultural engineering 
Textile engineering 
Mining 
·Civil engineering 
Hydraulic engineering 
Architecture 
Marine products manufacturing 
Metallurgy 
Industrial engineering 
Agricultural machinery 
Electronics 
Computers 
Physics 
Navigation 
Marine mechanics 
Urban planning 
Shipbuilding 
Food technology 
River and ocean engineering 
Mining and petroleum industry 
Engineering science 
Subtotal 
Life, agricultural, and medical sciences 
Horticulture 
Forestry 
Agricultural chemistry 
Animal husbandry 
Agronomy 
Veterinary 
Agricultural extensions 
Plant pathology 
Fishery 
Entomology 
Botany 
Soil conservation 
Agricultural products processing 
Afforestation 
Subtotal 
Year 
Initiated 
1961 
61 
61 
63 
63 
63 
63 
64 
64 
65 
68 
68 
68 
70 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
74 
75 
75 
63 
63 
63 
63 
63 
63 
64 
64 
65 
68 
70 
71 
74 
74 
Number of 
Students 
388 
538 
464 
25 
6 
32 
310 
12 
41 
4 
3 
2 
5 
36 
9 
4 
1 
8 
1 
10 
7 
1 
3 
1 
1,911 
71 
44 
93 
53 
50 
18 
6 
40 
2 
5 
3 
4 
5 
1 
395 
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Business and economics 
Economics 
Industrial & business management 
International trade 
Business administration 
Agricultural economics 
Banking 
Accounting 
Maritime management 
Finance and taxation 
Enterprise management 
Cooperatives 
Customs administration 
Transportation and management 
Banking and insurance 
Statistics 
Tourist business 
Subtotal 
Psychology 
Art 
Home economics 
Subtotal 
Total 
62 
62 
62 
63 
63 
63 
63 
64 
64 
65 
68 
68 
68 
72 
72 
74 
72 
72 
72 
Ill 
49 
107 
23 
33 
94 
132 
7 
6 
85 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
661 
4 
1 
1 
6 
2,973 
Source: Hua-cha'iao eking-chi nien-chien (Overseas Chinese Handbook) 
(Taipei: World Chinese Traders Liaison Office, 1976), pp. 589-593. 
Taiwan's role as an intermediary in conveying technological 
know-how and experience in economic development to Southeast 
Asian countries began in the 1960s. At its peak in 1967,60 114 
persons were involved in the program of overseas technical 
cooperation and teams of specialists from Taiwan were found in 
Vietnam and Singapore. Two years earlier, similar teams from 
Taiwan were also found in Malaysia and the Philippines. By 1974, 
however, Vietnam was the only Southeast Asian country that still 
had a Taiwan technical cooperation team. With the fall of 
Vietnam in 1975, Taiwan's role in providing technical aid was 
sharply curtailed in Southeast Asia. Consequently, training of 
students from Southeast Asian countries has become a much more 
important source of contact with the future technological cum 
business elite of Southeast Asia than it was ten years earlier. It is 
more than likely that upon return to their own countries, many of 
these students will become active businessmen and profession-
GO. See Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976 
(Taipei, Taiwan: 1976), pp. 236-237. 
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als.The contacts they have gained in Taiwan will be an asset that 
could lead to a preference for Taiwan products and opportunities 
for joint ventures with Taiwan interests. Their assistance in 
foreign marketing and an expanding investment horizon in 
Southeast Asia are advantages of vast importance to Taiwan's 
future export growth. 
What is peculiarly Chinese in the Taiwan case is the specific 
opportunities presented by the many large and economically 
active - in some instances, even dominant - ethnic Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia, together with the importance of 
Southeast Asia as a source of raw material supply. Joint ventures 
between ROC and Southeast Asian business interests have vast 
potential. At the same time, the educational, training, and 
business opportunities that Taiwan offers to the ethnic Chinese 
elsewhere are attractions that the latter can hardly ignore. Future 
expansion of trade and investment relationships that take 
advantage of these facts and ultimately use Taiwan as an 
intermediary in the infusion of technological know-how from the 
West (and Japan) to Southeast Asia, along with direct infusions 
from the West to Southeast Asia, offer a challenge to business 
entrepreneurs everywhere who are interested in the region. 
Various efforts capitalizing on the sense of kinship among 
ethnic Chinese in different countries have been initiated by 
Taiwan to promote trade, investments, and other economic 
activities between Taiwan and other countries where Chinese 
reside. Joint meetings of various national chambers of commerce 
in which ethnic Chinese businessmen are a major component, as 
well as a joint banking institution with a strong Filipino-Chinese 
participation, are some good examples. 
At first glance, one would assume that the specific advan-
tages the ROC enjoys by virtue of the affinity of its population to 
ethnic Chinese communities elsewhere, both in the United States 
and in Southeast Asia, would be equally available to the PRC. In 
reality, however, this is not quite so. 
In the first place, it is true that both the ROC and the PRC 
have changed their policies toward ethnic Chinese outside China. 
Both have now called upon the latter to conduct themselves as 
good citizens of their adopted countries. However, there are still 
some fundamental differences between the two in the eyes of 
Southeast Asian countries. First, the PRC has never abandoned 
its ideological stand on revolution. To endeavor to bring about 
social change by revolutionary means is by implication the basic 
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duty of every member of a pre-socialist society. Therefore, any 
ostensible policy not to pursue such a goal smacks of a tactical 
shift only. Second, even for those who are inclined to give scant 
emphasis to an argument based on the PRC's ideological position, 
it is undeniably true that the PRC is large while Taiwan is small. 
A large Chinese power could become a threat to a country with a 
large ethnic Chinese community if it should choose to, and could 
successfully, exploit the Chinese in that country. Regardless of the 
latter's real attitude, perception by the non-Chinese local authori-
ties, right or wrong, is the all-important factor. One would suspect 
that the more they have discriminated against Chinese in the 
past, the more they would be concerned about the ethnic Chinese 
in their midst and the more fearful they would be of hostile 
intentions on the part of the PRC that might attempt to exploit 
the ethnic Chinese communities outside China and Taiwan. 
In the second place, by virtue of its non-market economic 
system, the PRC does not possess as much flexibility as private 
business in Taiwan. It is not able, in the long-run, to enter into 
free-wheeling joint ventures with ethnic Chinese businessmen in 
Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States. While 
the PRC can subsidize ethnic Chinese business outside China, 
especially covertly and indirectly, the scope and variety of its 
economic activities are necessarily limited by its inability to give 
private entrepreneurship the full range of the imaginativeness of 
which it is capable. Although one group of ethnic Chinese 
engineers in the United States has, as of this writing (1977), also 
organized several technical tours and seminars in Mainland 
China, providing introductions to new developments overseas, 
their effort appears to have been somewhat less productive than 
that of their counterpart in Taiwan. In the long-run, the same will 
probably hold true for their relationship with ethnic Chinese 
businessmen outside China in general. 
III. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, POLITICS 
AND STRATEGY 
Some Basic Considerations 
Viewed both domestically and internationally, there are 
certain political and strategic aspects of trade that should not be 
ignored if we wish to understand the economic and political 
evolution of Taiwan in its entirety. 
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First, as long as the PRC continues to threaten Taiwan with 
military annexation and irredentist political claims, residents on 
the island will always be subjected to feelings of uncertainty. This 
sense of uncertainty tends to be pushed to the background of 
public consciousness when business is brisk, employment is high, 
and the benefits of prosperity are widely shared. Thus, economic 
growth is a sine qua non of Taiwan's internal "political 
buoyancy" and of the people's confidence in their own system. 
Second, since 1971, Peking has actively pursued its policy to 
isolate the ROC government diplomatically. As a result, many 
countries have, since that time, shifted diplomatic recognition 
from Taipei to Peking. This means that the existence of 
nondiplomatic relations with other countries, particularly the 
establishment and expansion of external trade ties, is viewed both 
internally and externally as evidence of Taiwan's economic and 
political viability as an independent system. 
Third, from Taiwan's point of view, expansion of trade and 
other economic relations is one way to develop a community of 
interest between other countries and Taiwan. Such a community 
of interest could benefit Taiwan diplomatically. When diplomatic 
relations have been severed or are nonexisting, expanding trade 
relations conceivably could lead to quasi-diplomatic relations. 
Fourth, while the last two points focus on the function of trade 
and economic relations as a substitute for external political and 
diplomatic relations, a separate factor that needs to be considered 
is the importance to trade expansion of international political 
status. The crux of the issue lies in the geographical position of 
Taiwan, which is dependent upon open and secure transportation, 
communication, and travel between the island and the rest of the 
world. Unless these conditions are maintained, continued trade 
expansion would become progressively difficult. Therefore, a 
fundamental issue is whether these conditions can in fact be 
secured for an indefinite period independently of Taiwan's 
international political status. 
Finally, there is a corollary to the above point. As the political 
importance of trade and other external economic relations 
increases, it will be necessary for Taiwan to minimize the 
vulnerability of such relations to adverse external political 
influences or deliberate attacks on Taiwan's economy by the 
ROC's political enemies. In this connection, there is a potential 
dilemma between Taiwan's alternative national objectives. 
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Concentration Versus Dispersion of Trade 
The more a country sells to, or buys from, a single foreign 
country, the more vulnerable it will be to an unfavorable change 
in trade policy on the part of the latter. In terms of specific 
commodities, the larger the market share accounted for by a 
country's export in the total supply in another country, the more 
susceptible it will be to protectionist measures instigated by the 
other country's domestic producers. The same may not be true, 
however, in the case of imports, inasmuch as foreign exporters 
would normally not object to expanding purchases by a single 
foreign buyer. Of course, foreign consumers may raise objections 
in this case just as they would reap greater benefits in the 
previous .case. However, consumers are usually politically less 
influential than producers in the formulation of national trade 
policies. 
In view of the above, reduction of the degree of concentration 
of Taiwan's growing foreign trade and diversification of exports 
to any given country are likely to become increasingly important 
elements in Taiwan's foreign trade policy. Any political benefit 
Taiwan conceivably might derive from the growing economic 
interdependence of other countries with Taiwan, however, is likely 
to be larger if Taiwan's foreign trade is concentrated in a few 
countries and is, therefore, of importance to them. This potential 
dilemma can be side-stepped in the long-run only if Taiwan can 
become a major, but not overdominant, supplier of a significant 
number of commodities to a large number of countries. The same 
may be said of Taiwan's imports, although, for reasons mentioned 
earlier, the requirement regarding the varieties of commodities 
might be relaxed in this case. In order to achieve such a 
reconciliation of objectives, an inescapable conclusion is that 
Taiwan's foreign trade must continue to grow for both economic 
and political reasons. The long-term target of trade expansion 
envisaged by ROC economic planners is thus entirely understand-
able. 
Community of Interests with Other Countries 
What are some of the more important circumstances govern-
ing Taiwan's trade prospects? The usual economic factors can be 
quickly listed: for example, the state of the world economy, 
particularly the rate of economic recovery and growth of the 
United States and Japan as long as they are still Taiwan's largest 
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trade partners; the extent to which protectionism will continue to 
rear its head, especially in countries with which Taiwan hopes to 
expand trade in the future; Taiwan's success in restructuring its 
commodity pattern in trade and in remaining competitive with 
Korea and Hong Kong, etc. These economic factors aside, perhaps 
the most important political condition is the extent to which other 
countries will be interested in maintaining for businessmen from 
Taiwan freedom of transportation, communication, and travel as 
they would for themselves. 
Since Taiwan is astride the principal sea lanes between Japan 
and countries to the South, as well as the Middle Eastern 
countries and others west of the Malacca Straits, Japan in 
particular would not wish to see the establishment of any overt 
precedent of trade disruption as a result of the open and gross 
infringement of freedom of shipping, communication, and travel. 
The same may be said of other countries in the Western Pacific, 
especially Indonesia, whose trade links with Japan pass by 
Taiwan. The more powerful nations, such as the United States 
and the Soviet Union, may wish to keep these same freedoms 
intact as a matter of principle, although one can readily think of 
exceptions. 
A special economic interest also exists for those countries 
whose trade with the PRC is substantially smaller and is faced 
with less favorable growth prospects than their Taiwan trade. 
This is true especially if their exports to Taiwan are both sizable 
and larger than exports to the PRC. In their case, loss of the 
Taiwan market cannot be ignored, nor can it be replaced by 
expanding exports to the PRC. If exports to Taiwan must be 
maintained, imports from Taiwan can also be more readily 
tolerated, although experience shows that this attitude does not 
always follow. 
During 1976, U.S. exports to Taiwan amounted to $1,569 
million, or 1.4 percent of U.S. exports to the world, while U.S. 
exports to the PRC were $135 million, or 0.12 percent of total U.S. 
exports. On the import side, the United States imported $2,958 
million of goods from Taiwan in 1976, or 2.3 percent of total U.S. 
imports, versus $202 million, or 0.15 percent, from the PRC (see 
Tables 6 and 7). As a market for U.S. products, Taiwan was half 
as important as the average of France and Italy combined, which 
in 1976, accounted for 3 percent and 2.7 percent of U.S. exports to 
the world. As a supplier of goods on the U.S. market, Taiwan was 
exceeded only by two of the nine European Community members 
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-West Germany (4.7 percent of total U.S. imports from the world) 
and the United Kingdom (3.5 percent) - ranking ahead of France 
and Italy (2.1 percent each), as well as the Netherlands, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, and Ireland. To U.S. businessmen and 
consumers the Taiwan economy can no longer be off-handedly 
dismissed. 
Table 6. U.S. Imports from Taiwan and PRC, 1971-75 
(Million US $) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total imports 
Taiwan 817.4 1,293.5 1,772.5 2,107.6 1,946.0 2,958.4 
PRC 4.9 32.3 64.0 114.7 158.3 201.9 
Food, live animals 
Taiwan 54.2 84.1 85.3 111.9 192.4 142.0 
PRC 1.5 4.2 6.0 13.5 14.2 23.8 
Beverages, tobacco 
Taiwan 0.3 0.4 0.09 
PRC 0.7 2.8 1.8 0.3 
Crude materials, inedible 
(except fuel) 
Taiwan 7.0 11.7 15.0 14.1 11.1 13.9 
PRC 2.2 12.3 14.6 16.3 17.6 38.5 
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc. 
Taiwan 0.4 2.1 0.4 3.4 0.01 
PRC 0.4 0.1 
Oils & fats, animal, vegetable 
Taiwan 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 
PRC 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.4 
Chemicals 
Taiwan 6.9 9.5 12.1 31.9 16.2 26.1 
PRC 0.3 2.1 8.2 18.4 15.9 18.0 
Manufactured goods 
Taiwan 119.4 193.2 242.2 288.0 238.0 355.4 
PRC 0.5 7.4 21.0 42.7 79.4 68.5 
Machinery, transportation 
equipment 
Taiwan 202.2 401.1 600.5 685.3 488.5 780.2 
PRC 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.3 
Miscellaneous, transportation 
equipment 
Taiwan 420.1 584.0 797.6 954.7 964.5 1,618.0 
PRC 0.3 6.1 11.2 19.2 25.6 47.5 
Miscellaneous 
Taiwan 7.5 9.4 17.1 20.8 31.4 22.4 
PRC 0.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.6 
Sources: See table 7. 
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Table 7. U.S. Exports to Taiwan and PRC, 1971-75 
(US $ Millions) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total exports 
Taiwan 342.7 629.5 1,165.0 1,423.8 1,655.7 1,568.9 
PRC 60.2 689.1 806.9 303.6 135.4 
Food and live animals 
Taiwan 30.5 55.9 154.1 167.8 180.9 202.1 
PRC 56.0 410.1 329.6 0.02 
Beverage and tobacco 
Taiwan 10.1 14.9 18.7 30.8 27.5 13.2 
PRC 1.4 2.7 
Cruje materials, inedible 
(except fuel) 
Taiwan 141.6 149.1 319.1 307.3 407.5 304.5 
PRC 171.9 328.0 100.1 13.0 
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc. 
Taiwan 2.1 2.6 3.5 7.2 7.2 0.01 
PRC 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Oils & fats, animal, vegetable 
Taiwan 4.4 4.3 5.2 18.4 10.0 12.2 
PRC 2.2 19.2 7.5 
Chemicals 
Taiwan 25.2 32.4 90.0 127.4 125.3 154.6 
PRC 7.9 10.2 5.2 10.4 
Manufactured goods 
Taiwan 25.3 31.4 76.2 123.4 141.3 143.2 
PRC 9.0 18.5 73.8 43.3 
Machinery, transportation 
equipment 
Taiwan 157.5 233.4 398.2 562.7 599.7 666.2 
PRC 2.0 69.0 106.7 118.8 65.1 
Miscellaneous, transportation 
equipment 
Taiwan 13.1 20.5 21.2 32.4 39.2 69.5 
PRC 1.1 0.8 2.7 4.9 3.4 
Items not classified by 
kind 
Taiwan 1.8 2.5 5.9 6.7 6.2 3.4 
PRC 0.3 0.4 0.02 
Sources: 1971: U.S. Department of Commerce, General Imports, World Area 
by Commodity Groups, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 374; 1972-75: 
Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 2, 1976, p. 44. U.S. Department of 
Commerce; Bureau of East-West Trade, office of East-West, U.S. Trade Status with 
Communist Countries, February 1977. 
For comparison with The European Economic Community, see U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Special Reoirt No. 32, U.S. Trade with the European Community, 
April 1977. 
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During 1971-73, Japan exported an average of $1.2 billion of 
merchandise to Taiwan versus $740 million of goods to the PRC. 
These figures were respectively 4.1 percent and 2.5 percent of 
Japan's exports to the world (Table 8). The relative shares of 
Taiwan and the PRC in Japan's total exports during 1974-75 
shifted to 3.4 percent, at $1.9 billion, and 3.8 percent, $2.1 billion, 
respectively, as a result of a slowdown of the Taiwan economy 
immediately after the oil crisis as well as stepped-up purchases by 
Peking from Japan, some based on deferred payments. On the 
import side, Taiwan accounted for 2.0 percent of Japan's total 
imports from the world in 1971-73 as against Peking's 2.1 percent. 
These ratios also changed during 1974-75 to 1.5 percent for 
Taiwan and 2.4 percent for Peking, as a result of Taiwan's post-oil 
crisis economic slow-down and increased oil exports from the PRC 
to Japan (Tables 9 and 10). However, allowing for economic 
recovery in Taiwan in 1976, even a modest rate of growth of 
imports should boost Japan's exports to Taiwan at a rate at least 
commensurate with the rate of Japan's exports to Peking. This is 
likely to be true in spite of Taiwan's efforts to favor machinery 
imports from the United States over Japan in view of the large 
export surplus Taiwan enjoys in the American market. 
Table 8. Destinations of Exports (1971-73 average) 
Taiwan PRC 
In percent of In percent of 
exporting country's exporting country's 
Exporting total exports from total exports from 
Countries Value the world Value the world 
Japan 1,220.9 4.1 743.5 2.5 
ASEAN 
Indonesia 99.5• 4.6 0.4 0.0002 
(1972-73) (1973) 
Malaysia 26.3 1.3 42.0 2.0 
Philippines 27.2 2.0 4.7 
(1972-73) 
Thailand 42.9 3.7 
Singapore 26.5 1.0 29.6 1.2 
Total 1,443.3 3.7 820.2 2.1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
Annual 1969-75), pp. 138, 221, 262, 272, and 275. 
(a) Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Jakarta, Economic Data on Republic of 
Indonesia (Jakarta: July 1975). 
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Table 9. Sources of Imports (1971-73 average) 
(US $ million) 
Taiwan PRC 
In percent of In percent of 
importing country's importing country's 
Importing total imports from total imports from 
Countries Value the world Value the world 
Japan 532.9 2.0 596.2 2.1 
ASEAN 
Indonesia 76.18 3.9 38.5 2.1 
(1972-73) 
Malaysia 37.7 2.0 94.2 5.1 
Philippines 22.4 1.5 13.0 0.009 
(1972-73) 
Thailand 51.3 3.2 
Singapore 90.0 2.2 170.3 4.5 
Total 810.4 2.2 912.2 2.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
Annual 1970), pp. 169, 203, 246, 265, 280, and 321. 
• Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Jakarta, Economic Data on Republic of 
Indonesia (Jakarta: July 1975), p. 17. 
Table 10. Sources of Imports (1974-75) average) 
(US $ million) 
Taiwan PRC 
In percent of In percent of 
importing country's importing country's 
Importing total imports from total imports from 
Countries Value the world Value the world 
Japan 882.5 1.5 1,416.5 2.4 
A SEAN 
Indonesia 73.9 2.0 145.0 3.2 
(1975) 
Malaysia 77.2 2.0 172.1 4.5 
Philippines 82.7 2.3 38.9 1.1 
Thailand 76.8 2.4 7.4 2.3 
Singapore 151.8 1.7 275.3 3.3 
Total 1,458.8 1.7 2,055.2 2.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
Annual 1969-75), pp. 137, 221, 262, 272, and 275. 
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If comparison is made between Taiwan and Peking with 
respect to exports from the ASEAN countries, it can be easily seen 
from Tables 8 and 11 that, with the exception of Malaysia, all the 
other four countries exported substantially more to Taiwan than 
to the PRC during 1971-73 and 1974-75. The Malaysian exception 
was accounted for by larger PRC imports of rubber and tin, partly 
to curry political favor with Kuala Lumpur. However, Peking's 
role as a source of supply of imports to the ASEAN countries was 
larger than that of Taiwan in the case of Singapore and Malaysia 
during 1971-73, and possibly also Indonesia during 1974-75. 
Table 11. Destinations (1974-75 average) (US $ million) 
Exporting 
Countries Value 
Japan 1,914.0 
A SEAN 
Indonesia 79.5 
(1975) 
Malaysia 50.0 
Philippines 28.0 
Thailand 107.5 
Singapore 62.4 
Total 2,241.4 
Taiwan 
In percent of 
exporting country's 
total exports from 
the world 
3.4 
1.1 
1.2 
1.1 
4.4 
1.1 
2.9 
PRC 
In percent of 
exporting country's 
total exports from 
Value the world 
2,120.5 3.8 
69.8 1.7 
18.2 0.007 
2.0 0.0008 
46.0 0.008 
2,256.5 2.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
Annual 1969-75), pp. 138, 221, 262, 266, 272, and 275. 
If, as we have speculated earlier, Taiwan should increase its 
raw material imports from Southeast Asia as its economic 
expansion continues, the probability is very high that it will have 
a larger share of the exports of countries on its sea route than 
Peking. Such a situation would enhance the community of interest 
these countries will have with Taiwan. It is fortunate for all 
concerned that political-strategic considerations in this connec-
tion coincide with economic interests. From Taiwan's point of 
view, a reinforced orientation of its foreign trade toward Japan 
and Southeast Asia would have much, to recommend it in 
Taiwan's future trade policy, although other potential and actual 
trade partners should not be ignored. 
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